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THE GENETIC VIEW OF BERKELEY'S RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION.

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Geneticism, which I believe to be at once the philosophy and the psychology of the future, regards the world not *sub specie eternitatis*, but *sub specie generationis*. It recognizes both pragmatism and absolutism, and justifies each as factors in its higher synthesis. It holds that all things in life and mind will find their ultimate explanation only when all the stages of their origin are simply but correctly described, and their evolution set forth with maximal fulness. It believes that nothing that mind is or does, has been or has done in the past, or will be and will do in the future, is without its sufficient reason; that this is true of all mental products, whether they be the apparent incoherence of mania and verbigeration, or philosophical problems such as whether unperceived objects exist, whether we think of things differently from what they are, why Plato postulated good, and Spinoza substance, as their absolutes, and so on. It would subject all these themes to its own psychoanalysis, and also the study of practicalities from Kant to Schiller, James and Dewey, in order to find out the deeper meanings and their latent content. It assumes that Thorndike's meliorism, Strong's substitutionism, Pitken's world-picture, Tawney's purposive consistency, and all the newest and oldest problems of epistemology, and the present struggle back towards the *terra firma* of realism, even in religion, do not one of them say all that they mean, and some only a small part; that most of the expressions of psychic life are more or less symbolic, and that their half-concealed,

half-revealed meaning will be brought out only when we can get through and back of their form in consciousness and tell what deeper tendencies they express and how historically they came to take on their present forms. With Perry, geneticism holds that the theory of knowledge arose from postulating matter without qualities and mind without extension, and that consciousness must be reduced to a form of energy, but that this objective is only another aspect of subjective psychology. W. F. Marvin (*Syllabus of an Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 129) says, "Consciousness is nowhere, that is, it does not exist in space," "nor is it a non-extended point in space," "it is, in fact, non-spatial." And McCosh says practically the same. What relation then can it possibly have with the brain or nerves? Can it move, or can anything in it move? Is it in time?

It is frankly admitted that, so far, geneticism is little more than an ideal with even its program but partially developed, but it affords a new and lofty viewpoint from which to survey with equanimity and with a wide horizon all the conflicts of present opinion, and to give them fairly a true perspective. It can already rather completely solve some problems, although, at present, it asks a score of questions for every one it can answer. For this reason, it will not appeal to those who seek completeness, or believe that we have already arrived, or that it is noon-day rather than a very early morning hour in philosophy. Thus, it is not a view that will commend itself to those who seek finality, still less to those who have already accepted or wrought out a closed system. All these should be warned betimes that their place is not in the camp of the geneticists.

Geneticism began but recently and obscurely with a few empirical data, its view being for the most part neglected by those who wrought in the field of mind, and we were very modest. But its growth has, of late, been amazing, and far beyond the early dreams of its originators, or the knowledge of those who have neglected it. It is already beginning to read its title clear to become the chief stone of the corner, entirely ignored though it still is by most of the guild of system-builders. From the observation of simpler and higher animal forms, and of the minds and conduct of children, normal and defective, it has already come to realize that the great speculative

minds of history are but children of a larger growth, that each system is only a set of more or less carefully wrought-out returns to nature's great unwritten *questionnaire*, which, from long before the days of the Sphinx down, has always been asking what is man and his place in the world, what can he know, what should he do, how feel, how did he and all his problems arise from great Mother Nature, and what will be his end? To the geneticists, all philosophemes, whether of children or adults, wise or otherwise, are only more or less precious data for studying human types of soul, temperament, diathesis and disposition.¹ Hence the geneticist can never be a materialist or an idealist, a dogmatist or a positivist, or any of the rest, because to him each is legitimate and has its own justification, and expresses a type of character and mental tastes and opinions, which it is his task thoroughly to know and sympathetically appreciate and, in the end, harmoniously synthetize into a new and greater harmony, nothing less than the symphony of man-soul itself. Those who need to do so may still make the personally-conducted and well-traveled tour through Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Kant, viewing the absolute idealism of the theory of knowledge, the best lesson of which is the realization that every psychic bane produces its own antidote or antiseptic, in this case, the new realism of the immediate intuitionists like Stumpf and, in a different way, Mach and Bergson; while others may prefer Schurman and the old short circuit of the Scotch philosophy (Reid and Stewart) of common sense, which bars this *détour*.

The epistemological microbe is most infectious at the very dawn of the teens, as so many studies have shown. At no age is the mind so prone to sudden and spontaneous obsessions of the question-mania regarding ultimate things. The collections of childish queries and speculations upon these themes should be very suggestive to philosophers. Like childish distempers, however, all these insistent questionings as to what knowledge and reality really are are innocuous and leave a very wholesome immunizing agency behind them, unless they come too

¹ As an early illustration of this tendency, see "Visualization as a Chief Source of the Psychology of Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley and Hume," by Alexander Fraser. *Am. Jour. of Psy.* Dec., 1891. Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 230-247. Also his "The Psychological Foundation of Natural Realism." *Ibid.* April, 1892. Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 429-450.

late in life, when they are much more severe and the effects more lasting and harder to recover from.

Thus, while the geneticist yields not even to the metaphysician and epistemologist in his appreciation of the great philosophic systems, he regards them in a very different light. He sees in none of them ultimate or eternal truth, but considers them as expressions of two things: *First*, of a certain age, race and nation. Not one of these systems could possibly have been developed in any other time or environment. Thus, like the ancient prophets each has always a primarily historical and never a scientific value. Their authors do not address us or our time, but others of a very different one. This is the new, historic, versus the old dogmatic and partisan view, which since Zeller and Fischer has been progressively recognized. Discipleship takes us out of our own age into that of one that has passed and gone. Many of the problems and issues that inspired both methods and conclusions of the great classical writers are simply dead from atrophy, or they are settled; and it is robbing the grave to resurrect them, save as an academic exercise in the history of thought and culture.

The *second* determining element in the old systems is the personality of the philosopher himself, for his biography is always the other key to his scheme of things. Idealists, epistemologists, dogmatists, empiricists, and all other schools, are some more, some less, temperamental as well as creedal. Philosophers have been always partisan, criticizing and rejecting those of other sects. Each interprets the universe according to his own individuality and is not content, like scientific men, to contribute a tiny brick to the same vast temple others are building. To the geneticists, these schools and creeds must always be studied judiciously, comparatively, sympathetically, but none of them can ever possibly be regarded as a finality. Each represents a species of the genus, "man of culture." A philosophy is the very acme of self-expression, as science often is of self-abnegation and subordination. There is no other field, not even literature or art, in which a man of education can vent himself with more self-abandon over so wide an area, and can choose his own periscope almost anywhere in it. He cannot be a specialist, but must be a generalist. He alone can follow his own thought freely, fearlessly, wherever it may lead him, weaving into it any color or patterns that seem to him good,

provided only he weave a careful or well-wrought picture. More than any other writer's, a philosopher's opinions are matters of his own taste, which no amount of disputation can change. If expression be the supreme luxury, the speculative philosopher attains this felicity of complete self-indulgence in his own opinions most completely. To be carefully explained by posterity, has been called the highest criterion of success in authorship, and we may add that, to explain the philosopher psychologically, is one of the chief new duties which our science now owes to the great speculative minds of the past. For geneticism, they all represent what Hegel characterizes as an animal kingdom of mind. They challenge us to study their types. No other intellects have ever blossomed so fully, none written so confessionally or revelatorily of what is in man's soul. *In vino veritas*, that is, men are all drunk with the spirit of truth and the passion to utter it, to show forth their inmost soul, only we must have the wit to do much interpretation. Psychological criticism thus must go back of what these systems say, in order to find all or most that they mean. They thought that they expressed certain things in certain ways. We shall find that they expressed very different things in very different ways. We must first take the trouble of understanding their own consciousness and, to do this, must often lay bare what they would fain conceal. We must seek for a deeper motive for all they said. Their documents tell us how the world looked from beneath their own skull-pans, and we must not only vividly revive their images and sentiments, as a starting point from which to proceed to a further analysis, comparison, interpretation, diagnosis of *Anlagen*, but trace out genetic stages to their causes and motivations till we understand them far better than they could possibly understand themselves. This genetic psychology is far vaster than all systems or creeds, for these are but two of the many fields it cultivates,

Appallingly great as is this task, even it is but part, for the geneticist must also consider not only the latest twigs on the old tree of psychic life, as represented by the most cultivated adult men and women of to-day, but he must consider all phases and stages of development of mind in every animal form, with each extinct species of which a specific type of soul-life went out and was lost to the world. He must peer wherever possible into the past, list and scrutinize every vestige of

psychic adaptation from the very beginning, and everything else that may serve as a key to what is gone, so as to restore the missing links of mind wherever possible. Hence, while he must introspect to the uttermost, he must realize that what he finds in himself is only a small and fragmentary part of the entire world of mind and that objective methods and data must be his chief reliance; that he must, in a new sense, become a citizen of all times, lands and climes and the spectator of all events. He must especially be on his guard against becoming a banausic provincial solipsist in his own field or a stand-patter of any school. To be a humanist, large as the term is, is not enough.

What, for the geneticist, is the most perfect type of knowledge, and what wins man's most complete belief? It is sensation, which is also the first and oldest of all psychic processes. Seeing is believing. What sane man, with normal senses, ever really did or could doubt the great body of their deliverances? Countless generations of beings have relied implicitly on their evidence. Had they not for eons been the most trustworthy of all witnesses, no psyche would ever have been evolved and animal life without them is inconceivable. Subjectively considered, sensation is not only the primordial but the most direct and immediate of all intuitions, and has, from the first, shaped not only all vital functions but structures into conformity with and adaptation to the external world. Now, what is the essential feature in all sensation? What is its purpose and end? Not the act of perception itself, as Berkeleyans aver, but a real outer object independent of the perceiver, not his ejection, projection, or any extradition of his consciousness. If we perceive, we perceive something not ourselves. Whether it be perceived truly as it is, or in a symbolic way, every candid analysis of the act of sensation or perception finds an object over against a subject, a counterposed non-ego over against an ego. Thus, there is an ineluctable realistic basis, no matter how transformed it be, to every true perception. This bottom fact, the exceptional cases of illusions and hallucinations should no more discredit than the fact of the existence of idiots and deviates of many kinds should shock our confidence in sanity, or sickness and weakness make us doubt health and strength. For the most part, then, the senses are the most truthful of all our faculties, the creators of automatisms and habits, the sovereign

lords of behavior and conduct, the mother of mind throughout both the animal and human world. They may err, but they do so rarely or under peculiar conditions, and all errors tend to be corrected. Most of the defects philosophers are so fond of charging up against them are really faults of interpretation, showing no lack of faithful deliverances on their part. Indeed, so invincible is their testimony, that, where subjective stimuli cause false sensations, they do not need to be very often repeated to compel belief in the objective reality they falsely assert, so that, as Helmholtz says, the soundest mind can not long remain proof against habitual illusions of perception. To suspect the habitual veracity of sense thus brings panic and confusion and is due, on the part of those who stress them, either to an exceptional number of illusions in their own experience, or else to some often hidden motivation or unconscious wish which causes them to over-emphasize the exceptional fallacies of perception and to interpret sound in the light of unsound experiences, rather than conversely, as they should. Implicit belief in the senses, therefore, is the most common form of sound common sense, for there is no reality or certainty in the universe that can begin for a moment to compare with that of a thing seen, felt, or otherwise sensed. That gives us a paradigm of every other kind of reality, knowledge, and certainty, the degree of which is directly in proportion as it approximates this, which can never be suppressed. The very etymologies of every one of the terms designating the so-called higher or more complex psychic processes show how sense forms and images of the various types pervade all mental processes. Even science, according to Avenarius, grows perfect just in proportion as it formulates the universe in terms of possible sense-experience, for this makes us able to think the world with the greatest economy or conservation of mental energy.

Conversely, whatever we try to take out of the sense-world loses reality just as far as we succeed in the attempt. To deny space relations of extension and position to *anything*, even God, soul, thought, is to rob it of its most essential reality, and condemn it to lead a hovering limbo-life in the pallid realms of nominalism: it is to cut the tap-root of genuine belief in its existence, because everything that truly is, even mind, thought, soul, God, is somewhere, although we may know nothing as to its position, size or shape. For the geneticist, thus, sense is

the foundation of everything in the psyche; and one of his great problems is to trace, step by step, how the world of mind evolved from this basis. To impeach its witness, is, therefore, to make psychology and philosophy air-plants striking no roots into mother-earth, and to rob them of the most essential criteria of truth. It condemns philosophizing to do its business with a paper of currency of promises to pay, when there is no specie basis.

This being so, the geneticist who must explain, evaluate and find partial truth in all things, deviative as well as normative, must tell us why, for instance, Berkeley and the subjective idealists came to proclaim sense-perception bankrupt, and must weigh their evidences, must ask what was the underlying motive of their elaborated solipsism, their rejection of what is so cardinal and inexpugnable. What was the deeper faith that underlay their honest doubts, for that these always exist, the geneticist, for whom there is no error, must always assume.

For this new psychoanalysis, despite the little known of his early family life, the case of Berkeley offers us, on the whole, a most favorable example. His biographer, Fraser, speaks of his "singularly emotional disposition." Irish, his fervid genius may in many points well be compared with that of his great Irish precursor, Scotus Erigena, the morning-star of medieval, as Berkeley became of modern, scholasticism. The dreamery and imaginings of this "romantic boy," "distrustful at the age of eight years," and "so by nature disposed for new doctrine," as he says of himself, were matured by a country-home near an old castle, such as fired the genius of Walter Scott, till at the age of eleven he was sent to the nearest town-school at Kilkenny, the Eton of Ireland, where he spent the four most susceptible years of pubescence. "Precocious," well-prepared and finding the curriculum easy, there is a tradition, says Fraser, that "he fed his imagination with the airy vision of romance and thus weakened the natural sense of the difference between illusion and reality." He was also very susceptible to the charms that nature had lavishly spread about this region, which he loved to explore and to feel all its thanatopsis and other mystic moods, and the inevitable provocation to speculate as to its meaning and man's origin, and place in all the mighty scheme. How deeply he could appreciate this is seen

in one of the very earliest of his writings, an account of a visit to the cave of Dunmore near by.

At the age of fifteen, in 1700, he went to Trinity College, Dublin, where, some three years later, he began his lately discovered (printed in 1871) *Common-place Book*, kept for years, which gives us exceptional insight into the seethings of his mind. In it he communes with himself, apparently with no thought that any other eye would see these jottings. In this precious, almost confessional document, we see that the reveried gropings and obstinate questioning so germane to childhood, as it begins to merge into manhood and realize things in a new way, had not in his case been left to fade into the light of common day, but that he had mused and pondered over them with rare fascination. His enthusiasm and perfervid fancy teemed with queries concerning the true meaning of reality in the world of sense. We find here a consuming desire to promulgate a new doctrine which should "make short work of all the supposed powers of dead unconscious matter;" should banish perplexity and contradiction, sap the roots of religious scepticism, and bring a new harmony of science and theology. All these centered in his new-old scepticism concerning things we see and touch, or the *visibilia* and the *tangibilia*. He would make a great *coup*, which should bring consternation to the critics of religion, by his *tu quoque* argument that students of nature also work by faith, knowing the material world only by a system of symbols slowly evolved and associated in ways that could be subjected to a most destructive criticism. During his thirteen years at Dublin, which he left at twenty-eight, this Guy Fawkes of naïve natural realism had pretty well matured and had scrappily laid his plot against common sense, but had done it in the sweetest unconsciousness of all the negative implications that ever since have flowed from it. He would impeach and discredit the most ancient trusted oracles of mankind by a flank movement against the critics of transcendentalities, by showing that matter too was really immaterial, was only a practical postulate on the plane of sense, which must be, in fact, everywhere accepted by an act of faith. He would subjectify even the objects of perception, and make each individual the creator of his own physical world, and bring to Modern Europe the old Indie psychosis of *maya*, which looks out upon nature as only a phantasmagoria of magic-lantern effects projected upon the *tabula rasa* of time

and space, the objective reality of which latter it never occurred to him to doubt. Things are only phenomenal; *noumena* are spiritual, higher, surer, truer, in fact, the only actual realities. Though not deeply concerned for things ecclesiastical, caring little for the conventional orthodoxy of his day, he was heart and soul a religionist, and most of all concerned to vindicate the ways of God in nature and mind, and to subject science to faith. Long he pondered the ways and means of the most effective propaganda of these doctrines, so that they should bring most startling consternation into the camp of the scientists, whose claims constituted the chief atmosphere of academic Dublin, which he found saturated and fermenting with them, for nowhere in Britain was there any center of scientific interest and activity to be compared at that time with Trinity, which had so lately been awakened to the new light.

To a youth of Berkeley's genius, whose mind was still full of the dreams of boyhood, all this was stimulating to the point of exhilaration and yet baffling to all his deeply-rooted and hitherto fondly-cherished tendencies. He was charmed, yet recusant; drawn, but repelled. Where was the place, and what was the justification, in an atmosphere so charged and saturated with science, for a purely idealistic diathesis, closing in about which the world of law and necessity brought almost claustrophobic symptoms? He could not, like the more prosaic Lotze, whose soul was long perturbed by the same antithesis, admit that the mechanical view of the world was everywhere present, but everywhere subordinate, for this would imply compromise, and of this the Berkeleyan type of mind never knows even the meaning. Ordained at the age of twenty-four, preaching occasionally, he had given hostages to the Christian religion, and his impetuous temperament, chafed as it was, stormed at by free-thinkers like Tolland, John Browne, Molyneux (in his new dioptries), Locke, Newton, Hobbes, Descartes, Boyle and the great Greeks (for he became Greek professor at the age of twenty-two), his realization that "things are thinks," to use Bronson Alcott's expression, brought thus a great revolution, and also a profound peace to his perturbed soul. This was all new and most stimulating to him. He felt that his own view would clear up "all those contradictions and inexplicable, perplexing absurdities that have in all ages been a reproach to human reason." He knew too that there was "a mighty set of men" who would oppose

and vilipend him, but he vows to cling to his transforming thought. With it, he says, he has "a heart of ease," knowing that things of sense are ideas, a thesis, as Fraser says, "not intelligible to his contemporaries and immediate successors, and he had only an imperfect consciousness of it himself." He sought with the greatest enthusiasm to restore spiritual beliefs and higher ideals of life in a materialistic age. He was really "against his own intention, opening the door for the most thoroughgoing scepticism and agnosticism ever offered to the world."

This made Berkeley the *enfant terrible* of modern philosophers, the arch-sceptic of all sceptics, casting doubt upon the most fundamental belief of the world. Never has there been a philosophy so purely one of temperament and so infectious to those of like diathesis. To the sedentary aloofness from practical affairs of academic life and isolation greater for speculators than for those in any other chairs, he added his own visionary temperament, his theological bias, and the special incitement of finding himself in the midst of the hottest battle so far waged between science and faith, where, with lines closely drawn and combatants in serried array on either side, he would be a new David coming forth with his sling against the great Philistine, science. But here the simile ends, for his sling did chief execution in his own ranks, which have ever since been more discomfited than have either the scientists or the every-day naïve realists. His great secret of visual and tactual immaterialism consisted in applying what Locke had said of the secondary to the primary qualities of matter, and it was both inspired and used as a method of causing physical things to vanish and to reveal in their places the eternal spirit and universal reason. The early stages of his writings were negative, while later the dominating motive was more in evidence. We live and move and have our being in God. We realize this "intellectually, philosophically and practically by assimilation to God who is reason and spirit and reality, so supreme" that, in His presence, the sensible world fades away and only things unseen are really eternal.

Thus we find the underlying motive deeper than his own consciousness, a bias probably never realized by himself. His all-dominant wish was to exalt the cause of faith and reason above, and at the expense of, that of sense, not content like Paul to postulate a new special organ of transcendentalities, to

parallel the domain of the sensory, thus giving us a dual world order; not quite a visionary, he yet believed the pipe-dreams of his own imagination until this faculty had become so vivid as to claim the same credence as sense. Like Swedenborg, he was satisfied with the mystic and absorbed contemplation of things divine till the physical world seemed empty and forgotten, as to the ecstatic newer Platonists. To these views he turned with special fondness in his old age. Incapable of the unique ontological method of Parmenides or Spinoza in resting everything on the deductive or mathematical elaboration of an absolutist's creed, his pugnacious Irish disposition impelled him as Philonous to carry aggressive warfare into the Hylic Court with the new weapon that turned the burden of proof on his adversaries and opened a new mine of psychological veins of doubt beneath their very feet, by convincing all who put their trust in sense of a credulity if not a superstition even grosser than that which scepticism had charged up against religionists. Thus, by breaking the bonds of sense, human might be sublimated into divine thought as in his later writings, especially in *Alciphron* and *Siris* he seeks to do positively. Even Micromegas on the dog star, with his thousand senses, got no satisfaction, but only growing perplexity from them. Thus, this author of the philosophy of a recrudescent Hindu *maya* gave the world a shock, which for subsequent students in the field brought actual disenchantment with nature by tarnishing its pristine charm and immediateness, and those who felt its full force and then succeeded in facing it down, returned to the world somewhat as convalescents, after grave disease, look out through the sickroom windows upon the palpitating life of man, while they muster strength again to face the world with courage and resolution as recuperative agencies bring them back to it again. They have trod the way of death far enough toward the end to have lost their way back for a time, but this experience was necessary, and was prescribed, in fact, not only as giving immunity against all less mortal microbes of doubt, but because those sick nigh unto death may return to life with a more vivid sense of the reality of things unseen beyond the veil.

His Bermuda scheme occupied a prominent, if not the chief, place in his mind from the age of thirty-six to forty-six. Realizing, from his travels on the continent and his life in London,

the corruption of Europe, which, to his pure soul, seemed to predict ruin, his ardent social idealism led him to plan a college on the Bermuda Islands, 600 miles from land, where both the sons of British colonists and native Indians from the continent of America could be educated. Long he schemed to raise money for his Utopian institution on these beautiful summer islands, to which his fancy gave a halo of romance. When Swift privately married Stella, and the unhappy Vanessa, whom he had never seen, bequeathed to Berkeley her fortune of some 3,000 pounds, this asset and the charter and grant from Parliament, together with private subscriptions, seemed to him to warrant the realization of his hopes, and so, in 1829, he landed, not at the Bermudas, but at Newport, where he began his bucolic life, wrote and waited for the special grant of 30,000 pounds which had been voted for his project, but which Walpole never sent. Here too he wrote his *Alciphron*, which marked a distinct advance from his phenomenological standpoint to an actual hypostatization of Plato's ideas, and here he inspired Samuel Johnson and Jonathan Edwards. But, after nearly three years, he sailed for home, a disappointed man, never having seen the Bermudas nor his college, but consoled by his transcendental speculations. In America, he charmed everyone, as he always did, and gave a great impulse to metaphysical speculation to the few scholars here inclined that way. He had found consolation for the disenchantments of immaterialism in a greatly augmented sense of the reality of the supernal world, where alone *noumena* were found. All phenomena were only media through which we discern the intelligent and divine spirit. Religion alone is the perfection of man. Indeed, we can see God even more truly than we can see nature or the soul of our friends. Reason is begotten of faith. All nature is but a revelation of God. Thus Berkeley sought to regenerate the New World by his new idealism. In the crude practical civilization of this country, as it was in his day, where the chief energies of men were directed to the conquest of nature, the enthusiastic espousal of his crude idealism by the chosen few was a contrast effect of reaction from a materialistic civilization, and suggests the strange success of Dr. William Harris' propaganda of Hegelism in the raw culture of St. Louis, thirty years ago. Pioneer-life complemented itself by crass religious creeds, while the few more thoughtful

minds turned to a crass philosophy which was the diametrical opposite of their practical lives. Thus extremes met, and this effect was heightened by the fact that Berkeley's socialistic ideas were favored by the callow Utopian democratic dreameries of our pre-Revolutionary days.

This was the most romantic of all romantic missionary enterprises, and might almost be compared with the South Sea Bubble and the tulip-mania.

In remote rural Cloyne, where, after a period of controversy, the last eighteen years of his life, from forty-nine on, were spent, when famine and fever had ravaged the region, and his own health was impaired, he sought a panacea for all bodily, as hitherto he had for all mental and social ills, and found it in tar-water, and his *Siris* or chain of aphorisms on this subject was written and became at once by far the most popular of all his works. The culminating thought of his life was of a universal agent, the one true remedy of remedies, the great reality revealed though concealed by sense. This nauseous drug, now shrunk to a very humble place in the medical pharmacopoeia, became the only drug in his household, and about it he spun a system of philosophical halos. It became the fashion, and factories were established to make it. It was to open a new era to the world. Though itself a phenomenal drug, it had behind it the infinite source of life, and those charged with it would make unprecedented advances, physically, mentally and morally. It thus became, as his biographer says, the ruling passion of his closing years, and yet he slowly sank into melancholy, a baffled ontologist.

In all this, his type of reason was somewhat paralleled twenty years ago by Brown-Séquard and his disciples' advocacy of testicular extracts, which many savants here and in Europe used with great confidence in their amazing rejuvenating effects. Unlike modern American idealistic professors, who left others to draw the ineluctable practical consequences of their creed in the theory and practice of faith-cure, he did not hesitate to enter the therapeutic field himself. If there be a universal sin-cure, as Christianity teaches, which all must experience to be saved, there must also be a universal bodily panacea. If there be one supreme creative energy, why not a sustaining and curative one? No doubt tar-water—ten grams of tar-water to ten grams of faith—did work cures, but so can almost anything

else, provided the faith be not wanting, and provided the remedy be not particularly harmful. But how sedulously explain that it was not the tar-water itself, for that was only phenomenal, but the great principle of life back of it which brought the cures? Here we psychoanalysts find a remarkable recrudescence in Berkeley's mind of the transubstantiation psychosis which the Medieval Church experienced in the doctrine that the bread and wine of the Sacrament were made into the veritable body and blood of Our Lord. As the one regenerated the soul, so the other did the body, not by its phenomenal material, the pitch and resin, but by its inner principle, the vital life, which expressed the life-giving energy of God, who had singled it out and imparted to it a unique and special power. Berkeley sought no patent for his new medicine, although perhaps no patent medicine was ever so effectively advertised on so high a plane.

Siris won the author, then but little known outside of England and her colonies, immediate and world-wide fame, and was translated into many languages. That and his further writings on tar-water were the largest of his works, save *Alciphron*, and by far the most scholarly, with allusions to a wide range of philosophical literature, which was generally lacking in his other writings. Very many, if not most, of his contemporaries knew him by this treatise only, which is now almost entirely ignored by both the history of philosophy and epistemologists. Those who treat his *Theory of Vision*, *Human Knowledge*, *Alciphron*, *Philonous* and *Hylas* seriously, usually wish his *Siris* forgotten, but to the geneticists, it is precious and indispensable, and it absorbed the chief energies of nearly a decade and a half of his maturest years. In it he not only hypostatized ideas, as he had begun to do in the *Alciphron*, but passed from the standpoint of Plato almost to that of the Neo-Platonists. Tar-water is charged with pure empyrean fire. It is not only the soul of all vegetable life, but the theoretical fire of the thermal principle. It is the soul of the world, which will go out when the world cools off. It is the principle of life, which the plant bequeaths to the animal world. Thus, the chain passes from the physical to the spiritual. Deity is spiritualized tar-water, a universe of ideas realized in living persons, they and it derived from absolute being. It is the link between physics and metaphysics, medicine and theosophy. It is some-

times compared with Plato's *Timaeus* for unintelligibility. The type of emanationism it represents is rather more Heraclitic than Alexandrian.

The tar-water psychosis in Berkeley was an expression of the unconscious wish of his soul to fill the great void which existed in almost every great and thoughtful mind till evolution, now supplemented by geneticism, came. Tar-water was more than his "flower in the crannied wall" to start with, and it became in the end the embodiment of his one and all. It was to him all that ether means to the physicist, and protoplasm to the biologist, noumenalized. In the beginning was tar-water. It was the primal source and therefore also the regenerator of life; the supreme quintessence of the alchemist, sifted out of nature by pine and fir trees, the most precious bequest of the plant-soul. It was the supreme type and symbol too of salvation and of deity. As the great and good before Christ, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and the rest were said to have anticipated the great salvation of the cross, so Berkeley by this chain of aphorisms filled the void that yawned and ached, consciously or unconsciously, in nearly every soul, before evolution came to fill it and he gained by his tar-water dreameries all that he could of the wished fulfilment or the lasting satisfaction which the genetic view of the world always has and always will give those who know what is to be known, and put their faith in and cast their burdens upon it, for the sake of its great uplift. This was the latent content of his patent emanationistic dream. This is the mother-lye of nature, and, at the same time, the web of thought spun from nature to nature's God. "Ohne Phosphor (=tar-water), kein Gedanke." It was more than Pflüger assigns to cyanogen. Indeed, it was more than the essential ingredient in the sacramental blood and wine of the soul-communion, for it regenerates the body as well as the soul. Thus idealists always take amazing liberties with the world of things as they are, but Berkeley outdoes them all, for his brooding had bred a profound sense of the unreality of facts. Otherwise, he never could have gone against them so naively with such a flimsy tissue of speculations. No philosopher is so like the Baconian spider who ejects a mesh of web from its spinnerette on the top of a picket and then floats from the air suspended by it. For subjective idealists there can be no criterion of truth, save the fitting coherence of ideas, one with

another. Here there is no logical consistency, but only the crassest syncretism of *quod libet* eclecticism. The same ingenuity might have made any object, element, or drug whatever, as credible a catholicon. Not a living soul ever did or could accept his system, not even the Hermetics, and Fraser himself is only painfully apologetic. Many delusions of the madhouse have been more systematized. Thus the time has surely come when we must ask whether these sickly vagaries of Berkeley, which haunted all his maturer years, may not be used as a wholesome admonition to youth to cleave close to reality, to wreak the fullest intensity of belief upon the world as it is to sense, lest they too cripple their own souls, and be left to believe any lie that speculative fancy, which has filled the world with metaphysical ghosts, may suggest. This is the Nemesis of immaterialism. That Berkeley's soul still goes marching on in the academic world to-day and is not relegated to the sibilant limbo of mere historicity is not creditable to our philosophic sanity, for, measured by higher modern standards of normality, his soul and career are simply pathological, although as a case for psychoanalysis, he will long be of unique interest. It is not therefore ghoulish to dig up and mutilate even a decent corpse like his, if it lies right athwart what has become a most traveled highway, where it trips and hips most and maims a few who traverse it. He wished posterity to judge him chiefly by his tar-water philosophy. We certainly cannot ignore it. When any professor to-day draws about himself the awful and inviolable circle of academic freedom, I would pause long before invading it. I would reflect how, in Germany, Fechner was allowed to teach that plants and planets were besouled, that the psyche of the sun and moon were regnant deities; how Bauer thought that the Gospels were myths, when myth had a very low connotation as mere fancy; how Zöllner, the great Leipzig astronomer, lectured on slate-writing tricks to demonstrate spiritism; how Kirschmann was allowed to teach red socialism right across the street from the most absolute monarch west of Russia, but I would not forget that Hygeia is a goddess on whose shrine authority is compelling us more and more to make oblations of even liberty — personal, social corporate, academic — and Berkeleyism with its languishing mental involutions brings such a unique blight and murrain, and raise the question of mental and moral hygiene; and there are

others in the history of philosophy that need this new, higher criticism and censorship on the grounds of academic sanitation. Eddyism is the inevitable logical consequence of New England transcendentalism, and Emmanuelism is the conclusion of academic epistemology. The authors of these systems of thought did not have the courage or the practical efficiency to draw conclusions, but left that to Mrs. Eddy and Worcester. Berkeley had the courage to apply his system.

Alciphron or the Minute Philosopher, contains seven dialogues, written in America, which are chiefly devoted to an attack upon British free-thinkers, deists, theists and atheists. Lysicles stands for a light-hearted worldling Mandeville, who taught that private vices were public benefits. Against Shaftesbury's reduction of conscience to good taste and virtue to beauty, Euphrator shows that aesthetics is not sufficient to inspire virtue or morality, but that we must have faith in God, whose existence we know by the same evidences that we know that the souls of our friends exist.

The *Analyst*, which followed, attacked infidel mathematicians and astronomers and the minute philosophers who dealt in infinitesimals rather than men of the world. It sought to show that force was as inconceivable as grace. The doctrine of continuity and fluctuations, the basis of calculus, he thought very minute and philosophy resting on presuppositions that were quite as much credulity as faith. His antagonism was specially directed against the astronomer Halley who could not accept the hypothesis of God because he could find no place for him in the universe.

Thus, to go back early in his life, when man is normally in the closest touch with his environment in nature, Berkeley committed himself to the hyperidealistic creed that degraded nature to a mere set of symbols, making a great negation before he had wrought out the great affirmation which always and only can justify denial. Berkeley's mature and later life furnishes us with the spectacle of a pure, ardent, ingenuous soul that had early mutilated itself, and ever after was seeking consolation in the spiritual for losses in the physical world, and this is the motive with which his philosophy is still taught. To wean from nature, impels man to take refuge in something higher. Full consolation, however, Berkeley never found, as may have

happened with a more abstract thinker like Spinoza and one with less ties to and sympathy with mundane things. His later sadness was that of an ontologist who, despite all his subsequent findings in the transcendent world, felt himself baffled and defeated. He, too, felt the malign spell of the spirit and method he had conjured up, which has paled life in so many since. How can one agnostic to the real world of sense be truly gnostic to spiritual verities? He did not pass through nature to nature's God, but found Him by turning away from nature as effectively as anchorites renounced the world.

Also, genetically, affirmations precede rather than follow denials. His scepticism was the most radical in all the history of philosophy. To be sure it was the *jeu d'esprit* of the lush, life-loving, gifted adolescent, sentimentally a perfervid lover of nature, and always preferring to live where her great heart beat strongest, in the country. A temperament that peculiarly needs to feel the authoritativeness of objective reality when it subjectifies it all, does experience a great and dizzying temporary exaltation, a mild inebriation, which is the great charm of epistemology, in the thought that the majestic spectacle of sky, landscape, sea, and even the works of man and the being of one's friends, are phantasmagorical evolutions of our individual selves, that all we thought to be from without is really from within the individual. This is a delusion, to some measure of which the adolescent soul is normally prone, as it breaks the chrysalis of childhood and first really looks out into the wide world of nature and man, but it is legitimate only as dreamy revery. It is a stage full of significance, but it should be evanescent, for it is only a waking dream belonging to the realm of poetry and myth, and indeed abundantly expressed in both, but not fit for prose, still less for science, the very root of which it cuts. Berkeleyan immaterialism has its place again in senescence, as a stage of its involution, for the weary soul withdrawing from earth. Its phenomena are those of renunciation. This, the long list of scientific men from Huxley to W. K. Brooks, who have been fascinated by it, after a life of devotion to nature and science, shows. The flitting introversion of youth is only like so many other things, a very faint anticipatory fore-gleam of old age, and, if intensified in early life and taken seriously, brings senescence before its time. If

we have found anything in a life's experience with philosophy better than the world of sense, then of course we turn from the latter to the former, but this withdrawal and valedictory must never be first or forced. Youthful nature need not be "sicklied o'er with this pale cast of thought," which belongs only to those who have achieved a wholesome culture, and a Ciceronian or perhaps even a Metschnikoffian old age. Subjective idealism is a kit of tools too sharp for college youth to more than handle with great circumspection. The immaterialism argument is the most desperate of all vengeancees that religion, the spiritual and ideal view of the world, has ever attempted to take upon all who in all ages have scoffed at its faith. If all its masked batteries are exploded in the youthful soul, progressive atrophy results, for it tends to wean both from aesthetic and scientific devotion to nature's form and phenomena. Thus, do the young men completely infected with it ever thereafter achieve anything worth while in either art, or science? Are they not all just at the time when they should be superlatively real and earnest, sad precocious wiseacres aloof, superior, always brandishing a few simple phrases with endless variations and chanting a theme of *vanitas vanitatum* as old as Ecclesiastes?

There is now quite a literature with many well-described cases of abnormal weakening or loss of the sense of reality and of the outer world (in Wernicke's allo-psychic field). These patients feel that all objects of sense are unsubstantial, fading, shadowy, and this brings depression, alarm and distress. Is this really a house, a tree, my brother, or am I dreaming? I can make nothing seem real. Am I awake? This is their plaint. It is especially the *visibilia* and *tangibilia* that are affected. This disorder usually begins with states of fatigue; is seen sometimes in involutions and in *dementia praecox*, and it also predisposes to these conditions. The only explanation so far suggested is that two things occur in such cases, first the muscular tension and response which sensation normally excites, and which has been the chief factor in the so-called extradition of consciousness or of sensation, is weakened or lost; and secondly, that the usual associations evoked by the act of perception are not aroused, that is, the patient does not see with all he has seen, touch with all he has touched, but this single experience is isolated from its natural complexes. F. H. Pack-

ard¹ describes a remarkable patient of his who when fatigued saw all solids as flat surfaces, as Berkeley says we all really do. In looking over this literature² I cannot find evidence of any case on record who ever read Berkeley, and he certainly never read of such cases. It would be interesting to know what both they and he would have said of each other. To him, they would have illustrated the sense of phenomenality or immaterialism, but they are mentally crippled thereby. They in turn might have felt the fears which go with this distemper allayed by finding that they had only drifted toward the position advocated by a great philosopher. But, had the perusal of his writings led them to the feeling that their senses were deluders, he would have had only their imprecations. They certainly have felt precisely what he wishes us all at least to know if not to feel, viz., the unreality of the objective world. Can we have a logical conviction that the verdicts of sense are false, without sooner or later coming to feel more or less as these patients do? Should we strive to attain this realization of unreality? Are not these patients, in fact, practical Berkeleyans, who, had they taken him in dead earnest, would thus be realizing precisely what he argues for? There may be different answers to this question, but one thing remains certain, viz., that the degree of intensity of the sense of reality of things rises and falls with the degree of muscular tension or reaction and also with the range, irradiation and vividness of association. With loss of the reality sense goes relaxation or atrophy of muscular tonus and narrowing of the breath and richness of association among the synapses, or a shrinking of the field of apperception. Thus a Berkeleyan creed must inevitably bring some loss of vigor, of the energy and fidelity of response to facts and events in the outer world. If the doubt is held to in a Pickwickian way, in the sphere of purely reasoned events, the weakening of response would lie more in the domain, not of reflexes but of deliberately planned voluntary conduct as directed toward outer reality. Again, with this distemper

¹ "The Feeling of Unreality." *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*. June, 1906. Pp. 141-147.

² Very conveniently summarized by A. Hoch. "A Review of Some Recent Papers upon the Loss of the Feeling of Reality and Kindred Symptoms." *Psy. Bull.* 1905. Vol. 11, pp. 233-241.

of mind are generally associated disorders in the somato- and auto-psyche field.

These disassociative states, with their depressive syndromes, involve retarded and weakened movements, both of body and of mind. Most tests of sensation show no defect whatever, save in a few cases, and very slight analgesia. Even ideas and feelings are dim. There is also loss of interest owing to psychasthenic lowering of self-activity. Recognition fails; parts of the body are not felt unless touched or possibly moved. The eye does not reach out; the patient does not know how things before him look when his eyes are closed, and there is a growing sense of insufficiency and aboulia with progressive agnosia. This is the precise opposite of Janet's conception of the most perfect normality, which consists in the most vital recognition of and response to present environment and the greatest absorption in it.

Just in proportion as this loses its power, the soul loses its grasp on things. From growing indifference and *nil admirari* the psyche may gradually pass to the opposite state called the *délire de négation*. In this state, the hold of presentative words is weakened and those of symbolic words increased.

Many from Aristotle down have recognized that the eye only perceives color and shade, that size, figure and motion are common to sight and touch, that rays of light converge to a focus in the eye and diverge again, inverting the image on the retina, and not a few (quoted by Fraser) before Berkeley have realized that we have to learn how to correlate and interpret the crude material of sensation and have seen the representative and symbolic character of impressions, that we never see but infer distance and that the bonds between sight and touch are knit up in early life; but all this pertains to the genetic or evolutionary history of the individual and the race. Hence, the fact that the adult immediacy of perception is acquired does not affect its validity. To consciousness itself the immediacy is indecomposable and the certainty is beyond all possibility of doubt. Philosophers have fallen into the inveterate fallacy that has been so characteristic of theologians that whatever is evolved cannot be perfect, that a unity made up of elements is not complete and that to demonstrate stages of development impairs the perfection of the product. But the legitimate inference from all Berkeley's facts on which he bases his new theory of vision

as well as all the very much we have learned since in this field is that God and nature have spent much time and made many a trial and error and effort in evolving senses that now act perfectly, instantaneously and truly and thus have been triumphantly successful and have not blundered or failed in their work. As atomism does not destroy spacial continuity, nor the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise disprove motion, so the fact that mental powers have been acquired by many tedious and intricate genetic stages does not invalidate their action. Thus in his vision-theory he is only a geneticist without knowing it and so was led to draw negative and destructive when he should have drawn positive and constructive conclusions. His and all analyses of perception only make the immediacy and certainty with which it now acts all the more precious and all the more trustworthy. Had Berkeley enjoyed the unimpaired healthful common-sense respect for reality that characterizes men who have attained real efficiency, he never could have blown the Bermuda bubble, which was only a dreamer's reaction to a world not real enough to be treated with proper respect. This plan has always been thought to be one of the wildest and weirdest of all schemes in the whole history of education. Had Berkeley not been sickened, like the medieval alchemists, by drinking his own elixir, he could never have evolved his almost lunatic creed concerning tar-water. He, doubtless, believed in this as profoundly as he believed in the external world, and probably far more so, but with the weakening of his sense of everything in the allo-psychic field, he had no criterion of truth, and so, because he believed in tar-water, that was the nostrum of all nostrums. It needs only a slight psychoanalysis of Berkeley's mind to show that his creed both expressed and had eaten into his life, most of which was spent in rural isolation, as if practical realities rather repelled him, making his mind his own kingdom, and like Descartes, occasionally coming into the great world to launch some scheme so fantastic that had it not been made plausible by a simple, attractive personality, great persuasive power and scholarly ingenuity, would have sent those who held it to the madhouse with delusions of greatness. This distemper often goes with disorders in the somato- and auto-psychic spheres, that is, the patient's notion of the reality of his own body and of his inmost ego is impaired, and so, the self in its psycho-physic aspect suffers. Whether this

tendency is logically or psychologically associated in the field of philosophy with loss of outer reality, we shall discuss affirmatively in the case of Hume, and show how, while Berkeley's self had been unduly exalted, that of Hume had been unduly mortified, and that his denial of cause and self was directly favored by tendencies and experiences in his own life.

It was Hume (*Treatise of Human Nature*, 1739 and *Inquiries*, 1748) who read only Berkeley's early sceptical writings, and who would have abhorred his positive religious views, who, if he did not save the Berkeleyan negative way of thought from progressive oblivion, developed it with a vigor of thought far greater than that of Berkeley, and lent to it the influence of his name, which shone with a wider luster. It was Hume who made Berkeleyism an integral part of the history of philosophy. Hume's chief motive was to weaken the hold of theological thought, rather than to strengthen it, so that, even if Berkeley contributed anything that strengthened the religious faith of mankind, Hume used Berkeley's prime principle far more effectively to upset faith. Indeed, Hume almost saved Berkeley from being a joke. Moreover, was it not significant that Fraser, at the *morturi salutamus* age of eighty, edited Berkeley almost as his valedictory to life, as if saying "Farewell, vain world, I'm going home." Geneticists see all three dimensions of life, never forgetting the temporal perspective, as even experimenters are now prone to do. For psychoanalysis trivial and undetermined details are often graver than those of seemingly serious import. Geneticists believe that philosophy is the love and pursuit of wisdom, and may even prefer its pursuit to possession, and do not feel compelled to decide even between parallelism and interaction.

Can man accept only so much that is given from without? Are there more or less fixed quanta of *credibilia*, whether percepts, facts or faith? Is the faculty of belief easily over-taxed, so that elimination at either end of the scale that connects sensuous and spiritual intensifies absorption in and docility to the other? Must we put out either the inner or the outer eye in order to see more clearly with the other? Does active doubt in the world of metaphysics or of physics depend on apperception of or quickened interest in the other? Is the carrying power of the soul for sense weakened, if we practice it for spiritual

things, and *vice versa*, as we often conceive reason and faith to be rivals, one flourishing at the expense of the other? Must we specialize in cleaving to the one and rejecting the other? If this be so, can we not say that Berkeley inverted the natural order by turning from sense before he had felt the natural impulse which had, in every thinker of the past, who has grown negligent of sense, given him the only normal motivation to do so, viz., absorption in metaphysical or spiritual verities? They have never scuttled the ship of sense before they have been well established with all their belongings on the ship of faith. They have become denizens of the higher before they forswore their allegiance to the lower kingdom. They have built secure heavenly mansions before they vacated the earthly tenements of sense. They have not burned this world in order that their homelessness here might impel them to seek a higher one.

Finally, no subjective analysis of the process of seeing and touching can ever reveal anything but a simple, immediate, unitary act of direct intuition. Berkeley's analysis is essentially not subjective, but objective. It regards nerves, brain processes, conjectural developmental associations, observations on those restored to sight, babies, etc., and only by this method can the act of perception appear to be complex or in any way accessible to doubt. Introspection can never doubt that e.g. if we see a stick, we could put forth our hand and touch it. If we knew nothing of the anatomy and physiology of the eye and central nervous system, or of abnormalities, we normal adults could never possibly even distinguish between *visibilia* and *tangibilia*. The Berkeleyan procedure, therefore, is an objective construction, according to which a series of sense images of what might and approximately does go on in the brain, which from the standpoint of psychology is only an abstraction, is taken inward and used to confuse thought. It is an alien point of view, imported from the objective into the very different subjective sphere. Otherwise, we could never conceive that a sensation or perception could occur without a real outer cause, independent of it and persisting, indifferent as to whether it was perceived or not. Thus, the psychologist, if he remain true to his own consciousness, will always be able to see that things perceived are really outer things. Though I may not know all about their meta-sensuous nature, they are external and inde-

pendent of myself. To deny this, means to impair the foundations of the very idea of causation and of the ego, both of which find their best paradigms in the perceptive process.

The *New Theory of Vision* wrecks youth and leaves ingenuous souls floating *in gurgite vasto*. The wreckers thus have them at their mercy. Euclid rests back on a more primitive eye-geometry, which it amplifies and confirms. But Berkeleyism rests only upon the dreamy revery of fatigue, and daily life, to say nothing of serious science, is its standing refutation.

SATAN AND HIS ANCESTORS, FROM A PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINT.

PART II. RISE, GROWTH AND DEATH OF SATAN.

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INTRODUCTION.

From the brief sketch of Satan, and some of his ancestors and contemporaries, one sees what a powerful influence the Devil has had on human kind. Many times his attributes have been contradictory and not well understood by his believers. He has often assumed the guise of pleasing forms, and has even been called God; but something diabolical has swayed all lands. What is back of this Devil-psychosis? Surely such a world-wide belief has some foundation. It is not the purpose of psychology to investigate the historicity of his existence, except in so far as it touches the experience out of which that belief arose. G. A. Coe says: "Anything that has taken a strong hold of man has a reason for existing." (13, p. 100.) It is our purpose to form some conclusions regarding the Devil from this standpoint.

FREUDIAN THEORY.

Freud believes that most of our thought-processes go in the foreconscious (*das Vorbewusste*). These can be called up at will. In addition to these, he says, there are certain complexes in the unconscious proper (*das Unbewusste*) which cannot be voluntarily called up. They never present themselves in their normal way, but appear as incongruous ideas expressed in dreams, lapses, etc. He holds that these complexes were once pleasurable in the early life of the child, but that the energy-relations of the psyche have changed so that they would be very unpleasant, if they became conscious now. He postulates a censor to keep these in the unconscious field. This is less vigilant at certain times, and the complex comes into consciousness, but only in a distorted form. It takes this circuitous route and apparently different form to protect itself. It must not

become conscious as it is, for the mental state is wholly different from that of the earlier years in which the complex was repressed. So, to avoid mental pain, it takes the line of least resistance, and seizes on some insignificant later experience and makes it the predominant element in the dream or working state of certain neuroses.

Around this recent experience the censor weaves in the threads of the complex, making it a blind, as it were, by which to let off this accumulated energy without permitting consciousness to be bothered with the unpleasantness its becoming re-known would entail.

Besides this change of psychic accent (*Verschiebung*), there is another process known as condensation (*Verdichtung*), which makes the ensuing dream more complicated. A single idea, obtained from recent experiences, may be made the burden-bearer of many and varied repressed ideas.

The factor of change to the opposite also aids the censor in presenting the disagreeable idea in pleasing terms. As in later dreams, and in real life, children are very solicitous for their parents' welfare, which was an opposite tendency to the real complex caused by the child's becoming aware he must not dislike the parent.

More direct and far easier to psychoanalyze is symbolic substitution, as, for instance, on the day previous to a dream, the patient may see something that reminds his unconscious complex of a similar state of affairs, and, however incongruous it would appear to us, it is made the principal or manifest content in the dream. The latent content can be found by a skilful psychoanalyst by retracing some of these steps.

Freud bases his theory of dreams being the fulfilment of repressed wishes almost wholly on the early sex-life of the child. He argues that sex plays a greater part in the early life of the child than we have imagined. He believes that sex-satisfaction is obtained on the body of the child as in thumb-sucking, etc., and, in addition, there is an external sex-attraction, which is first felt toward the mother. He doesn't make this any unholy or repulsive thing, but a perfectly legitimate work of nature. It seems to him to be necessary for the sexual development of the child. There would naturally arise an enmity toward the parent of the opposite sex, and a wish that he were dead, which, to the child's untrained mind, would only mean that

he be taken away, so he himself might be supreme in his mother's love. Of course, this affection, expressed toward his mother, and by her toward him, is the only shape his sex thoughts take. Perhaps back of it, and unknown to him, lies the real sex-attraction, which, when only dimly realized, becomes a disagreeable thought. This censor now comes to his aid, and represses it so completely that he could never know he experienced such, except for the psychoanalyst.

Freud suggests that this same psychoanalysis could be applied to myths. From an evolutionary standpoint, the child repeats the life of the race, so, why may not many of our myths be so analyzed?

It is my purpose to apply such, in an empirical way, to the idea of the Devil. This, to be sure, is a very complex problem, and my deductions at most can be theoretical only and mere guess work at times. Psychoanalysis is a new field to me, and I hope that any deduction that is too strained may be excused on these grounds.

Using race as a sociological unit, may it not have forgotten many processes analogous to those of the individual? May not its horizon have broadened and its consciousness *in toto* have found certain ideas unpalatable? If so, in an analogous way this same censor repressed them in its life, and the Devil, could be, in Freud's own language, as regards the individual, "the created output in a sublimated manifestation of various thwarted and repressed wishes of which it is no longer conscious."

The race has not meant to create a Devil, any more than we have meant to dream bad dreams. He has been a necessary construction, and, like the dream, an outlet for otherwise nauseating conscious thoughts. There has been a change of psychic accent, a condensation, a change to the opposite and symbolic interpretation here, as well as in the individual, to save itself.

To be sure, not all race-repressions have been from sexual causes; but, as these seem to be most potent in Freud's psychoanalyses, I shall take them up first. Many of the Devil's present characteristics cannot at all be connected with sex, in view of our present knowledge, yet the reader must again be reminded that the problem is complex and psychoanalyses new; doubtless, if better understood, sexual motives could be found for many characteristics not even guessed at now. Sex has been one of

the most powerful influences of the race-consciousness in its development. This is shown by the phallic element in certain religions. The adoration of the male principle of generation was a simple and natural way of expressing child-like emotions on this subject. This conception was helped by ancestor-worship, which was learned from about the same cause. Sexual worship was a pure and holy thing; a simple and natural way of expressing their feelings in a primitive state. It represented life and birth; it was the most mysterious part of man's nature. Sexual pleasures were made more of by some savage peoples than now. Their circle of pleasure was more limited than with civilized man, so their grosser forms of sensuality were over-emphasized as seen in animals to-day.

PHALLIC AND SERPENT WORSHIP.

The many ancient carvings found in India, Egypt, etc., indicate rather conclusively that many of their religious ceremonies were connected directly with phallic worship. Of course, not all religions have been phallic in origin, but it has probably been a more prominent feature in those of India than has been generally believed. J. H. Rivett-Carnac, Professor Stephens, of Norway, Sir G. W. Cox, and others who have studied this subject, believe phallic worship was essentially the earliest form of religion there. The rock-carvings, the sculptures, and many later beliefs are evidence of this. The magician's staff is simply a representation of the *phallus*, which, like it, created new things. The narrow-pointed obelus (obelisk) of Egypt points clearly to this same origin. The *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, under the head of Phallicism, says that phallic emblems are found in Mexico, Central America, Peru, and in other parts of America. In Greece, phallicism, according to some authorities, was the essence of Dionysiac worship. *Chamber's Encyclopaedia* says:

"The phallus was an object of common worship throughout the nature-religions of the east. Originally, it had no other meaning than the allegorical one of that mysterious union between the male and female, which, throughout nature, seems to be the sole condition of the continuation of the existence of animated beings."

It is especially conclusive that the ancient rock-sculptures of India are crude representations of this early form of worship. Professor Stephens says of them:

“I look upon these things as late conventionalized abridgments of the Lingam and Yoni, life out of death, life everlasting—thus a fitting ornament for the graves of the departed.”

As the race advanced somewhat, and direct phallic worship became repulsive (probably because these organs were organs of discharge), it became serpent-worship. This was only a childish symbolism, and, from its similar characteristics to pure phallic worship, must be analogous to the early symbolic changes in the child.

Mr. J. H. Rivett-Carnac in “The Snake Symbol in India,” a paper published in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, states his belief that the serpent is a symbol of the phallus. He says, in speaking of the snake symbol of India, “In the Benares bazaar I once came across a splendid metal Cobra, the head erect and hood expanded, so made as to be placed around or above a stone or metal Mahadeo.” He believes the serpent worship a modified form of phallic worship, as shown by rude carvings, and itself identical with the worship of Mahadeo, or Siva, the devil of India. He speaks of the Nagpanchami, or fifth day of the moon in Sawan, as a great fête, in the city, where unusual license is indulged in, and rough pictures of snakes in all shapes and positions are sold as valentines. As this was connected with the worship of Siva, who is not a devil entirely, they must have some significance.

Such things show the race still in its infancy; the symbolism has not become very complex yet, but the transference to Siva, who has some diabolical qualities, shows a probable origin of all devil-worship.

The race has not been young as a whole; various parts have advanced and progressed while their less favored brethren have remained in the early savage state. The culture gleaned by a certain tribe has been borrowed by the less civilized so, even nations and dynasties have skipped a few of the stages. From this complex whole we can get a few of the hidden meanings.

India offers a fair example for such study. We have seen how it was the early home of practically all our religions. Ideas worked out there have been carried to Persia, Chaldea and Egypt; and thence to the early Hebrews and on down to us. So belief in Siva as an early devil, whose form was the serpent, was doubtless due to the first outcropping of a repressed wish among our Indian kinsmen.

Phallic worship was purely and simply a fulfilled wish, and the guise of the serpent-form of the same is easily seen as a childhood social attempt to repress it.

Phallic worship was also directed to the female principle. The sacred tree worship of the Assyrians points to this phase. The fruit symbolizing creation could easily have been associated with the female sex. This does not, however, seem to be connected with the ancestors of the Devil, except, perhaps, in the myth of the Garden of Eden. The fruit, as representing children, might have been the result of a symbolism. The race interpreted the results of sexual attraction for the real attraction itself. This view harmonizes some early Biblical implications, which point to the fact that Jehovah wanted Adam and Eve to be his own pure race; that he meant Eve to be only a companion to Adam; and the fall was the fact that they brought forth children who married with the daughters of the Elohim, as did Cain and Abel.

This same sexual desire, conceived of as creation and light, was perhaps transferred to the sun as Typhon in Egypt. Typhon, as the god of the Semites, was worshipped as their life-giving, creative god. It was the same identical principle as is found in earlier India. It was sex transferred to the sun. When the Egyptians conquered the Semites, Typhon became a devil. We have seen already in the earlier historical sketch, how the tribal wars created him. This transference of worship to the opposite was not made in a day. A god could not be diabolized in so short a time, any more than sexual worship could grow repulsive. The two ideas helped each other. When he was seen as an ex-god, the dominant aversions to sexual worship would be quickly aroused when such a chance was seen for their incorporation in Typhon. He became an ex-god at the opportune time, and aversions and repulsions to such worship to their god were at once put off on his opposite. The sun, as life-giver, was too close to direct phallic ideas not to become also somewhat tabooed. The two incidents interpenetrate and cause each other. Sometimes they conquered the later development and worshipped Typhon, but the half-worshipful, half-fearful position explains pretty clearly their attitude of mind. Typhon was powerful, yet he must not be worshipped. He fought with and slew Osiris, yet in the end Osiris would conquer. To show conclusively its phallic origin, Typhon was

early represented as the sacred bull Apis or Muevis, yet this in itself may have only been so conceived by a part of the Egyptians; it at least is more primitive in its form.

In Greece and surrounding countries we see a further transition from serpent to man. Aristophanes relates the story of the people of Phrygia on the Hellespont, who found there a people known as the *Ophiogencis*, or serpent-brood. They were believed to be in close touch with serpents and were said to have been conducted thither and changed into men.

Thucydides mentions a people of Aetolia called Ophionians living on the island of Cyprus. They were described as serpents with two legs,—the Ophite race. The Athenians were styled *Serpentigenae*; and there is a tradition that the serpent once guarded the Acropolis.

Several new symbols came in here, from opposition to people encountering these tribes; wisdom and tact of the enemy. The snake would fight, he was wise, these people had these characteristics, hence they were serpents.

The Greek religion is made up of gods and goddesses, whose principal aspect seems to have been sexual pleasures. The giving of the magic girdle to Aphrodite by Saturn shows its probable connection also with the serpent. These gods and goddesses resided on Mount Olympus and held sexual orgies that shock the sensibilities now; but it was not so then. Their gods and goddesses had to be proto-types of themselves, and their ideas of nature. So the sexual side received undue prominence. At a later date, sexual distinctions were lost and deities became sexless. Sir William Jones says:

“ We must not be surprised at finding, on a close examination, that the characters of all pagan deities, male and female, melt into each other and at last into one or two, for it seems a well-founded opinion that the whole crowd of gods and goddesses of ancient Greece and modern Barbarians means only the Powers of Nature, and principally those of the sun, expressed in a variety of ways and by a multitude of fanciful names.”

If this be true, as we have intimated, it is the key to our psychoanalyses for the powers of nature are easily condensed or compressed into the one most mysterious and over-mastering power of nature, viz.: sex; and conversely, the various powers of nature could be easily adduced and personified from this one power itself. That is, that this great power could be a sufficient incentive for transference to, and speculations of

all the others. In the unconscious mind of the race the same repressed wish, which in its pure and original form had become distasteful, longed to be let into consciousness, but only succeeded when it assumed a pleasing and deceiving form in the simulation of the power of nature. Because this repressed wish was unpalatable, the harmful powers soon took the lead and a real devil was made. His harmful attributes were in proportion to their stage of advancement, and, consequently, their concept of sexual worship. When once the latter stage was reached, other tendencies aided and abetted his assuming worse proportions. The sexual origin was not guessed at nor known to them. It had served its purpose in the race development and saved them from themselves. Its prominence will not be kept in view from now on, except when we come to the modifications of Satan by the barbarous Teutons, who were then in a most primitive state.

TRANSITIONS AND CHANGES.

Going back a little, and approaching the same problem from another side, we see a different evolution for Satan. The Hebrews did not get their devil from the same sources as did the Greeks, whom we have first studied. They got their ideas from Egypt, Persia and Chaldea, and show a very different development as to details, though practically the same underlying causes are seen; only here were they differently conceived by an entirely different people.

The Egyptian dragon resembled the fearful crocodile that inhabited the Nile; the lizard guard at the mouth of Hell is a remnant of this same psychological selection of the Egyptian mind. The Chimaera, originating in countries where lions were man's greatest enemy, is a lion whose tail has on its end a serpent's head,—a mere vestige of borrowed tradition from early peoples whose greatest enemy was the serpent. The dragon, so often mentioned in the Old Testament, is a modified form of the serpent. He is more hideous and powerful. In Job XII, the Leviathan figured there gives us a pretty good idea of him. He is described as having an awful form; his face had enormous doors and terrible teeth; horrible scales and claws covered his body; his breath was fire and smoke, which kindleth fire; his strength esteemed iron as straw; arrows could not make him flee, and spears only caused him to laugh; he

made the deep to boil. Truly none on earth were like him, and who could stand the sight of him, and be not cast down? This was evidently partly poetical, yet it means something. It was not Satan; the repulsive ideas were slumbering beneath the surface. This was an outburst, but Satan was not identified with it yet. Satan, as shown before, had a different origin to that of most devils. He was the servant of God, who did the wicked things for him; and he became Satan only because of a changed opinion of God. He was represented as possessing human form from the first, and was not at all connected with repressed wishes of the race in his origin. Demons and the other devils, Mammon, Belial, Azazel, Beelzebub, Samael, and Asmodeus served as an outlet for these. Asmodeus, as the devil of lust, shows his origin easily.

As Satan's position became less and less enviable, he took on, as was seen, the characteristics of all these devils, and with his new heritage reigned supreme in the early Christian ages. During the Dark Ages, he received a new set of attributes from the barbarous Teutons. His great beast-like proportions, not being comprehensible to them, were changed to fit the animals they encountered and feared and detested most, viz.: the ox, the goat, the bear, the wolf, etc. Not being able to find suitable horrible animals at all times, they made him take on a mixture of these repulsive qualities they knew of. He was made to represent the prejudices of their makers. He was black and hairy, he had hoofs and horns, serpents entwined him, and ugliness in general and repulsiveness were his chief attributes. M. D. Conway says: "The shape of the Devil and the combat with him have always been determined by dangers and evils that were actual, not such as were archaeological." He cites as a proof of this that the devil of some South African peoples is called *Muzungu Maya*, which means "wicked white man." This is directly traceable to the kidnapping slave dealers of former days, and explains why their devil is white.

Even in India, Siva is oftentimes represented as a white devil, and shows all too clearly the effects of English rule there.

Satan and, indeed, most devils have not been represented as ugly at first. There was no conscious need of their being so. This would have destroyed their purpose to seduce and tempt and lead astray. It is analogous to the transference to the opposite in psychoanalyses of the individual when devils are

believed or represented hideous. They were thought really beautiful, so were painted ugly to make the other fellow steer clear, and even to make themselves believe they were not attractive.

Probably the horns and hoofs and cloven foot were used to represent Satan because they were hideous. Daniel Defoe seems to think they were due to the fact of deceit. Early in the race-history, animals were classed as suitable for food,—therefore good, that had cloven feet; hence Satan had cloven feet to conceal his identity, at least to make believe he was good. But underneath it all one sees something of the symbolism of sex. The animal most generally known to these people was probably the goat. He is not repulsive as to appearance. His shaggy coat and cleanly manners are rather attractive; but he is the most lustful of all animals. The offensive odor of the male goat is at once associated with his sexual proclivities; and it would be easy to take his horns and hoofs as a symbol to what such proclivities now mean to the race. These, coupled with other ideas already handed down to the Teutons, made a pretty good devil. Probably the hairy body was so conceived for Satan from such animals, although this itself might have been less symbolical. It perhaps was a more direct childish symbolism handed down to them. There is something back of all this. Why have nations so diverse in every idea made a devil with hoofs and horns? The same underlying cause must have influenced them all, and sex seems to be the most probable explanation.

Leanness of devils is also hard to account for, except on this same basis; they are said to be so thin as to cast no shadow, and, no matter how fair a devil may be in front, he can be detected by the hollowness of his back. Doubtless hunger and scarcity of food aided this idea. Hunger was man's greatest enemy and his traditional enemy was Satan, so the two would be blended. Man could not get food because the Devil, his enemy, took it. Prayers were offered to these demons to let food alone. The saying of grace at dinner is probably a remnant of this. But back of all these secondary causes the germ of the ideals existed. The ill-health of prostitutes and sexual pervers was seen, and the symbolism was only carried out in their idea of Satan.

As man became more civilized, as his intellectual field broad-

ened and gave him more things to ponder over, naturally these earlier ideas would be lessened in sphere and influence. So we have a corresponding decrease in Satan's size, as shown in representations of fairies, bogies, elves, pignies, dwarfs, etc. The great serpent, which once encircled the world to the mind of our northern ancestors, became the tiniest of serpents, and the large beast-like proportions in general were toned down to represent a more comprehensible Devil to a more mature race.

OTHER CAUSES AND AIDS.

Opposition to man and God has been very conducive to the creation and power of the devil; and its psychoanalytic equivalent is not difficult to see. Just as the child is unreasonably selfish, desiring the things that give it pleasure, at any cost, so the race has longed for more mastery and freedom. The child found his first enemy to be his father, who was his rival for his mother's love; the race has found them in the multitude of difficulties that encountered its progress. It is true the analogy is not complete, for the child that finds his father a rival and an enemy in childhood is generally more solicitous for his welfare in mature years, but who knows that the race is not still in its childhood in many respects? It cannot certainly be far past the adolescent stage, and, being so complex still, has many childish ideals. We can even now though see the same solicitous tendency in the race. We realize that opposition is not so bad, that it fosters interest and work; that barriers must be found and overcome. We court opposition in a way. Such things to the savage were never seen in this light. Things that opposed him were hated, and were fought and overcome in this attitude of mind.

Opposition, as a cause of certain devil attributes and characteristics, cannot be said to rest entirely on repressed sexual ideas, any more than can his physical appearance be entirely accounted for by same. Freud says:

"It is true that in another series of cases psychoanalyses at first traces the symptoms back not to the sexual, but to banal traumatic experiences" * * * "But we must consider these mighty wishes of childhood very generally as sexual in nature." (*Am. Jour. of Psychol.*, 1910. Vol. 21, p. 207.)

Any repressed wish tends to show itself in this substitution and sex as the prime motive can generally be seen, but opposi-

tion in itself to any racial want seems to have been most powerful here. When the individual want conflicted with the tribe or society that want had to be suppressed. As Professor Jevons has shown in his *Idea of God*, the fetish-individual-god had to give way to the tribal god, when their interests conflicted. These individuals' wants would not be eliminated but suppressed, and would seize on any opposition to give themselves an outlet, and enemies in general would be made up of the aggregate of individual concepts of evil things, which in turn were caused by being unable to realize their childlike wishes.

As man emerged from barbarism, the common good was more to be desired than individual welfare; but human nature is so constituted that selfish pleasure and individual good are ever making their demands. As this ideal social condition grew, man thought of this selfish desire as a shadow ever darkening his view ahead. These ideals restricted his individual liberty, and the brighter that social light the darker loomed this shadow.

This opposition has usually been found at first in natural barriers and treacheries. The savage sought his food, nature seemed to thwart him. He saw a devil behind the lightning that destroyed his home; a devil brought the invaders who stole his wife; a demon caused the disease that carried off his child. They were against him and must be devils. They easily fitted his notion of evil, and soon came to be the same malignant personage. Fear, dreams, and a lively imagination aided him very largely. Some one has said, "Man's first conflict was with his own quailing heart. His own cowardice was the devil, and his fear this evil one's power." A grotesque shape in the moonlight suggested an enemy: the cat's eyes in the distance became as large as saucers. Ingersoll has aptly expressed it thus:

"A man walking in the woods at night—just a glimmering of the moon—everything uncertain and shadowy—sees a monstrous form. One arm is raised. His blood grows cold, his hair lifts. In the gloom he sees the eyes of the ogre, eyes that flame with malice. He feels that something is approaching and runs, afraid to look back, until he falls exhausted at his door to tell the story." (25, p. 10.)

Of course, his children and grandchildren believe their father actually saw a devil for he was never known to lie.

This fear of the night was caused by the dangers of darkness; an enemy could more easily approach and the attacked would be at a greater disadvantage. Most animals of prey prowl around at night. Man, tired out from the toils of the

day, would be weaker then, and especially, if aroused suddenly from his slumbers, when his mental powers were scarcely awake. Enemies, fancied and real, were magnified thus, and even the breaking of a twig became the footfall of a powerful giant.

One slight likeness to a fancied enemy started the train of thought and the real picture stood out as a whole in consciousness, just as we think we see a friend on the street, when it is only a stranger whose nose resembles that of our friend. We look again, and see our mistake, for the stranger is so unfamiliar and unlike our friend we wonder how we could have mistaken him for such. The savage looked again, and, not seeing his antagonist, imagined he had miraculously disappeared, which added to his belief in his diabolical origin. Such fantasies were real to him. The dreams he dreamed were not only true while they lasted, but ever afterward. They were real visitations of corporeal bodies, that kept in touch with their departed dead, hence these visitations were interpreted as mystical and prophetic, instead of an index to childhood wishes, as they are now believed to be. They were more often bad than good, because childish wishes were not in accordance with mature ideals, so have been a powerful factor in the creation of devils.

Ignorance of science and law, among uncivilized peoples, has been another factor in devil belief. When their village was the center of the world, as each one appeared to be, they peopled the region beyond the distant horizon with horrible monsters and men-devouring giants. They had not learned the simplicity of nature in that unknown lands were similar to their own.

Distance always lends enchantment to the view, so the western world, especially, where the sun sank each evening, was believed to be worse than their own. Even in the time of Columbus, the poor sailors were bidden adieu, as if they were going directly into the jaws of these terrible sea-monsters.

Shadows and noises were no less real. Milton expresses their reality thus:

“And airy tongues that syllable men’s names,
On sands and shores and desert wildernesses.”

These people had their unsolved problems, and mysteries just as we; they explained them in a different and more childish way. When they saw a will at work, of which they knew nothing,

they naturally supposed it would hurt them. Conway shows how these deceptions and mimicries were often harmful, as the mirage which caused the traveller to grow careless with his drinking water when he saw so much ahead, only to recede as he approached, and so on to a death by thirst.

Man saw he had a companion who walked with him in the sunlight. He would commune with this other self and take the shadow for the substance. Seeing his brother asleep, he said the other spirit (breath) was ruling him. This belief was strengthened when his brother awoke to tell of his visit to other places, and of his encounters there. He knew it must have been the other self, because his brother's real self had not stirred. They reasoned that the other self must be like the visible self, and if a bad man died his ghost would be shunned and feared. "What the man was in life so his spirit must be after death." (23, p. 51.)

In animism the savage saw a spirit at work in everything around him. Dr. Chamberlain, in one of his lectures on Anthropology, said that Spencer's idea that belief in immortality arose from dreams and death could not have been universally true at the beginning; these abnormal phenomena must have come later,—the common things in primitive life were the real originators; besides, it is impossible to class all primitive religions in one category. The point I want to make is this: that, when once the germ of an idea of an evil spirit has been developed other causes and very dissimilar phenomena aid its completion. To be sure, some are primary, and some secondary; and the present and traditional ideas are woven into one complex fabric, differently conceived by different peoples, yet, on the whole, a similar devil. When once one devil is imagined, others help him out, which have no foundation but the unbridled imagination. Some are brought in by the adopted sons of another tribe or traders, and incorporated with their own. Do we wonder at his great power and knowledge?

One can see how this same great devil would be an enemy of their god. He was their enemy and thwarted their plans. Their god was their ally who aided them in all things, even their wars of extermination. The struggle between tribes being incited by their respective gods, the god of one would necessarily be the devil of the other. The one, whose tribe was vanquished, would become a permanent devil because of lack

of support. The conquerors ruled and even incorporated the conquered many times into their own tribes, either as slaves or brethren. The god of the conquered tribe would be less and less thought of as a god even by his own people, because he had failed them when in need. Seeing the worship of the victorious god, and hearing their own god mocked, etc., would cause even the conquered to think in time he was a devil. Diabolized or ex-gods have created a devil for many peoples, and strengthened existing devils for others, either by being made to embody their evils or by transfixing their own to already existing devils. We see a remnant of this yet. Priests and clergy, not wishing to create or foster scepticism, termed other gods devils, instead of denying their existence. They had to call them such, to make them their own God's enemy.

The Devil reached a higher state, when he became God's enemy, just as he had when he became the enemy of the tribe, instead of the individual.

Things that opposed their plans would be attributed to the Devil. For instance, the "Devil's bridges," so commonly believed in during the time of the Crusades, were due to the actual danger the crusaders encountered in their journeys to the Holy Land. They had to cross various streams and the falling rocks caused by melting snow and avalanches were attributed directly to his agency as God's enemy.

When the Devil reached this state of being God's enemy, naturally he became wiser. He had to cope with divine intelligence and power, and to match his strength and cunning with God's. He learned to give present rewards to gain remoter ends; he became God's ape to mimic him, so as to appear good to the unsophisticated. Goethe represents Mephistopheles as teaching Faust's class and dwelling on the goodness of orthodoxy. Heretics were believed to go to the stake fearlessly and joyfully, because they were aided by the Devil. He protected their bodies from the flames, to serve as an example, only to torment them in a place where they could not be seen nor heard by men.

To show his ape-like characteristics, we have only to look at the Trinitarian conceptions of him. Didron (in his *Manuel d'Iconographie chrétienne*, Iconograph H, p. 23) shows the French idea of the trinity of devil, of the fifteenth century.

Dante's Satan was three-faced. Eusebius called the Devil "Three-headed Beelzebub."

The sacrifices, homage, etc., paid to their god marked this fear in their hearts; the instinctive cry for help, the prayer to be delivered from Hell, superstitious practices, belief in signs and omens show their recognition of the Devil's sway. When they had done their uttermost to combat him, they would ask aid of their God. They believed they must help; they refrained from doing those things that would antagonize his Satanic majesty. No one would tempt fate by continuing a journey, if a black cat crossed his pathway. No one would look at a new moon through the branches of a tree. All these omens, which were termed bad luck originated because of the Devil's power. It is not our purpose to trace out their origin here, but simply to refer to them.

Many times it seems as if the greater part of many religious ceremonies was a propitiation to these diabolical powers, but one can see underneath the surface this was really secondary. Men saw that good things came slowly, but that evils were found easily, and everywhere. The evil things, being powerful, were more noticeable, and had to be thought of quite a little. Sacrifices paid to gods show this same propitiation, only it is given to God instead of the Devil. It was really to avert some evil. One could hardly see how a sacrifice could be offered to a purely benevolent deity. The flattering names and attributes given their gods show the fear and awe in which they were held. This was an unconscious worship of Satan, in so far as they feared God. They would not have feared a loving Father.

With all his power, Satan was subordinate to God. When sickness came, it was because the good power held aloof and permitted the evil ones to hold sway. They believed that by some act of their own they had caused God to permit such, but that he could expel the demon if he would; prayer then would be an asking for continued oversight, and, as such, was not really fear but reverence for His power.

When a devil held such sway as did Satan during the Middle Ages, devil-bargains must needs have been a result. Men imagined their souls were a choice bit of merchandise, which the devil was always ready to buy. Even church officials believed such bargains could be made, and did all in their power to prevent them. They were so stern in their rule, so exclusive

in their teaching, that poor, ignorant peasants, rather than endure the church's severe and unrelenting rule, sold themselves, as they imagined, to Satan. When once outside of the pale of the church, new pleasures, which had been forbidden them before, were now theirs. They argued that these must be of the Devil, because the world ruled by the church believed it; people shunned them, and they actually believed they were controlled by the Devil.

Present pleasures are so much more enticing to most men than later good that many, seeing the earthly pleasures enjoyed by their more favored brethren, would be ready to sell their soul too, if the results were not any more visibly felt than those they saw. To be sure, they believed Satan would demand their soul in the end, but that was afar off and did not weigh against the pleasures of the gay and beautiful world. Some imagined Heaven to be as stern and unrelenting as the church, so Hell might be better after all. When such a harmless thing as music was tabooed as the Devil's enchantment, one does not wonder at such bargains.

Even the legitimate acquiring of money was considered sinful, and the Jews, who were really more industrious and economical, were pointed out as aided by Satan in their prosperity.

A POSSIBLE AND AN ACTUAL DEVIL.

A modern Devil, to embrace the most general conceptions of his principal attributes, would possess great power and knowledge. He could tempt men to sin, and then have power to punish them because they sinned. He would control our thoughts, making us think bad things, when we would think of pure and holy things. Not only in the mental realm would he hold sway, but would bring us all physical pains and mis-haps that humankind is heir to. He would be behind the storm that destroys our homes; he would bring the disease that afflicts our bodies and carries off our loved ones. And last, but not least, he would be able, in opposition to an all-wise, omnipotent Father, to torment our souls in an eternal hell if we disobey, in the least, the commandments God has given us, and die with our sins unpardoned,—sins not necessarily bad, but like those of Dives, whose only condemnation was that he was rich.

He would possess the knowledge of arts and sciences that we lacked; people who searched for nature's hidden secrets would still be meddling with diabolical things, as when medicine was first suggested as an aid to prayer. These things, if efficient, were God's secrets, and meant to remain so, or they would have been revealed in His word. The Devil, as God's opposer, would always be glad to give them out.

Goethe's Mephistopheles is an embodiment of this idea in literature. He desires to gain poor Faust's soul, and, to do so, gives him all knowledge and power resulting therefrom. Calderon's Devil in the great Spanish drama, *El Magico Prodigioso*, refers to this phase of life. *El Demonio* is an example of a cultural and refined Spanish scholar. Politeness and courtesy are his graceful accomplishments. He is modest and unassuming as to his acquirements. When anyone asked him, if he had studied much, he replied, "No, but I have sufficient knowledge not to be deemed ignorant." The desire of knowledge and power are here shown as secondary to the gaining of the women he loved. Cifrano gave his soul to learn how to win the heart of Justina.

These masterpieces could never have been written had not such ideas been current in their time. They appealed to the people because they had something in common. Now we read them for their literary value only.

The Devil should be our opposer, whom we must fight with at all times. He tries to show us that black looks white, and that, apparently, evil things are really good. We must be on our guard against his wiles and subtleties. He begins by suggesting apparently harmless things, as taking a social glass at a banquet, only to lead us on by degrees until we are drunkards beyond recall. He is the ever present tempter to do those things which will harm us in the end, actually suggesting them to our bodily senses. He would give us some material prosperity, only to mock our conscience-stricken souls later, as when we are tempted by him to cheat our neighbor in some trade.

In the same vague way, he would be God's opposer as in Milton's *Paradise Lost*, trying to undo all good and happiness in general. According to some, he has actually been a pretty able rival for the Almighty. He is seen as Prince of the world, with its inhabitants in his grasp. It is most generally believed (if he is believed in at all) that in the end he will gain the

majority of souls. The oft-repeated quotation used by the clergy to exhort to be good shows this: "Enter ye in at the strait gate, for wide is the gate and broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there be which go in thereat." Matthew VII. 13.

This has been believed by them to refer to the actual road to hell.

These three characteristics noted above; power, knowledge and opposition to God and man, I should call his primary and fundamental traits. There are many secondary traits also attributed to him, such as lying, selfishness, miserliness, drunkenness, sexuality, etc. The connection is not always seen by those who attribute these things to him, and many times they contradict his primary qualities. Many believe he really possesses these traits, but does not mean to expose them, because a tempter and an opposer would have to be wiser than that. He could not gain many souls, if he showed himself in such detestable ways. The drunkard in the gutter, the miserly man, the liar, the prostitute, as seen by the individual, would not be tempting to imitate to say the least; while power, knowledge and opposition have attractions in themselves. Some of these secondary qualities have been explained to make him appear as bad as possible. Popular belief has done some psychoanalyzing in telling why Satan is a liar. He wanted to cover sins and iniquity, to conceal his badness, so as to flourish rankly. He represented the enemy of truth and light, and would, from the very nature of the case, be the embodiment of lies. Yet, according to their own argument and reasoning that he did not mean to show his lying proclivities, he did actually outwit them, for they accepted his word as law, they never actually caught him in a lie. From the time he told Eve the truth in the Garden of Eden, no direct lie is recorded against him. He has always kept his promises to the letter. The Devil-contracts (which represent the common consciousness) show that his mere word was accepted as law while he made man sign with his own blood. In all these he was more faithful than man. This is why I say lying is secondary, while really truth was his attribute, repressed yet outcropping at times, because Satan must not have good qualities. The cause of this unwilling and unrecognized attribute of truth was doubtless due to the fact that he could be relied upon if truthful. He had more

prestige when they knew he would do as he promised. They were sure of Hell, if they followed him. It added to his diabolical qualities, for it appealed to their reason, and made him more powerful.

In a somewhat different way, sexuality as a Devil-attribute has been secondarily adduced. Early peoples have considered sex as a pure and holy thing when rightly used, but then, as now, its use was abused, and it became tabooed. This abuse is the cause of its being a delicate subject to handle now in polite and refined society. It need never have been so otherwise. When its abuse was recognized and marriage laws instituted, violations of these were put off on Satan, as agent, instead of men and women. Man connected Satan with woman here, because she unconsciously tempted him. Her charms and powers could not be resisted, and her spell upon men was often his greatest evil. It is true she did not always mean to tempt him thus, but it is a feminine characteristic to play with fire and then get singed. Man could not say she was a devil, but the inference has been expressed in various ways. From the Old Testament legends, one sees woman's powers over the good and powerful rulers, as for instance, David and Solomon, Potiphar's wife, Jezebel, Salome, have been regarded as she scape-goats. Cleopatra probably influenced the Roman Empire more than any actual ruler. In all ages and lands, men have considered woman their inferior, but have never been able to shake off her influence and power. One can easily see how she was associated with evil powers, for, until recently, her rule and sway have been limited largely to her sexual qualities. When man saw she conquered by subtlety, even though she was a weakling and their slave, and, more often than not, that her influence in the use of these powers was bad, he would call her a devil, and make sex a devil-attribute.

Certainly, no one sees in the modern Devil all these characteristics; but such he would have, were a synthesis made of all his actual and inherited qualities. The actual Devil has been so restricted, even in the minds of the most unthinking, that the same mediaeval Satan is scarcely recognized. The minute germ has taken his place as the agent of disease; hysteria has been quite sufficient to explain demon possessions that were once attributed to him; and, even in actual insanity, patients

are sent to the insane hospitals to be treated for brain-lesions rather than the grip of the Devil.

We still have the ambition to know and do, but this is not considered to be of the Devil any more. It could be at most only so when directed to personal and selfish ends, a furtherance of which would hinder the progress of the race for the gain of the individual. This is truly of the Devil, but not in its former sense. We still call what opposes us the Devil. This is a sufficient Devil for us, and as such one we must fight and conquer, if we would enjoy real salvation.

GOOD QUALITIES OF THE DEVIL.

“Bad as he is, the Devil may be abused,
Be falsely charged, and causelessly accused,
When men, unwilling to be blamed alone,
Shift off their crimes on him, which are their own.”

This quotation forms a good introduction to our chapter on the value of Satan. He has not been wholly bad, but has filled his place in the evolution of the race well. He has always been willing to bear our infirmities, when we wanted to rid our conscience of them. Many a poor sinner (and I do not imply any sarcasm here) has been eased by believing Satan caused him to do wrong. His heart was lightened, and his pathway made easier. Undoubtedly Satan has thus caused much indirect happiness. Worry and remorse, which would otherwise have been destructive to the mental and physical powers, have been shifted off on him, and human hearts made freer and lighter by so doing.

This transference of our badness to Satan is, however, only a minor point of his value to the race. Opposition to self and God has made him an unreckonable factor in our progress. Opposition in any form has always been an incentive in bringing out the best in man.

C. C. Everett believes the Devil has been a potent factor in the uplift of morality, that this personification of Evil has caused a more profound recognition of sin. He says men have been comparatively innocent before they invented a devil, and his origin can always be traced to some disobedience of their part, which, being objectified, added an incentive to its conquest.

To have an enemy to deal with, makes a man stronger, so an enemy of morals would make men better.

The man who has not encountered difficulties is not generally strong. He has not acquired the combatting instinct which has been so helpful to the survivors in the survival of the fittest. Opposition by rivals made the Athenian youth excel in oratory. It brought out the military genius of our great heroes, and, in general, has aroused the otherwise dormant traits of our inner selves. Perhaps it has helped more in a social than an individual way. Opposition to a tribe, clan, community, or state, causes concentrated effort among even discordant members, as during the Civil War the contestants of inherited feuds in Kentucky laid aside their differences to fight, as brethren, the hated "Yankees;" and, even though they failed, this bond of sympathy and common cause was not lost, and many were the feuds settled in this manner. Just so with regard to the devil. In olden times, when he was considered so powerful, union and strength were created by opposing him.

In another realm, he has been very useful too. He has always been very democratic and independent. Milton embodied this in his immortal epic and actually made him a hero who believed it "better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven," though in torment. He has often defended the peasant from the over-exacting noble, giving justice as was deemed necessary, and never failing in its exactness.

He has not always been a bad fellow to oppressed people. He was conceived by them in opposition to priestly power and austere deities. They believed the priests were right, yet they secretly cherished their ideal attribute of justice. Carus says that monarchical Europe has generally characterized the Devil as the rebel in the universe, and that, in a sense, he has been, but generally these revolutions have been for good.

Satan has done great service to science; from the time he told Eve that she would become wise, if she ate the forbidden fruit, until the present time, there have been many to whom "forbidden fruit is sweet." Men have dared to do the forbidden, and many times only because of the dare. "Thou shalt not" oftentimes bears with it the implication that the thing would be good if we did it. This is almost the same as opposition, earlier discussed, but I wish to apply it here to priestly authority, and clerical mandates. Within the pale of the church, many harmless studies have been forbidden. The science of the Bible, supplemented by Aristotle, to the Scholas-

ties was supreme, and those who differed were aided by the Devil and forced to recant or die. This left them in the mood of Galileo, who kept a mental reservation, when forced to say the sun did move. Such opposition would cause a search for more conclusive proofs, and, as time passed, a belief in these. These Heaven-defying Ajaxes of Christendom, ostracized by the world, had to labor and work harder to defend their beliefs among so sceptical a people.

People in general have vaguely realized that the Devil is not all bad. Expressions like *Poor Devil*, *Le Bon Diable*, etc., show this. They have pity for the great giant-like creature, who is somewhat stupid in his bargains. He gets cheated many times, and it is all right for the best Christian to cheat him. Yet he is always faithful on his side, only giving his due part. His word is law in his bargains, but Christians have to sign their compacts with him in their own blood. Naturally, we would pity such a good, easy fellow. This same pity, in a less serious way, is expressed by our smile when his name is mentioned. It is rather the pity of stupidity. We realize we have gained at his expense. He has not been deposed, nor seriously injured, but we, in general, have got the best of the outcome. He was the perpetuator of the theater, until it became such a factor for good and enlightenment, then he was driven out. In the same way, he has preserved many things for our benefit, keeping them as his, while we thought them bad, only to give them willingly to us, when we were wise enough to appreciate them.

Defoe, in the *Political History of the Devil*, shows us how badly we treat him, and how little we appreciate his service. Defoe says it was bad that the Devil stirred up Christians to go to Jerusalem, then deserted them there, leaving the bodies of thirteen or fourteen hundred thousand Christians as a trophy of his work. Of course, the Crusades were the work of God, until they failed, then the poor Devil got it.

BAD EFFECTS OF THE DEVIL.

On the other hand, the Devil as taught has done irreparable harm. He does not mean to us now what he meant in former years. We can smile at his pranks and laugh over his discomfitures, but to our ancestors he was anything else but a laughable subject. This point cannot be emphasized too strongly.

He controlled men's thoughts and deeds, not only of higher religious thoughts and metaphysical speculation, but in the minutest details of everyday life. He was their accuser and spy. He tempted them to think and do bad things, and then laughed at their misfortunes. Surely they could not escape his influence, and power. It was fate that the world was in his grasp, and a weak, puny man had as well give up. This belief was universal. Uncultured people generally take this side of life more seriously than do cultivated and civilized people.

Such implicit belief in this great evil god necessarily stunted freedom of action and investigation. Just as Calvinistic predestination, which had its root in Devil-superiority, taught men it was useless to struggle, so Devil belief made it just as hopeless. If opposition did make a few strive harder to accomplish their aims, it did not work so with the majority. Most people, not having this spirit of aggressiveness inborn in them, have decided it best to give it up as a losing game, and, drifting idly along, let fate choose their pathway. Such a belief has been the cause of much of the sadness of the world. To people of limited intelligence and a less limited reasoning power, personal salvation after death has pre-eminently ruled their thoughts. Not having had many comforts in this life, the very thought of a future readjustment where the good man would be rewarded, gave them a new zest for living, and made life worth living. Anything that interfered with this hope cast a gloom over their whole existence. The Devil, as preached to them, had the world in his grasp. He would gain the majority of souls in the end. He was Prince of the world and its god. This being conceded to him, he did not need even to exert any efforts.

Do we wonder that such a belief hardened their hearts, and caused them anxiety and mental unrest? Conway says:

"Theology may induce the abject and cowardly to subject their human hearts to this process of induration required for loyalty to such powers, but in the end it makes Atheism the only salvation of the brave, pure and loving natures." (15, p. 416.)

Devil-teaching has its basis in fear, and such a motive may do for the time being, but in the long run it must be disastrous.

Ingersoll says:

"The consequences of devil-belief have been terrible beyond imagination. Millions of men, women and children, fathers and mothers, have been sacrificed upon this ignorant and idiotic belief." (25, p. 9.)

The bad effects have been universal in their results. It has destroyed the happiness of thousands, whom it did not profit in making better, and, as happiness, if not the goal, is the right of the race, its effects have been awful.

Only these direct effects of Devil-belief have been cited which were detrimental to the individual and consequently to the race. Many indirect results could be shown that have been equally bad. Literature, science, morals, and even religion, have been throttled and held back from their natural growth. Valuable libraries have been burned as of no use, because, if they had anything of value it was also in the Bible, if not, it had better be destroyed. Untold riches, as indexes of early race struggles, have been lost this way. Narrow views of orthodoxy, all traceable directly to Devil-belief, have hampered thought so much that freedom of expression in literary ways has been impossible. The Dark Ages, which were darkened principally by this insane shadow, could not contribute much to the world's store of knowledge, as long as such superstition ruled with such vigor. Science could not flourish, when men were tortured and even burned for expressing their honest opinions. Opinions were considered to be of the Devil, when they differed in the least from the church's accepted views. Men like Galileo were forced to recant their statement, when they knew they were right. Physicians were ostracized, who prescribed specifics and medicines, instead of prayer and charms. The science of medicine has been especially held back on account of this idiotic belief. The pious old surgeon of the fifteenth century, who searched and found the insensitive spot with a sharp needle thought he had found the "Devil's claw," a sure sign of witchcraft; he had really found anesthesia on the body of a hysterical patient. Public opinion was back of him, however, and witches continued to be burned to the time of the Salem witchcraft craze.

When the Devil was seen back of all such phenomena, when he caused disease and death, there would be few incentives to hygienic living and right observance of nature's laws. He was above and beyond their control, and things might as well take their own course. It not only stifled the spirit of investigation in those who did not believe it, by silencing with mandates to the contrary, but was itself, from its very nature, the cause of great loss of health and life.

In the realm of morals, the results were equally baneful. It became a question of outwitting the Devil, of beating him around the stump and then doing as they pleased. It was not a question of doing right because it would make them better, but simply to escape the Devil; hence, if he could be deceived and outwitted, no moral incentive remained. They argued with themselves that probably he would not get them, if they did not live too wickedly, so morals on such a basis would be lax; or worse still, they relied on the probable goodness of God to set all things right in the end, and they wouldn't have to be so exact. No other incentive to pure living was held up to them. One can easily see how religion would suffer, as they saw no direct effects of the Devil's power, and as no other incentive was held out to them to be God-like, it would lose its interest and become commonplace and *passé*, or else be rejected *in toto*, because of its inconsistencies. New England, with all her boasted heritages, realizes this, for she never boasts of her Salem witchcraft craze, and rarely mentions as a "Yankee" product, the preaching of Cotton Mather and Jonathan Edwards. Probably these things have caused more scepticism than the writings of Voltaire, Paine, and Ingersoll combined.

Probably, nothing is wholly bad, so the good things said about the Devil are to be taken in this light, for he has undoubtedly been more harmful than otherwise. Frances Power Cobbe, in writing of the Devil, says:

"It can hardly be doubted that it would be of a benefit to the world if this outgrown doctrine were confessedly abandoned. Such decaying exuviae of faith still clinging about us are unhealthful and embarrassing things at best. The proverbial wisdom of the serpent is displayed by rubbing off its skin at the proper time, and allowing a new one, however tender, to shine unincumbered; and not by stopping its ears to the voice of the charmer as the Fathers explained that feat."

The Devil has filled his place, and is no longer needed in the present advancement of the race. Theology has used him whether good or bad. He has been thought about and dreamed of in all possible combinations; but the tendency has always been to diminish his proportions, both as to actual size and influence, when his adherents advanced. Now he seems to have lost his entire support, and the time seems near when people will speak of him only in the past tense.

USELESSNESS OF THE DEVIL.

To the modern mind the Devil is a useless thing. Granting that he has done about as much good in the past as he has done evil, it seems to be to the best interest of Christianity to dispense with him now. He has long since been dethroned from the physical realm and had as well be undone from the mental realm. People have been greatly benefited since they realized that disease and premature deaths were caused by unhygienic conditions, instead of by a Devil. They get better results when physicians are allowed to use specifics and germicides than they did when prayer was directed to God to banish the disease demon, or to change his never-swerving laws.

Even for those who still believe in him at all, he has lost his sway and power of former years. He is a kind of impotent prince, tolerated in the same way that democratic Europe tolerates her powerless monarchs. They would be rid of him, if they knew how. He is only a silent tempter of the heart, who is to be combatted with prayer and moral efforts rather than exorcisms and charms. As the intellect advances, religious ideals must advance, and men have realized that they do not need the assurance of supernal things through the evidence of the bodily senses. Even the working man, surrounded by the educational advantages of our modern civilization, such as the daily paper, the unions, clubs and the theater, demands a why and a wherefore of things. He is not content to accept things on mere dogmatic authority. He has his own standard to judge by, and cannot be duped much longer. Social and political conditions have made him too democratic and independent to believe any such absurd thing. Man, with his broadened ideals, realizes that religious ends must be more social than individual. He sees that evil is not absolute but relative. What is bad to him, may be good to his neighbor, and *vice versa*. The root is deeper than the individual happiness or misery of one human being; the cause must be removed by going to the fountain head rather than by straining each minute drop.

Probably the greatest cause of his lessened efficiency is the decline of fear as a controlling factor in men's lives. It is almost impossible to comprehend the part fear once played. It was the principal element in law, morals and religion.

Rulers controlled their subjects by it, priests and clergy gained converts through its appeal alone; but happily now conditions have changed. Modern psychology and pedagogy have shown its usefulness in school life as an incentive to education. Preachers are no longer accustomed to use it as a motive in religion because such an appeal would be useless. G. A. Coe says:

"The modern man cannot be scared by the thought of death or of judgment, and if he could be the modern code would require him to conceal his terror * * * to lament this fact is to distrust the cause," (13, p. 34.)

William James says: "In civilized life it has at least become possible for large numbers of people to pass from the cradle to the grave without ever having had a pang of genuine fear." (*Psychology, Briefer Course*, p. 408.)

The psychology of sin has in all lands been translated into fable. Children and savages have to use objective realities to understand deeper subjective truths, but it seems time for twentieth century advancement to shake off this childhood heritage. The Devil and Hell are no longer necessary according to modern ideas of justice. Banishment from Heaven, whatever may be our conception of it, is sufficient. We only banish a criminal from society by imprisoning him to mete out justice for his wrong doing; so are the sinner and wrongdoer banished from earthly enjoyments and pleasures given to the good. C. C. Everett says: "Sinful acts are wrong, because they fill the place for the good acts."

THE DEVIL AND GOD.

Some have argued that a denial of the Devil's claims would invalidate those of God. That the Devil is a pragmatic necessity has been maintained by others. It is not the purpose of this paper to argue these questions, but it seems that from the simple exposition of his powers and growth one can see such claims are not well-founded. It seems that pragmatism would be stretched to its utmost limits to teach his existence in this age. It could not work long, so the best that could be said here would be to let this old doctrine die a natural death. It has been bolstered up long enough, and pragmatism, or what-not, could not hold it up much longer.

That a denial of the Devil causes scepticism as regards God has no foundation. The arguments for God as a Devil-opposer

do not hold now anyway, new hypotheses have been found. He is the absolute, not the half.

Scotus Erigena, the first of the Scholastics, writing about the middle of the ninth century, was the first to formulate the idea that evil is negative. He argued that as God is the only real being, separation from Him was but a negative reality, and if we deprive a being of everything good in it, we annihilate it. This idea has been advocated many times since, under various names, and with diverse ideas of God. Yet, on the whole the problem of evil has received scant consideration in comparison to other problems. Most of those who have studied it hold to a view similar to Scotus Erigena. Otto Pfeleiderer, of the present generation, says:

"On the assumption that evil is an actual entity in man its existence cannot be explained or reconciled with origin of evil as a created being, but by supposing a corruption of human nature taking place in time and caused from without." (30)

Others have held that it is a disharmony of a yet defective organism. This seems to be quite a common view from an evolutionary standpoint. Rev. H. S. Bradley, in a baccalaureate address at Clark College, in 1910, said:

"Sin is not an innovation that came suddenly to an absolutely perfect being, but it is the survival or misuse of habits and tendencies that were incidental to an earlier stage of development, and were not originally sinful but actually useful and beneficial."

As it is not our purpose to discuss this topic in detail, only quotations regarding it are given from men who have studied this phase of the subject. These could be multiplied at length, but it is unnecessary, as from those given the trend of thought regarding it can be seen. Probably, not any one of these hypotheses has been the cause of evil, alone. It is more likely a result of various and diverse causes. One cause was more potent than another in one place, and the whole surely is a complicated result.

On such a basis, there is no need of a Devil. He is a useless appendage, outgrown and forsaken. This view that evil is not a reality does not invalidate God, for the same arguments are not used to substantiate Him, when we postulate His existence. To say that the Devil is an unwarranted personification adds to our concept of God. It makes Him more powerful, more

just and holy. In whatever way we conceive Him, whether a personality or a force, law or substance, He is enhanced by taking away an enemy whom He could but will not overcome. If we think of Him as a personal God, if we consider Him as nature and her laws, a devil is equally repulsive. Science teaches the unity and oneness of nature. She has no place for two contending systems, her laws are unity of a well regulated whole, and must necessarily be under one management.

Philosophers in all ages have called the *unknown* God, after explaining all they could, they come square up against the unexplainable; to be consistent thinkers, they have to postulate something here, and that something is their God. Other thinkers, not so philosophically bent, see some power above and beyond them, and call that God. They argue, with reason, that some unknown something must be back of it all.

The unthinking person, finding a ready and willing devil already created for him by various and sundry causes, chief among which have been distorted outcroppings of repressed social wishes, easily put on him his own ignorance and shortcomings. Away with such a hindrance! Let us face the evil and fight it as our own product, and make room for our God and ourselves.

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PSYCHIC RESEARCH AND HUMAN IMMORTALITY.

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While many millions of men have the conviction that individual immortality is the greatest of evils, and devote their religious energy to the taking of such measures as they believe will insure escape from that unpleasant condition, other members of the human family anxiously desire that very sort of immortality, and are striving to convince themselves that they will attain it. As fondly as the Buddhist desires Nirvana, so fondly, at least, the Christian longs for Heaven—or for some sort of a heaven.

For centuries the work of “authority” has been sufficient to the mass of Christians. Immortality they desired, and immortality the church (or the Bible) told them they should have. By asserting her control over the avenues leading to the other life, or at least her possession of final information concerning those avenues, the church has exercised a vast influence in the affairs of men. The dominant desire of immortality has been the fulcrum for the ecclesiastical lever which has moved the western world.

During the last few generations the deliverances of “authority” have been losing somewhat in weight, and men have worried more and more over the *proofs* of immortality. Does the church know what she is talking about? If we reject the church, must we admit that we have no grounds for a belief in the life after death? What are the possible proofs of the continuance of life and personality? These questions have been voiced more and more insistently and by an ever increasing chorus.

The actual search for proofs has gone to the most obvious quarter. If those who lived and are not now with us are still alive, we might be able to communicate with them, and get their testimony as to their existence, and perhaps some information concerning the conditions of that existence.

Communication with those “gone before” is not a new idea. Reliable history and plausible guesses based on relics of the

past do not take us back to a time when such communication was not attempted. But in the early periods the attempts were based on the desire to extract from the other world information concerning this world which would enable the possessor to "get the better" of his fellow men. In remote times men wanted "inside information" which would make them victors in battle; now they want tips on the stock market. The idea of using the occult line of communication to demonstrate the reality of the station at the other end of the line could not arise until the doubt of such reality prepared the way. The horde of soothsayers, clairvoyants, thaumaturgists, and "psychics," who ply their trades in all our cities (except where the police "run them in" as vagrants), are the representatives of a line which loses itself in the haze of antiquity: the ingenuous medium who serves as the nucleus for a group of "psychic researchers" is the product of the last half-century.

At this point it is necessary to draw a distinction which the public seems slow to grasp, and which removes a vast deal of misunderstanding when it is grasped. This distinction is between *natural mediumships* and *supernatural mediumships*.

We may define supernatural mediumships as *alleged production of physical effects without adequate physical means*. The lifting of tables, writing on slates, playing on banjos, production of "spirit photographs," pressure of ghostly hands, materializations and dematerializations, *ad infinitum*, *ad absurdum*, which form so large a part of the stock in trade of the professional medium, are one and all rank frauds. There is no more room for debate on this point than there is on the statement that an unsupported body moves towards the earth. That a woman or man untrained in science should discover a new form or manifestation of physical energy is so extremely improbable that it need not be considered in connection with the claims of supernatural mediums. If any such discovery should be made, it would be as rigorously and satisfactorily demonstrable as have been the X-ray and radio-activity. In every case where a supernatural medium has been investigated with passable thoroughness the imposture has been discovered. In a very few cases the verdict has been "not proven:" the investigators have not been able to plan the proper precautions. Thus, Kellar, the famous stage magician, was able to produce slate-writing under the eyes of the grave and learned Seybert

Commission, in broad daylight, and the Commissioners could not discover the simple trick he played on them. Kellar himself subsequently explained it. In the great majority of cases the medium simply will not allow adequate investigations.

There are only two ways in which the supernatural mediumships interest scientists. First, as means of amusement, like any clever trick whose analysis is entertaining, and second, as material for psychological studies in deception. To observe a stout medium with a raucous voice impersonating the "spirits" of deceased persons of various presumed ages, dispositions, and sizes, may be stupid enough; but to study the poor dupes, and observe how at the medium's suggestion they imagine what she is totally unable to counterfeit, is a chapter in psychology. When an elderly professor of physics declares that he saw a medium float in the air out at one window and in at another, the condition of the spectator becomes a matter of interest. Was he hypnotized, or was he open to suggested hallucination without hypnosis, or was he just a careless observer who overlooked conditions he should have noticed? In all tests the exact conditions under which the performance is carried out are all-important, and it has been abundantly shown that in investigating the supernatural the most careful man is woefully inaccurate in his observation. This is perhaps the most valuable result of the whole series of investigations.

In a natural mediumship the medium makes no claim of performing physical feats without physical means which are normally adequate. If writing is produced, it is the medium's hand which does the writing, and there is no pretence to the contrary. If information is given vocally, it is the mouth of the medium which utters the sounds. In short, all physical phenomena are produced in the ordinary physiological way. The only mystery, if there is mystery, surrounds the source of the information given by the medium, by voice or hand, and on this point there is at present a legitimate difference of opinion.

While the majority of the natural mediums rest under the suspicion (to put it mildly) of plain humbuggery, certain ones seem to be honest. Eminent scientists have made careful tests with these mediums, under conditions that seem unexceptionable, and have obtained results which have convinced several of these scientists that the mediums do indeed have some extraordinary source of information. Accounts of some of these ex-

periments may be found in the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research. The experiments with Mrs. Piper are typical.

The small mass of data obtained from a few of these mediums constitutes the surd of the occult. The more sceptical scientists ascribe this residuum to chance. Let a medium give enough information, and a little of it is liable to be true; it would be strange if some were not; say these scoffers. Others find chance to be no explanation, some of the information seeming too definite and too copious to be accounted for in that way. Hence they adopt either the hypothesis of telepathy—that the medium reads the mind of some person and so obtains her information; or that of spiritualism—that the medium receives or transmits communications from the “spirits” of the dead.

Telepathy may be eliminated from the list of possible explanations, without much discussion. Experiments scientifically conducted have so far shown absolutely negative results. One person can “read the mind” of another only by the interpretation of physical signs—words, gestures, feelings of warmth, etc. So much may be stated with finality, for almost all psychologists are agreed upon this point. Moreover, telepathy, even if admitted as possible, seems an inadequate explanation for some of the mediumistic data, or at least in some cases there is no assignable person from whose mind the information might have been obtained.

The explanation which assumes communication between the medium and the “spirits” (whatever the word means!) of the dead has at least one virtue: it accounts for all the data. If one “spirit” doesn’t know a certain thing, it ought to be able to obtain the information from some other “spirit.” We can give no definite reason why the “spirit” could not acquire any information whatever. This very vagueness of the concepts of “spirits” and of their activities makes the hypothesis less objectionable to the psychologist than the telepathy hypothesis. The “spirit” hypothesis is too vague to conflict sharply with anything. We can demonstrate experimentally and theoretically that direct communication between the minds of living persons is improbable, but we can’t show anything with regard to the communication between a mind and such an indeterminate thing as a “spirit.” This negative attitude of psychology must

however not be construed as a positive indorsement of the "spirit" hypothesis.

What the future may bring forth for the interpretation for the few troublesome facts of mediumship, should not be opposed by the prejudices of hastily formed conclusions, but it is advisable to consider what inferences are to be drawn if the claims of the psychic researchers in regard to their data are substantiated.

Suppose there has lived in some far-away place an old gentleman by the name of A. Blank. Suppose this old gentleman possessed a pocket knife, which he kept for a number of years, used daily, and prized highly. Suppose, after the death of the old gentleman, his son, B. Blank, living in a large city, attends a seance by a psychic-research medium, and suppose that during this seance the medium, under the form of a communication from the father, tells the son how the knife came into the father's possession. Suppose the son has never previously been told the history of the knife, but that he subsequently finds out, by making inquiries in his far-away paternal home, that the incident was correctly reported by the medium. Suppose further, that the son was carefully disguised and presented to the medium under an assumed name, so that she should not draw upon any knowledge she might possess concerning the family, but that she nevertheless told him his father's name and the matter above mentioned. Suppose, in fine, that we are forced to the admission that the information must have come to the medium directly from the dead father (or practically so). What, after all, have we admitted?

The spiritualist will claim that the "spirit" of the late Mr. Blank still exists, retains many of the traits of character of that individual, and is able to communicate ideas directly to the consciousness of the medium: or perhaps, in the abeyance of the medium's consciousness during a trance state the "spirit" is able to direct the hand or vocal organs thus released from the medium's normal control. The data will be looked upon as establishing the doctrine of individual immortality. It is true that the spiritualist assumption does violence to our laboriously acquired psychological knowledge, but, if one wishes to make a custard, some eggs must be broken!

As a matter of fact, the spiritualistic conclusion does not follow strictly from the premises which for argument's sake

we have admitted as per sample above. The revelations and communications obtained by the psychic researchers point to the dissolution of personality, not to its continuance after death.

Personality—that mass of habits of thought, feeling, and action—is built up gradually during the life of the individual. Granted that it does not disappear abruptly at death: it may disintegrate slowly, as it has arisen. The factors which will persist longest will of course be those which have been the most firmly knit together by being frequently active during life, or by being closely associated with the daily routine. We find in senile decay during life that the routine ideas, commonplace traits of expression, trivial recollections, etc., hold their own long after the more exalted characteristics of the individual's personality have passed away. It seems therefore perfectly natural that, if decaying personalities persist after the death of the body, the fragments which remain some little time in a fair state of preservation should express themselves inanely and trivially, when in some way they attach themselves to the consciousness of the medium.

If the "spirits" from which the mediums receive communications are living, flourishing personalities, we must be a bit disappointed that these communications consist entirely of the twaddle and trifles the psychic researchers so solemnly record; but, if they were mere fragments of personalities, we need not be surprised at their inconsequential deliverances. We may expect, moreover, that mediumship will fall always upon those who are mentally weak or diseased: decaying psychic fragments should be repelled by healthy minds.

The dissolution theory not only explains the alleged facts of psychic research more readily than does the spiritualistic hypothesis, but also demands less reconstruction of our scientific hypotheses. A psychic entity, separable from the body, is postulated by the spiritualists. The dissolution theory simply supposes this entity to be phenomenal rather than substantial, and to be subject to the ascertained principles of psychology.

It would be a dreadful calamity to the psychic researchers, if, setting out blithely to establish beyond a peradventure the doctrine of human immortality, they should seem to demolish it instead. Happily for the peace of mind of those who hunger for the doubtful blessing of indefinitely continued existence,

the phenomena of mediumship must still be regarded as interesting episodes, which possibly are worth investigating, but which are certainly very far from being bases for arguments of any sort. Moreover, if we should ever come to the point where the reality of the communications from the spirits can no longer be doubted, and thus the post-mortem decay of personality become a proven fact, the thirsters after immortality could console themselves with the reflection that a soul worth preserving would probably slough off the empirical personality when it escaped from the body. The conception of such a spiritual moulting is in fact discoverable in all respectable forms of spiritism.

THE WINNING OF RELIGION.

PART I. NEED PEOPLE BE RELIGIOUS?

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Wherever the English language has penetrated in the whole wide world, travelers and tourists find a building, large or small, grand and magnificent, or ignoble and insignificant, around which there is an association of great meaning, and whose memory, from among the rest of all the world's noblemen and great, is therein kept green and fresh. That association is of one of the great facts in the life of mankind, namely that man himself is not alone, nor yet his own master. That memory, instead of being the name of a great philosopher or scientist, a great historian or warrior, is the memory of the world's lowliest character, who, by his own self-abasement, has become the eternal sign and token of the world's redeemer—the lowly man of Nazareth. All alike agree in exclaiming in wonderment at the magnitude of his power and the majesty of his bearing in the lives of those who most truly emulate the example of this Lowly One of Galilee.

Why is it that this character of twenty centuries ago, who never passed beyond the limits and confines of his own small country, except for one brief moment, as it were, to cross over the borders of an adjoining state, and among a people who were at great enmity with his people,—why is it that this character has conquered peoples and nations and brought them in humility to his feet — and from the time of his appearance on the stage of action the world has ever been turning on a new pivot and towards larger and better things? Was time out of joint with itself when it produced a Christ of Galilee, or was each preceding age indissolubly bound to the other in vital and organic necessity and likewise to the age that produced the Christ? There are many answers given to these questions, answers as diverse as the races of men, each in some measure true.

I. Whatever else they may mean, they surely mean that there is something more in man than his body and his brains. They attest the greatest fact in the life of man; and it is in trying to arrive at an appreciative understanding and a sympathetic interpretation of this great fact in the race, that this contribution is made.

The psychological study of religion is forever making it clear that the mind of man is a great unitary force, and that, while man to-day is different in very many respects from earlier men in the world's history, he is yet so much essentially the same as to make no great moral difference. Jesus Christ has won such a place because of the inevitability of things in the race itself. And the world of men and life found in *him*, both compared and contrasted with his teachings, *the embodiment of their highest conception of life and character*. And where this is not true in just this manner, it is nevertheless true because *he has awakened man as to what God's thoughts of men are*. In other words, and despite the fact of denials from various quarters and sources, man is unlike any other creature on the face of the globe, because he has something besides bodily passions, besides language and besides intellect; he is a supra-sensuous animal, and cannot be confined within the bounds of mere sense-perceptions. This has been true ever since man began, in spite of the favorite theory concerning the origin of man and his relations to the lower animal kingdom as given by the doctrines of evolution or descent. The great contribution of anthropology to our knowledge is, that, in the beginning, when man became man, he was so much man as to be for ever separated from his nearest congeners in the same kingdom by a barrier that can never be removed or by a gulf that can never be bridged. In the beginning man was man, and not monkey, nor any other animal than man himself.

While it is true that the human animal is different from animals of other species and varieties by the facts of language and intellect, it may be held that equally great differences lie more truly in the same realm that his merely bodily or somatic constitution occupy—and subject to the same laws of development or deterioration with it. Speech and intellect are correlative and interdependent facts in human life as a rule. Higher bodily organism and higher and more complex nervous organization go hand in hand; and from the higher nervous specializa-

tion we reach to the higher mental life in which we find intellect and the finer sense-susceptibilities. This is pre-eminently true of man, for it is here, in the realm of human life, that we find just that highest type of nervous development or organization, with the consequence of a true emotional and intellectual life. Man is man the world over, and throughout all the unfolding years—only as he is a volitional, an emotional, and an intellectual being, and only when these attributes of his true humanity become the masters of his body and the determining factors in the making of his character.

No man is truly satisfied who is satisfied with the meeting of his merely bodily needs and demands, for there is something in man other than his body. He must find satisfaction for the needs and demands of his intellect and thinking, and he must have some measure of satisfaction for his aspirations and his desire to will and to be. But it is no uncommon thing to see men and women more or less satisfied in the demands of each of these aspects of their lives, and yet they are not at peace. They are conscious of greater things that may be accomplished, of nobler lives that may be lived, of a still more beautiful character that can be attained. And such instances recall the confession of an early and learned saint of the Christian church: "Oh God, we were made for Thee, and our souls are restless until they find their rest in Thee."

And here, we must confess is the crux of the whole matter—God and humanity, naturally akin to each other, but alienated, separated, and lost to each other by the fickleness of our weak humanity, and with not an innate selfishness, but more truly a cultivated selfishness,—that one burning and blighting element which has wormed its way into our life, bringing with it destruction and death! Though this is true in the largest aspect of our modern and Christian civilization, it is not universally true. For there are primitive peoples to-day whose contact with the white man has not spoiled them, and they stand before us as the saving element of an imperfect humanity, because they are truer to the really generic traits and characters of the race that is the offspring of God Himself. Here we find the truly human characteristics of our common humanity in their simplest and most congenial forms. Those who have made man their one great object of study in life assure us that this fact is most truly emphasized to-day, or at any rate in recent years,

by reason of the effects of our own civilization upon modern primitive people. Along with our civilization there have gone, hand in hand (one might truthfully say), those cunningly devised means of destruction which are the product of a selfish civilization. The foot-prints of the missionaries of the Christian church made pathways for the commercial highways, which brought a greater disaster to the "savage" than the one from which to save him the man of God had left home and friends and fireside.

There are men of culture and leading in learned circles, who are of the opinion that there are people on the face of the globe who are naturally destitute of religion. Such assertions are not to be disregarded when coming from sources of scientific authority, but their reasons for such conclusions must be understood. Such men in this day are so exceedingly few in number that it may be safely said that such an opinion is the special property of but one or two men, chief of whom is the brilliant English scientist, Lord Avebury, who has recently gathered up the significance of science in general, and his own work in particular, as far as it applies to the fact of religion, and reëffirmed his conviction of half a century ago, that *religion is not one of the genetic characteristics of the race!* A lone and solitary figure he stands in mature majesty! On the other hand the multitude of modern scientists accept the fact that religion seems inherent in humanity.

The place which Anthropology in general has given to religion, as a generically human trait of the race, has been abundantly justified in late years by its twin daughters—Psychology and Sociology. Psychology especially has brought to us the true instrument whereby we may make a truer study of religion than could ever be made by the old order of the metaphysical philosophers, the theologian of the old order, or yet even the sociologist. The former two dealt more largely with words—often "to the subverting of the hearer," as the great Christian apostle designates it; the latter (Sociology) dealt particularly with the consequences of custom and culture which are but external to life, and not life itself. But in Psychology, as its name indicates, we have an instrument wherewith we may make excursions into what had been the inaccessible realms of experience—and behold, when we have cut our way into the heart of the thing and taken away all accretions and unnatural

accessions, we find the gem of unmistakable value to the world of flesh and blood in the form of men, *Religion, that part of man which made him one with God.* And there never was any doubt about God's existence, because it is indelibly written in the texture, the warp and woof of the human constitution.

There is a strangely significant analogy to this fact of primitive life in certain tendencies in the religious thinking of the modern world, what I would call the movement towards the simple fact of religion in the life of man. For instance, while not by any means accepting all the reasoning involved in the complete system of which it is a part, in "Christian Science," the fundamental truth is God and man brought together in Divine-human character by the means of unselfishness and love. The same is true of such other movements as "Divine Science," "New Thought," and "Faith Healing," etc. All such efforts are attempts to meet that deeper, yes, the deepest and truest nature of man, divested of the mere accidents of civilization and education. They are attempted answers to the cry of the human heart for its own home. And this is where we must consider the nature of religion and its place for all time in the economy of the race.

II. From the far-off days men have been cogitating about this fact in human life. It has always been recognized that man is a religious animal, and that, apart from the satisfaction of this quality in his life, no amount of wealth or possession of education could grant him peace with himself and with that other-self which makes for righteousness. Men of the ages and years, whose learning cannot be lost, and to whom the world will for ever be a debtor, have spent the ripest years of their life and knowledge in meditating upon and writing about this undeniable fact in the life of man. They have sought to find its true nature and place in life; they have tried to understand and explain it. Nor have their efforts been fruitless. In the search of their quest they have dug many treasures which make thinking in this direction easier for us, and enable us to understand more truly and more fully the meaning of the deepest things that the intellect of man can engage in. We are surely heirs to a vast heritage which cannot be despised by the highest or the humblest. And the true aim of education should be to make this heritage the property of all. Education and religion have always gone hand in hand, and true religion

has always been the sponsor of true education. Why? Because religion is at once the home of the soul of man and that which has made him at one with the great Source of all, and one with all the life that pervades the universe of God.

III. We have little or no care for an effort of man which tries to comprehend and for ever define religion in any set of words; that is to say, that religion can mean nothing more than the words which its definition includes. For just so often as that is tried will religion become a delusion. It cannot be made to keep within the confines of any circle of words any more than life itself can be confined within definable area and perpetuate itself. But we can state the simple fact of religion as that expression of the life of God in the soul of men which finds itself in serving the widow and the fatherless, and showing itself in the conscious exercise of unselfish service which has been described as Love to God and Man. Each passing age has tried to formulate the fact of religion in those terms of expression best suited to itself; and the definitions of religion are almost as innumerable as the sands upon the seashore. Some such definitions have nobly and well served their day and generation, and have been preserved in literature and life even down to our own day with a surprising degree of vitality. It is a surprising fact, full of significance, that each to whom religion means life will have his own definition of this greatest fact in his life: on the analogy of experience such a definition may be found to embody the *sentiments* of many other religious people in their own experience. But, from the very nature of the case, it cannot embody all that each will find satisfaction with. For it is the wonderful province of religion to fit so many and varied lives in so many and varied environments. Whether religion is the bond between man and God, we may be sure that it has a great deal to do with restoring man to the image of his creator: and all definitions, temporary as they must be, must make this the chief thing in religion when it is joined to human activity.

IV. But how did this Something we call religion originate? How came it to appear in the life of the race? Was it synchronous with the birth of the race in its emergence from the lower animal world, or is it the result of natural forces of development and subject to the laws of development and decay in the same manner that the structure of the body and all other

forms of organic life are subject to these laws? The story of the origin of religion is as fascinating as it is wonderful and diverse, and is a theme upon which the human mind can find much opportunity to dwell. Many are the ways in which it has been conceived that religion had its birth in the race, theories with which the common people ought to be acquainted just as much as the professional educator is acquainted with them. Religion has had such a wonderful fascination for men of very different temperaments and culture from the physicist to the psychologist, and each has his own technical way of speaking of this fact.

In Darwin's epoch-making book on *The Descent of Man*, he refers to the fact of religion and its development in the race; and speaks thus regarding religion as "belief in unseen or spiritual agencies," that contrary to the fact of all peoples believing in a God or gods—"this belief seems to be universal with the less civilized races." He seems to be quite content that religion is but such a belief; then he accepts, *in toto*, one might say, that doctrine of the origin of religion known as *Animism*, formulated by Dr. E. B. Tylor in 1865. This theory is that dreams first gave rise to the notion of spirits, and then the spirits were objectified and deified and man thus came to have his gods. In his monograph on *The Study of Religion* Dr. Jastrow points out the following objections to the animistic theory, as an explanation of religion: "Religious manifestations, however, precede even the appearance of *animism* as an explanation of the universe, and hence, as a theory for the origin of religion, the latter (*animism*) would be defective." This theory was, for a long time, in the balances, as it were, over against another once popular theory, given to the world a few years later—in 1870 to be more exact—by the brilliant candidate for honors as discoverer of evolutionary laws. In the *Fortnightly Review* for May 1, 1870, Spencer was able to formulate his theory of the origin of religion, after the collection of a vast amount of material from among modern primitive people, especially Australians, by an army of co-laborers. This theory accounts for the origin of religion in an extended belief in ghosts, shadows, and dreams, and is called *spiritism*. Neither the animistic nor the ghost theory of the origin of religion goes to its core. The source of religion must lie deeper than its manifestations of this character. Animism and ancestor-wor-

ship are *symptoms* of the actual religious experience of men. Each of these theories is true in a very narrow sense as Professor George Galloway, of Castle Douglas, Scotland, suggests in his important contribution to the science of religion, *The Development of Religion*.

Fetichism, totemism, and ancestor-worship have each been severally exploited as explanations, only to find, after a while, that they were as inadequate to explain the origin of religion as either the animism of Dr. Tylor (which has found the widest acceptance among scientists from the day of its announcement) or the spiritism of Spencer which has had little or no permanent place in the science of religion—despite the appearance of the remarkable book of a very loyal disciple, *The Religion of the Universe*, by Mr. J. Allanson Picton. As Jastrow remarks,

“Still less satisfactory (than the theory of animism) is the theory chiefly associated with Herbert Spencer (*Sociology*, ch. 8-17), which traces religion back to the worship of ancestors under the guise of ghosts as its sole factor.”

Another theory of the origin of religion is that which makes magic the mother of religion—of which the learned professor in the University of Liverpool, Dr. J. G. Frazer, is the enthusiastic sponsor. He holds and maintains that, in the failure of magic to hold men's minds and satisfy their deeper nature men turned to or developed religion—indeed a very ingenious theory! but one about as little accepted as the theory of Spencer. In a clever monograph on *Magic and Religion*, the versatile Scotch anthropological and folk-lore writer, Dr. Andrew Lang, shows good reasons for rejecting such a theory; and, in his Gifford Lectures on *The Making of Religion*, he takes up the various objections to the magic theory of the origin of religion.

Once more, it has been thought that the origin of religion was to be found in a revelation of God to man. The late Max Müller has left us his extended thoughts on this problem. To him there is a spiritual element in man which gave rise to a real religious feeling—what he characterizes as the “perception of the infinite.” This led him to further describe religion as the yearning of the soul after God, with the consequence, as already stated, that the source of religion is in the human heart. We may never arrive at a satisfactory explanation of the origin of religion, but time spent upon its consideration is

never lost. It repays a thousandfold! The analogy, I would like to note, in passing, regarding the origin of religion in primitive times and the trend of religious thinking of a popular kind to-day, appears in the various modern movements after a simplification of religion as seen in the religious denominations of the world—and the utterance of the most powerful facts of God in human life. To quote Dr. Jastrow once more, we may say, that

“the origin of religion, so far as historical study can solve the problem, is to be sought in the bringing into play of man’s powers of perception of the Infinite through the impression which the multitudinous phenomena of the universe as a whole make upon him.”

V. Another thing that the historical study of religion unmistakably impresses upon us is its permanency in the human heart. When once aroused, we may safely say that it can never really be put to eternal sleep.

“It accompanies man throughout his career, making its presence felt in every step that he takes on the golden ladder of progress. * * * The manner in which he strives to secure a proper relationship between himself in the last instance dependent, will be subject to frequent, if not constant change, as the conception of this relationship gradually takes on a more ideal shape.” (Jastrow, *Op. cit.*)

Being thoroughly convinced of the universality and permanency of religion, it would seem almost useless to ask “Do people need to be religious?” But there is every reason to believe that such a question is not only pertinent but needed to-day, especially as the distinction between Religion and Theology is generally vague in the popular mind.

VI. We have already seen that it is no easy task to define religion or yet to determine its entrance or mode of entrance into the life of the race. We can simply acknowledge the fact that it is, and for weal or woe, mortal man will be forever interested in it, for it is built in the very warp and woof of his being and constitution. The history of the rise and fall of nations indubitably enforces this fact in our consideration. But we may be able to come to some appreciable degree of understanding more fully what religion is by the process of elimination. That is to say, by learning what religion *is not*, rather than by affirmative reasoning and declaring what it is.

(1) Even a cursory study of religion will show us that it is connected with some kind of an institution—the family, the

clan, the tribe, the nation; or the ceremonies of the initiation at the age of puberty; the "medicine men," or shamans of primitive people; the temples of early civilization—and for the last two thousand years, especially, the extraordinary organization and machinery of the Christian church. But is religion an institution? Yes, and no. We can conceive of the time in the very early life of man when religion had no relation to an institution. Indeed, we have what I consider a classic instance of this in historical times of no very remote period: I now refer to the fact of the movements from Ur of the Chaldees, of Abraham, who, leaning heavily and in great faith on the Power with which his heart was not only in communion, but in the veriest harmony and unity of purpose, obeyed willingly and cheerfully the mysterious leading into the land of possession, and saw by the same faith and confidence the great family of whom he should be called the father and founder. Because Abraham was so genuinely a religious character, so human withal, it was necessary that that experience should ultimately formulate itself into an institution fitted to meet the needs of his descendants, even according to the very laws of their being—a united people,—a community of wonderful oneness, and the development of those social and moral laws, obedience to which secures the highest human efficiency and standard of life. The institution succeeded the religion, and religion was truly the foundation of the institution.

Another instance illustrating the truth that religion is not an institution is that afforded by the life and work of Jesus Christ. Having reached maturity of both body and soul, he comes out from the quietness of his mountain home permeated and passionated with the fact of God's presence in his own soul; he is deeply conscious, too, that all men everywhere are the children of God by the right of birth, but that they have alienated themselves from Him by their own lusts, passions and selfishness. And, to realize his own life work, it was necessary for him to break away from the ecclesiasticism and clericism of his own day, yes, he saw that indeed he must come out from among them in that unique separation which finally caused his death—namely this, that he was the son of God and that God worked in him His own divine purposes for the world. This close relationship between Abraham and God was called friendship, love; and the relation between Jesus and God was pic-

tured as that of Father and Son united in the ties of closest paternal and filial love, by the loyal obedience of Jesus to every divine impulse. It was not until late in his brief three years' ministry that he began to organize his followers and disciples, and that organization was no human accident, *but a human as well as a divine necessity*. We could not possibly picture the organization without the fact of Religion: (1) in the heart of the founder and leader to whom it was his very life, (2) then through the communication of that life to kindred spirits.

In what may be called immediate historic times we have another great instance of the same fact in religion, namely, the movement originating with Luther in the sixteenth century. It seems tremendously like a rebirth of Christianity in the light of history. For do we not find Jesus a Jew among his people—but whose heart was aflame with the passion of God—and the religious institutions of his day had shown their inability to meet the needs of humanity because they had shut out the *life* of men and bound themselves with forms and ceremonies, thus destroying *life*? In the case of the German peasant-boy who became priest, we have practically the same thing recurring. Organized religion was, yes, had killed itself, and all that remained of it was the merest casket and shell. Religion had been crushed under the weight of creed and ceremony and the blight of passion and sin in those who should have been its conservators. The young unsullied heart of the peasant priest, in its deep yearnings for the true life of God, was touched by the hand of the Great Spirit of All and filled with new light and life. And with and for him, henceforth, religion was to be a *life*, "*a living bright reality, more near, more intimately nigh, than e'en the sweetest earthly tie.*" Henceforth his glorious enthusiasm was the mainstay of a new burden for his own people—Justification by Faith alone. *Now* there was no necessity for church, priest, or pope. The human heart was to have free access to the throne of God, and nothing but Man's sinfulness was to interfere with such a relationship. And to make this more possible of realization, next to preaching according to the free message of his Scripture, was to make it possible to have that Scripture made over into the vernacular of his day and scattered broadcast over the land. Without this awakening in the heart of Luther, we can hardly see how

that great movement, of which he was the center, would have come about. It was first essentially a movement for the people—not as organized in some new institution, but as a *new life* which would realize itself within the compass of its own life-giving activities. It was a necessity, common to all movements in the race, that to reach their greatest efficiency men must be bound together for service; and so the Lutheran church became an institution for the diffusion of the new life (Vide Köstlin's *Martin Luther*; and Arthur P. McGifferts' *Life of Luther*, New York, 1911). Perhaps Tolstoi was justified in the belligerent attitude regarding the church, that he sustained in some of his correspondence with that brilliant French scholar and critic, Paul Sabatier, when he said: "Religion is truth and goodness; . . . I tell you frankly, I cannot agree with those who believe the church is an organization indispensable to religion." At any rate, his own experience with the Russian national church (the Greek church), and the type of mind and viewpoint of history resulting from that experience,—namely the apperception always of rioting, bigotry, and tyranny, which undeniably defile the pages of the history of the church—made such an impression as to be to him eminently justifiable.

By the enumeration of these three classic instances I think it becomes abundantly clear to us that *religion is not an institution*—but that it has in the largest sense always ultimately been identified with an institution. And even to-day the smallest religious sect, Protestant and non-conformist, gathers itself into an organization and an institution. Human beings can no more live apart and alone and know their true selves than they can become the sons of God while perpetrating outrages against the divine and human laws governing life and thought. The danger always is, that religion, when once organized, is perilously liable to allow the cold hand of reason and the blight of ceremony to come upon it—almost unaware—with their deadly effect. Or again, to become vitiated by a creeping paralysis of complacency and self-esteem, either of which is enough to sow the seeds of disintegration in the life of religion.

(2) Because religion has so long been conceived of as inseparable from a supernatural revelation given to persons and preserved in so-called sacred literature, we have been apt to think that religion is a book or a collection of books. The consequence has been, that, because they have been so conceived

of as divine, their contents are held not to have been liable to error or inaccuracy—in other words, they have been infallible in their contents and meaning for man. For the great fact is that almost every religion under the sun, ancient or modern—yes, even to the newest religion less than half a century old!—has its own sacred literature. Oftentimes this literature is so diverse within itself as to be seriously incompatible; and from the fact that one set of such literature is unintelligible to another part of the race, we may reasonably be sure that religion is not a book or books nor yet any amount of literature! The acceptance of literature as religion, or taking upon itself the right to determine whether one is religious, has wrought much harm and havoc in human lives, and men have been led into tragic extravagances. How true is this of the Jewish people in the years immediately preceding the Christ, and in fact contemporaneously with him: for did not the religionists of his day ask among themselves concerning him: “How speaks this man these things, seeing that he *knoweth not his letters?*” Mohammedanism with the *Koran* is on the same level as this low experience of the Jews. To come nearer home, it is not so long since that a man was regarded as being a religious man or an atheist or an infidel, accordingly as he held or refused to hold to certain things in the sacred books of the Jews and the Christians: for instance, the scientific or absolute accuracy of the creation story in Genesis and the fact of the involvement of all the race in the sin of Adam—or the literal inspiration of the Bible, in which it is held that every word even was dictated by the Divine Mind, in some such mechanical fashion as a lawyer would dictate a brief to a stenographer. Such literatures are valuable only as possessing in cold letter that form of life and type of religious experience in the growth of the race—and no word in them, *ipso facto*, must be accepted that is contrary to either historical or scientific fact. But they are full of vital meaning for the religious man as bringing him into closer contact with the working of the divine spirit in the hearts of men as they reached out to the light and life, and as they are actuated to better lives. *But religion is not literature, nor is literature religion.* We may say that, even if the Bible were taken away, Christianity would not cease to be—for it is that development of life that far transcends any set of books—it is a continuous, yes, the highest continuous motive

force in the lives of men whom it has touched and has its fairest fruitage in life, light, love, and service for humanity.

(3) Arising from the fact of the close relationship between an institution as expressive of religion in the life of men, and of a book professing to be its source, history is replete with instances where leaders in religious movements have tried to formulate their conceptions of both the institution and the book as things verily to be believed without question and as axiomatic, self-evident truths. In this manner we have the Credo of the institution or the church. As intellectualism and formalism laid hold on the institution, this creed, instead of being merely an instrument to help men into a better understanding of religion, was transformed into the fact of religion itself! And the pages of the history of many religious movements are blotted by this substitution of a means to an end—and that end a larger life—into the end perfect in itself! And one has only to read such books as the Hon. A. D. White's work on the *Warfare of Science and Theology* or Dr. Draper's *History of the Conflict between Religion and Science*.

(4) In man's efforts to formulate his ideas and knowledge of God and Man, he developed a theology—a science of God. And in very much the same way that the creeds were made an end in themselves, so theology found itself in the same danger—and that the acceptance of some specified theology too—e.g., that of Aquinas or Augustine in Christianity, or of Mohammed in Islamism. The resulting injury to the cause of true religion has caused much sorrow and suffering to genuinely religious souls. Theology is but an attempt of the reason to comprehend the fact of God and his exact relations to Man and the Universe, and must ever be subject to the changes which may be necessitated in the face of new experiences and new facts. *Theology only becomes vital when it is the offspring of genuine religious experience, but it can never become that Religion itself!* Man was religious ages before he ever thought about theology; so religion is not theology. What then is it?

VII. It has been characterized once in these words: "Pure religion and undefiled before God and the Father is this: to visit the widow and the fatherless, and to keep himself unspotted from the world"—so, then, we may say that religion is the true life of man in filial relation to God, showing itself in love and service.

We need religion because it affords the human character the proper opportunity to realize itself in its true sphere of activity. At heart, and divested of the shams and artificiality of our civilization, man is essentially an unselfish creature, lacking not one whit in the highest intelligent human and moral attributes and qualities which, in the animal world are but blind instinct. In every effort of service and exhibition of love, we show our inherent religious nature. Shall we then truthfully acknowledge this great fact of our nature and put ourselves in that attitude of heart and mind which shall best secure such a life as the only genuine expression of ourselves? or shall we continue to deceive ourselves with less than the real thing? For weal or woe, religion is and eternally will be. We are made in God's image and God's likeness; we are his children. What kind of children are we—loving? obedient? loyal? *Do we really know that we are the offspring of God?* There are only two kinds of people in the world, religious and irreligious, and the religious people are those who are living genuine human lives, happy, joyous and glad, souls full of music; while the irreligious people are those who are deluding themselves in seeking the shadow for the substance, the unreal for the real. They pride themselves on being the sons of God, when in truth they are bastards.

The one supreme thing that enters into the daily experiences of the race—experiences of joy or sorrow—is the divine interpretation that the religious man puts into them. Instead of being accidents of blind force or fate, they are but the keys into the heart of God's love. In the separation of loved ones by the exigencies of life, there is found the bond of unity kept unbroken at that

“place where spirits blend,
Where friend holds fellowship with friend,
Though sundered far by faith they meet
Around one common Mercy-seat.”

When that other great fact for all the race faces us, death, the religious man's sorrow is turned into deep and abiding peace, because he knows that the loved ones are

“Safe home in port, the harbor reached”

and enjoying greater happiness—for are they not at home? And those left behind have the confidence in their hearts that the

separation is but temporary. For when they too shall be called, by the same unrespecting power, they shall be forever with them.

Religion is at once that one companion which goes by our side throughout life in the eternal growth of the soul and a continuous revelation of the real beauties of life.

“Let each man think himself an act of God,
His mind a breath, his life a thought of God;
And let each try by great thoughts and great deeds,
To show the most of God and heaven he hath in him.”

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De la glossolalie chez les premiers chrétiens, et des phénomènes similaires—

Etude d'exégèse et de psychologie. EMILE LOMBARD. *Préface de Th. Flournoy.* Lausanne, Bridel; Paris, Fischbacher, 1910. xii, 254 p.

The "Académie" of Neuchâtel, Switzerland, was transformed two years ago into a "Université," and we have here the first doctor's dissertation in the "Faculté de Théologie;" it is a splendid start. Our discussion comes somewhat late perhaps; but it is never too late to call attention to a good book, and *De la glossolalie* will surely remain a standard work on the special question it treats, and a most valuable contribution to the psychology of religion in general. Flournoy—who is a *connoisseur*—does not hesitate to call it "une oeuvre capitale et définitive sur la glossolalie religieuse." To apply data of modern psychology to the interpretation of the Scriptures is not exactly new, but to apply them so well could probably be called new.

Lombard begins by giving a definition of glossolalia in the Apostolic Church, as accurate as possible, from the few texts on hand (especially the First Epistle to the Corinthians, and the Second Chapter of the Acts of the Apostles). Glossolalia is one of the "charisms" of the early Christian Church, like prophesying, or performing miracles. It is a product of divine inspiration, the person speaking in tongues not by *nous* but by *pneuma*, according to the Neoplatonic and Gnostic terminology. It requires usually interpretation; at times the effect on the listeners is intensified by the singing of the inspired phrases. An important difference between the two groups of passages mentioned, is that according to I Cor., XII-XIV, it seems that the "tongues" were of a purely spiritual character and spoken by no nation on earth; while according to Acts II (account of the Pentecost) they are tongues spoken in foreign countries, although unknown before by those now using them under the influence of the *pneuma* (*xenoglossia*.) Modern Bible scholars seem to agree that the notion of *xenoglossia*, as found in Acts, was introduced later into the question and thus may be left aside. Lombard adopts this interpretation (let us, however, remark here that it is adopted on purely exegetic grounds, and is based chiefly on the fact that Acts was written after Corinthians; this is interesting, but is not quite convincing that the idea of glossolalia was not originally connected with that of *xenoglossia* by reliable although oral tradition), and then has no difficulty in finding that the phenomenon is not confined to the time of the Apostolic Church. He finds glossolalia proper, or similar manifestations, in Israel, with the Pagans (in religious ceremonies, like mysteries, oracles); and in the Christian Church up to the second century (Montanists); and again in more recent manifestations, which have been minutely described either by the inspired persons themselves, or by psychologists who have found there a fruitful field of study. Lombard draws illustrations chiefly from the Irving revivals. The "prophets cévenols," the Welsh revivals, from individual cases like Le baron and Helen

Smith. Chapter V, (§I and II) which gives the psychological description and explanation of glossolalia, is a remarkably keen piece of analysis and shows a most sagacious use of the material collected. Of course the way had been prepared by the studies of Flournoy and Henry, but the original application of results already attained to the history of the early church is all Lombard's. His reconstruction, by analogy with modern glossolals, of those Christian meetings is absolutely convincing: namely the atmosphere of religious exaltation suggesting the idea of talking in tongues; and the contagion either directly by hearing a glossolal act, or indirectly by hearing of the enthusiasm created in assemblies by the rising of the glossolals; then, glossolalia growing more frequent all the time until it became an almost everyday expression of religious emotion, and a natural way of confessing one's faith like praying in a Salvation Army meeting. We also follow the various phases of the act itself of glossolaling: people are trying to express things for which they find no words, and thus use, at first, vague exclamations; now one of those exclamations more frequently occurring than others finally calls for some meaning, and such ideas like *Jesus*, or *God*, or *Sin* is associated with it; then a second, a third, a fourth meaningless sound is treated in the same fashion; a few such new words, joined by vague, senseless syllables, suggest some sort of a regular language. The longer one person keeps on the talking in tongues, the richer the vocabulary gets: an embryo of syntax (borrowed from the person's native tongue) is added to it and by and by, if sufficient time is allowed, a complete language is formed, like the "Martian" of Helen Smith.

The appreciation of the value of the glossolalia lies outside the pale of Lombard's work; but as a matter of fact the results of his psychological demonstration leave little doubt as to his attitude: glossolalia although the expression of a sincere and deep faith, of feelings of really superior nature, remains a childish expression; the idea of talking in tongues is legitimate, and by no means the sign of an inferior mind: St. Paul himself despairing to find human words to express his religious emotion, would occasionally "talk in tongues" and try coining a new, a supernatural language; but, of course, such an attempt even if carried some way, can contribute but little to the edification of the other members of the assembly,—since they cannot understand—, and therefore need not be encouraged. Lombard adopts entirely Paul's attitude, which is the "pragmatic" attitude: if people like to talk in tongues, let them do it *privatim*, it will still do them good, and not create disorder in assemblies.

A few critical observations: Lombard has a long passage on Psychology of Religion (IV, iii) which is not entirely satisfactory. One does not see exactly at first what the author is driving at, because he brings in elements that belong rather elsewhere in the book. Evidently what he wanted, and what he had to say was this: In No. I (of Chapter IV) we have seen the conditions under which glossolalia took place; in No. II *how* the phenomenon took place; therefore in No. III we ought to be able to infer *why* it took place, i.e., why people talked in tongues. And the answer is given, too, namely: man tries to express the inexpressible, and only a supernatural language will answer the purpose. But besides this answer, there are found in the same chapter all sorts of discussions which are either of an exegetic

character or of a theological character (various views on glossolalia by scholars); thus discussions which are out of place here. In other words, in No. I and II Lombard was a demonstrator, a psychologist, he discusses facts; in No. III he keeps on demonstrating but, besides discussing facts, he discusses theories,—he is still a psychologist, but, at the same time, he becomes a philosopher or a theologian: thus we miss the clear-cut psychological demonstration that we had enjoyed so much before. This can be altered in another edition.

Lombard simply states the difference between Corinthians (glossolalia=talking in supernatural tongues) and Acts (glossolalia=talking in foreign tongues, or xenoglossia); the notion of xenoglossia was introduced in later texts only, and thus he drops it altogether, ignores it in his book. But some reason there must be why xenoglossia is associated with glossolalia, and why glossolalia is a special feature of the Christian religion. Now it seems to me that one ought to remember that, if the account of the Pentecost is posterior to the writing of I Corinthians, on the other hand, the event of the Pentecost is anterior to the events discussed in I Corinthians; and nothing proves that the idea of xenoglossia was not already associated with the oral accounts of the Pentecost. Therefore I venture the following hypothesis: The apostles, at the Pentecost, were exalted over the idea of evangelizing the world; which led them *naturally* to the other idea, that in order to do this, they need acquaintance with foreign tongues. It occurred to them just as naturally as, e.g., it occurred to Helen Smith, that, if she gave herself as coming from Mars, she must possess some special language spoken in that planet. In that exaltation they begin to utter foreign sounds, which are taken by those present, and possibly by themselves, for the foreign languages needed for missionary work,—while it was only "Lallspiel," expressing their faith that they could go to various countries and be understood. Then, the account of the events at Pentecost spread, together with the report of glossolalia = xenolalia, and in various cities disciples of the Lord, seized with a great enthusiasm for the service of God, felt in themselves the same inspiration for talking in unknown languages. By and by, however, it had been found out that those who spoke in tongues were not able, for that, to evangelize foreign countries, in other words that glossolalia was not xenoglossia; but by this time glossolalia had already become one of the "charisms," and was not given up. If my suggestion is correct, then glossolalia would be really an outgrowth of xenoglossia, and the considerable part which glossolalia plays in the Christian Church is well enough explained. All the information and interpretation of Lombard not only remain as solid as before, but gain in probability; moreover, the rather small practical value of the "charism" is confirmed overmore.

Lombard is thoroughly equipped as far as literature on his special topic is concerned. I am inclined to think that he might have found valuable suggestions in the domain of general linguistics, if he had consulted others than Leroy and Wundt. Wundt after all is not a linguist by profession, and, if his work on that subject is suggestive at times, however, the lack of deep grasping is apparent all through. While writing this, I have not the library facilities that would enable me to give special references; but I remember at least one long study on artificial languages (schoolboy

languages, argots of all classes and all trades, even Volapük and Esperanto) by Richard M. Meyer in *Indogermanische Forschungen* (October, 1901). And this calls to my mind a curious relation between glossolalia as described by Lombard, and the esthetic theory of the modern poets called Symbolists. Glossolalia means an attempt to express inexpressible things by vague words or sounds; it means acting by mere suggestion, because the ordinary language is too coarse a book to express high and subtle emotions. Symbolists started from the same principle in the domain of poetry; their way of writing was to use the vaguest possible word, so as to keep as far removed as possible from current coarse ideation and leave things as ethereal as possible. The theory of glossolalia, as used by poets, would be expressed as adequately as possible in these words from Morice:

Ta pensée garde toi de la jamais nettement dire. Qu 'en des jeux de lumière et d'ombre elle semble se livrer toujours et s'échapper sans cesse—agrandissant de tels écarts l'esprit émerveillé d'un lecteur comme il doit être, attentif et soumis—jusqu 'au point final où elle éclatera magnifiquement en se réservant encore et toutefois, le nimbe d'une équivoque féconde afin que les esprits qui t'ont suivi soient récompensés de leurs peines par la joie tremblante d'une découverte qu'ils croiraient faire avec l'illusoire espérance d'une certitude qui ne sera jamais et la réalité d'un doute délicieux. Ainsi sauvegardé par celle initiale prudence d'éviter la précision tu iras, Poète, par tes propres intuitions restées indépendantes, plus loin dans les voies même purement rationnelles que les plus méthodiques philosophes et la plume te deviendra talisman d'invention, de vérité * * * . (Ch. Morice. *La littérature de tout à l'heure*. 1886.)

And should you want to press a little more the comparison and see the transition between the unconscious process of extatic glossolalia (Helen Smith, e.g.) and the conscious process of symbolists, examples will be found in Richard Dehmél, the famous modern German poet who simply outdid the symbolists, for he deliberately suggested thoughts by sounds instead of suggesting them by vague words. Here, for instance, is the refrain invented by this author, for the poem, called *Der Glühende* (note the title in connection with the refrain):

*Singt mir das Lied vom Tode und vom Leben
Dagloni, gleia, glühlala.*

ALBERT SCHINZ.

Jamaica Negro Proverbs and Sayings, Collected and Classified according to Subjects, by IZETT ANDERSON, M. D., and FRANK CUNDALL, F. S. A. Kingston, Jamaica: The Institute of Jamaica, 1910. 48 p.

This collection of 737 Jamaica Negro proverbs and sayings is of interest here by reason of such items as relate to folk-religion and its linguistic expression. The following sayings of a more or less religious character may be cited:

48. When cow' tail cut off, God-a-mighty brush fly.
140. Cunny better dan obeah (i.e., Cunning is better than witchcraft).
162. If you get your han' in a debil mout' tek time tek it out.

163. If you yearry (i.e., hear) debil a come, clear de way.
164. I eat wid de debil, but I cautious a him.
165. It hard fe keep out de debil, but it wus fe dribe him out.
166. Accidental shot may kill Satan.
187. Ebery dog hab him day, but puss hab Sunday.
244. Duppy know who be frighten.
329. Chicken 'member God when him drink.
353. Godamighty never shut him yeye.
354. Godamighty no lub ugly.
355. Godamighty mek man 'traight, a rum mek him can't 'tan' up.
356. Big Massa (i.e., God) gib ebery man him oun mout'-water fe swaller him oun ducanoo (cornmeal cake).
357. When poor slave look through smoke glass, a no Godamighty fault dat Him wull look dingy.
358. Godamighty only mek you see 'tar, no matter which way wind blow.
557. Parson christen him our pickney, fus'.
587. Pr'yer in de mout' only, is no pr'yer.
680. Ebery day debil help tief, one day God help watchman.

Of these proverbs No. 48 is the equivalent of our "God tempers the wind to the shorn lamb;" No. 162 warns one to "act cautiously in getting out of a difficulty;" No. 164 is our "who would sup with the Devil need have a long spoon;" No. 164 corresponds to the Scotch "Better keep the deil oot than hae to turn him oot;" No. 187, which signifies "every one has his chance in turn," is based on the fact that "the dog is petted when he goes out with his master, while the cat has his chance when the master is at home on Sunday." No. 244 corresponds to the Scotch "Freits follow those who look to them." For No. 329 there is a variant, "When fowl drink water him say 'tank God,' when man drink water, him say nuttin," the reference being to the action of fowls in lifting their heads after drinking. No. 357 is certainly noteworthy. The interpretation of No. 680 seems to be "Murder will out," or "Crime will be discovered sooner or later." As the authors note, "comparatively few of these proverbs can be traced to their African origin." Quite a number of sayings are "more or less Biblical in character." The tendency of the Negroes to improvise proverbs, just as they improvise verses to their songs, gives rise to "two or three renderings of the same saying;" and very often one meets "the same idea clothed in different words." Many Jamaican Negro proverbs are nothing more than "European proverbs turned into meanings more readily understood of the people."

A. F. C.

Die Dichtung der Afrikaner. Hamburgische Vorträge von CARL MEINHOF. Berlin: Buchhandlung der Berliner ev. Missionsgesellschaft, 1911. 179 p.

The eight sections of this book treat of the *märchen*, the myth, the *sage*, the epic, cult-compositions, the beginnings of dramatic art, proverb and riddle, minor poems and songs. The author is well known through

his African linguistic researches. The material is compiled from various reputable sources. As the author points out (p. 10), when, in 1889, E. Meinhof published his *Märchen aus Kamerun*, many would scarcely believe that an African could tell such beautiful and charming stories, so like our *märchen*. Moreover, protests came even from Africa, made by people who had had daily intercourse with the Negroes, and thought they ought to know about such matters. Since then the literature of African folk-lore has assumed such proportions as to silence effectually such arguments. Dr. Meinhof seems to follow Wundt in his ideas of the succession of *märchen*-subjects in the development of the child and of the race, viz., human beings, animals, plants or flowers, moon and other heavenly bodies. In the African *märchen* animals play a great rôle, but plants are little represented; nor are the heavenly bodies of very great importance,—the moon is often much more prominent than the sun. The tale of the wager is known over the whole continent; so also the story of the stupid and the wise animal,—as wise the hare or the jackal often figures, as stupid the lion, the panther or the hyena. That the hare should be given such a superior rôle is thought by some to indicate influence from India, as the author suggests (p. 17), but this view is not at all necessary. The appearance and rôle of the snake, as intermediary between this and the spiritworld, Meinhof explains, again with Wundt, as due to the belief that "the cold animals, that creep forth out of the ground, or live in the water, have a special relation to the realm of the dead, and are looked upon as the 'souls' of ancestors, who have come out of their graves again."

In Africa, according to Dr. Meinhof, cosmogonic and anthropogonic myths "have little or nothing to do with cults, but move about among the religious exercises like simple *märchen*-material." They are probably considered as purely poetical products. In African mythology, as here considered, sky and earth, the origin of man, demons, ghosts, wood-spirits, the origin of death, the interpretation of natural phenomena, and many other subjects all figure. For the half-animal and half-human, long-tailed demons or hobgoblins appearing in certain stories of the Masai the author again sees the influence of India (p. 36). The sacrifice-myth given on pages 38-39 expresses the real folk-spirit and, whether borrowed or genuinely African, is characterized by beauty and poetic truth. The *sage* "is the mother of history," and here Africa is represented both by hero-tales and totemic legends. Interesting are the stories of the Ziba in which the Supreme Being is represented as blond. This, Dr. Meinhof thinks, has some historical basis. But in other parts of Africa, and elsewhere also in the world, uncivilized peoples have made their heroes or their gods of another color or another race than their own,—and no mass-contact, or very marked foreign influence is needed to explain these facts." One of the first approaches to epic poetry in Africa, according to Dr. Meinhof, is to be found in the laudatory songs so common among many peoples. These run all the way from a song of a few lines in praise of some chief to such a self-song of many verses as the chant of the Basuto Chief Kukutle, given on pages 65-66. The way the Kafirs tell history "is strongly suggestive of the epic" (an interesting specimen is given, pp.

68-70). Dr. Meinhof remarks (p. 70) that "Verse is found in Africa, only where Asiatic influence is present, Christian, e.g., in Abyssinia, Mohammedan elsewhere,"—thus the songs of the Somali have fixed rhythms. Concerning the Somali and their great love for poetry, the author observes with respect to two incidents on record (one tribe promised not to avenge the theft of 100 camels if the chief who had stolen them would sing a great song about his deed; a threatening feud was once settled by the song of a blind poet), "are we not in the days of Homer?" The general impression made by Africa is that of antiquity,—Asia Minor gives merely the impression of the Middle Ages, when one is transported thither immediately from Europe. The epic stories of the Mohammedan Suaheli (pp. 77-90) are of interest in the matter of the mingling of races and religions.

The section on cult-songs, etc. (pp. 93-112) treats of the Bushmen, Masai and Nandi, Jagga, Zulus, Basuto, etc. According to Dr. Meinhof, the magic formula "is perhaps the origin of all poetry." The poetic form of cult-songs is, to begin with, "simple, like that of the simplest prayer." Besides simple repetition by the monologist, there is repetition of the same thing by a chorus, after the soloist has chanted it,—later come the soloist and the choir as singers of different parts, as in the Masai production on page 97. Among cult-compositions are to be reckoned "magic songs," songs of medicine-men, certain prayers (especially among the Nandi, Masai and Galla, who have a sort of monotheism), etc. It is remarked also (p. 101) that "the songs of children are partly old magic-songs,"—this statement often holds of uncivilized peoples as well as of civilized Europeans, etc. The puberty festivals (e.g., of the Basuto boys and girls) are sometimes the most important religious acts in the life of the individual, but it does not appear that the songs are necessarily cult-songs (p. 103). But the language of many of these songs is unintelligible, so their import might be almost anything. On pages 109-112 the use of the cult-song in the mother-tongue by the Christian missions is considered. In several religions, among Zulus, Basuto, some peoples of Togo-land, gifted natives have been encouraged to sing Christian ideas in the forms of their national poetry (e.g., Untsikana, a famous Xosa-Kafir). This has produced, for the purposes needed, much more effective literature than is furnished by the hymns, etc., of ardent missionaries, even when they have had some real knowledge of the native tongues. The beginnings of dramatic art are seen in the imitation of animals and in real pantomime as met with among the Hottentots (who are so passionately fond of dancing), representations of historical events, battles, etc. As preparation for the drama proper serve the plays of children (often imitative of the acts of adults, the doings of animals, etc.), dances and their paraphernalia, hero-songs (practically often the monology of a heroic drama), *märchen* (where occur often genuine dialogues,—examples are given on pages 127-131), etc. On page 124 the opinion is expressed that the secular dance has grown up out of the cult-dance. Dr. Meinhof notes the horrible and fearsome character of some of these African dances and pantomimes with their masks and *outré* dresses, ornaments, etc., and brings this aspect of them into connection with the

fear-theory of the origin of tragedy advocated by European authorities. In modern Africa as in ancient Greece, "the fearful and the burlesque, tragedy and comedy, lie close to one another."

The fact that African proverbs are the expression of African everyday life makes the understanding of some of them (cf. the interpretation on page 137 of the Suaheli proverb about shaving one's self) difficult for a European. A knowledge of the *vie intime* of African animals is also needed. There are, of course, many African proverbs that correspond aptly enough to familiar European ones (e.g., to the German *Man soll das Kind nicht mit dem Bade ausschütten* corresponds the Togo *One doesn't burn up a dirty dress*). Some of the African proverbs reveal unexpected depths of feeling and sentiment. As examples of this the author cites such as the following:

A beautiful town is not so beautiful as home (Togo).

For the disease of love there is no physician (Herero).

Peace comes only at the point of the sword (Suaheli).

As an expression of love of liberty the Herero proverb, "the guinea-hen does not breed in captivity," might have come from some member of a civilized race, like the saying about peace and the sword. Some of the satiric proverbs are equally impressive (e.g., the Jaggá "there is no woman who tells another woman to wash her face"). Proverbs relating to religion are said to be rare (p. 146); they are most often found among the Mohammedan Suaheli (a proverb of the Ziba of German East Africa runs, "You see the temple, and yet ask where God lives"). The Suaheli have many proverbs in poetical form. Among many African peoples there is a fixed fashion of asking riddles, and some of the riddle-questions are very complicated. The minor literary products of African peoples considered on pages 153-155, include work-songs, travel-songs, songs in *märchen*, herdsmen's songs, satirical songs, wedding-songs, hunting-songs, war-songs, mourning-songs, dance-songs, love-songs (some of the Suaheli love-songs, according to Dr. Meinhof, suggest Arabic models), etc. A really good dance and love song of the Suaheli, given on pages 177-178, treats of true conjugal love. The author has probably underestimated the element of nature-observation in African primitive poetry and folk-literature,—to the few examples cited on pages 170-171 others could certainly be added, particularly from the Masai, etc.

As a résumé of the chief facts concerning literary composition among the uncivilized peoples of Africa Dr. Meinhof's book will be very useful. But too close adhesion to the Wundtian theory of the evolution of the various forms of the literary products of mankind is hardly to be recommended.

A. F. C.

Folk Stories from Southern Nigeria, West Africa. By ELPHINSTONE DAYRELL, F. R. G. S., F. R. A. I. With an Introduction by ANDREW LANG. With Frontispiece. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1911. xvi, 159 p.

This book gives the English texts only of forty tales on all sorts of topics from "the tortoise with a pretty daughter" to "the woman with

two skins;" and from "why worms live underground" to "the King and the ju-ju tree." They were collected among the Negroes of Southern Nigeria by Major Dayrell, District Commissioner for that part of the British Empire. In an interesting Introduction (pp. vii-xvi), Andrew Lang discusses each tale briefly and points out its analogues in folk-tale and folk-lore the world over. "The woman with two skins," e.g., is "a peculiar version of the story of the courteous Sir Gawain with his bride, hideous by day, and a pearl of loveliness by night;" "the pretty stranger" is "a native variant of Judith and Holofernes." A dozen or more are simply "just so stories," plain, or elaborate. Several of these tales have to do with religion, some others are really cosmogonic myths. The story of the retreat of the sun and moon into the sky (pp. 64-65) is *sui generis*; and Mr. Lang styles the story of the lightning and the thunder (pp. 70-71), "quite an original myth," but "much below the divine dignity of such myths elsewhere." The tale of the King and the ju-ju tree is "a fine example of ju-ju beliefs." Concerning these tales in general Mr. Lang makes the following remarks (p. xvi):

"The most striking point in the tales is the combination of good humor and good feeling with horrible cruelties, and the reign of terror of the Egbos and lesser societies. European influences can scarcely do much harm, apart from whiskey, in Nigeria. As to religion, we do not learn that the Creator receives any sacrifice: in savage and barbaric countries. He usually gets none. Only Ju Jus, whether ghosts or fiends in general, are propitiated. The Other is 'too high and too far.'" This is a handy and useful little book.

A. F. C.

The Numeration, Calendar Systems and Astronomical Knowledge of the Mayas. By CHARLES P. BOWDITCH. Privately printed. Cambridge:

The University Press, 1910. xviii, 346 p. Plates I-XIX, figs. 1-64.

This well-printed volume contains the results of a serious study of the Maya hieroglyphs by a competent American investigator, familiar with both the Codices and the glyphs on the stone monuments of Yucatan, Guatemala, etc. The hieroglyphs of the Mayas are the *crux* of American archeology, and the inscriptions left by these more or less civilized Indians of Central America appear to be mostly, if not entirely of a calendaric, or semi-religious character, having to do, like certain figures in the Codices and others on the stelae and the great stone monoliths and elsewhere in the temple ruins, etc., probably with anniversaries, festivals, memorial and ceremonial occasions and the like. So far, no complete and satisfactory interpretation of the "Maya hieroglyphs" has been found,—no Rosetta stone, or bilingual inscription such as solved similar problems in Egypt and Asia Minor, has turned up, or is ever likely to. All efforts to obtain illuminating knowledge from the Mayas of the present day (possibly they really have none) have failed. But at points, here and there, workers like Mr. Bowditch are plodding away in the hope that something important may soon be discovered that will go far toward settling the matter.

The present volume, besides treating of the mathematical and limitedly calendaric aspects of the subject (use of lines and dots in numeration,

higher numbers, methods of fixing dates, intercalary days, methods of marking the passage of time, methods of calculating time), discusses, in more or less detail, the meanings of the day and month signs with their variations, the glyphs marking counts, calendaric rounds, periods, cycles, grand cycles, "wheels," etc. The knowledge of the Mayas concerning the heavenly bodies and their motions, and the important part in their life and customs played by the *tonalamatl* (the Mexican name of the period of 260 days,—the name is also applied to a divination calendar or ritual of feasts, etc.) are likewise briefly considered. Dr. Förstemann, a distinguished German investigator of Maya antiquities, was of opinion that these Indian chroniclers recorded the lunar revolutions, also those of Mercury and Jupiter, as well as those of Mars and Venus. But Mr. Bowditch (p. 236) considers it doubtful whether the Mayas observed the synodical revolutions of Mars, though they evidently did those of Venus, and probably Jupiter, but not Saturn (they hardly "discovered the Copernican theory"). The so-called "planet signs" need very careful study. Venus counts for much in this part of the world. The Maya periods of time seem to have been: *Kin* (day), *uinal* (20 days), *tun* (360 days), *katun* (7,200 days),—also cycle of 144,000 days and *grand cycle* of 13 or 20 *cycles*, for which last two periods no Maya names are known. Concerning the knowledge of the Mayas Mr. Bowditch remarks (p. 199):

"But with a nation which had remained in the same general area long enough to have enabled them to keep records which have as a basis a date more than 3,000 years in the past, and to fix the length of the year as accurately as 365 days, and which, as is probably shown by the Dresden codex, had worked out the length of the revolutions of the moon and of the synodical revolutions of Venus, the observations made by them must have been very accurate." As compared with the Mayas, so far as is known, "the Mexicans used no method of recording time like the long count, built up of *kins*, *uinals*, *tuns*, *katuns* and cycles," and "therefore, they had no such plan of recording time as is found in the thirteen-*katun* count" (p. 334).

Mr. Bowditch has his own method of finding the day reached by the Maya system of time notation, differing from those of Förstemann and Goodman. He also holds that *ahau* was not a synonym of *katun*. As to the general character of the Maya hieroglyphs themselves the author expresses the opinion that we have here no real phonetic alphabet,—“the phonetic use of syllables,—the rebus form,—called by Dr. Brinton the ‘ikonomatic’ system, is probably the solution of the question” (p. 254). The disappointing “alphabet” of Bishop Landa “was probably merely a collection of the signs which would be used by the Mayas to recall the sounds of the words of the church service; thus, if the priest asked them what sign would be used to recall the first syllable of the word ‘Ave,’ they would draw the head of the turtle or *Ac*.” The writing of the Mayas, however, was on a different plane from that of the Aztecs, for, as Mr. Bowditch points out (p. 255): “As far as I am aware, the use of this kind of writing was confined, among the Aztecs to the name of persons and

places, while the Mayas, if they used the rebus form at all, used it also for expressing common nouns and possibly abstract ideas. The Mayas surely used picture-writing and the ideographic system, but I feel confident that a large part of their hieroglyphs will be found to be made up of rebus forms, and that the true line of research will be found to lie in this direction." It is thus "very important, indispensable indeed, that the student of the Maya hieroglyphs should become a thorough Maya linguist." The author also thinks that the consonantal sound of a syllable was of far greater importance than the vowel sound, so that a form could be used to represent a syllable, even if the vowel and consonant sounds were reversed." The list of the Maya day-names (pp. 263-265), with their meanings as suggested by various investigators past and present, shows how much has yet to be done to change guesses into certainties. A. F. C.

Unsere ältesten Vorfahren, ihre Abstammung und Kultur von DR. HEINRICH MICHELIS. Mit 14 Textfiguren. Leipzig and Berlin: Druck und Verlag von B. G. Teubner, 1910. 35 p.

This pamphlet treats in readable fashion, with references to the literature of the subject in footnotes, of the descent of man, the culture of our oldest ancestors and the primitive history of mankind in the light of the theory of evolution and modern civilized man. Naturally there are few items here relating to religion. The origin of cremation is placed in the metal period (p. 27). Grave-gifts were common then also; likewise stone burial-places for several or many individuals. The beginnings of agriculture belong to the later stone age and domestic animals counted for much in neolithic times. The author seems to adopt (p. 24) the "magic" theory of the art of cave-man. Dr. Michelis gives expression (p. 20) to the following rather *outré* opinion: "The Hindu twirling-stick for fire-making, the hooked cross, the *swastika*, indicates the primitive cult of mankind. In it we have also the origin of the Christian symbolism of the cross and the Christian cult itself. A direct line of evolution leads from the simple stone block of primitive times to the high altar of the modern church, from the heathen sacrificial fire of long vanished ages, past the Agni cult of the ancient Hindus, the Vesta worship of the old Romans, and the sacred hearth-fire of the Teutons, down to our own times,—with the ever burning lamp of the Catholic Church." After saying this much about the "fire-cross" and its significance today and yesterday, the author considers the effects of the glacial age upon early European man. The Edda is right, he thinks, in making Ymir, the giant and first of the gods, arise from melting blocks of ice. Old Teutonic mythology bears many marks of the age of ice: "The earth arose from the contact of two worlds,—cold Nifelheim and hot Muspelheim. Primitive man, living on the edge of the slowly melting glacial world, left behind him in tradition, in his original myth of the origin of earth, a clear picture of his earliest and simplest beliefs" (p. 25). A. F. C.

History of Anthropology. By ALFRED C. HADDON with the help of A. HINGSTON QUIGGIN. [Issued for the Rationalist Press Association Limited.] London: Watts & Co., 1910. x, 158 p. Ill.

This welcome sketch of the development of anthropological science in its various aspects divides the subject into Physical and Cultural Anthropology. Under the first head are considered: The pioneers of physical anthropology, the systematizers of physical anthropology, anthropological controversies, the unfolding of the antiquity of man, comparative psychology, and the classification and distribution of man. Under the second: Ethnology: its scope and sources, the history of archeological discovery, technology, sociology and religion, linguistics, cultural classification and the influence of environment. There is a bibliography (pp. 155-156), supplementing the references in the text; also an index of authors, but none of subjects. A few more names ought to be added to the list of the pioneers of anthropology as given here; certainly on page 148, in connection with Gallatin ought to be mentioned Thomas Jefferson, whose ethnological opinions and activities the writer of this review has made the topic of a brief study (*Amer. Anthropol.*, Vol. 9, N. S., 1907, pp. 499-509). The sections which particularly interest us for this Journal are those on "Comparative Psychology" (pp. 78-87) and "Sociology and Religion" (pp. 128-143). Under comparative psychology, phrenology, psychical research, ethnic psychology, folk-psychology, experimental psychology and eugenics are touched upon. As representing notably in America the anthropological-psychological field, the name of Dr. F. Boas should find place here beside those of Bastian and Wundt,—he is mentioned only on p. 69, in connection with the Negro question; his book on *The Mind of Primitive Man* appeared since Dr. Haddon's volume was published, but the material included in it, was already largely available in essays contributed to scientific periodicals, etc. In the consideration of sociology and religion Brinton should have received at least mention; and in a new edition Dr. P. Ehrenreich's *Die allgemeine Mythologie und ihre ethnologischen Grundlagen* (Leipzig, 1910) and Dr. A. A. Goldenweiser's *Totemism: An Analytical Study* (N. Y., 1910), originally published in the *Journal of American Folk-Lore* (Vol. 23, 1910) are important enough for special consideration, the last as embodying the new conceptions of the "American school" of anthropologists. With the reference to *orenda* (p. 136) might have gone mention of J. N. B. Hewitt and Miss A. C. Fletcher. As Prof. Haddon points out (p. 137), anthropology has studied but little the belief aspect of religion, having hitherto "practically confined its attention to ritual and myth, and but too frequently extensively to the last." On page 140, with reference to the theories of the origin of religion set forth at various times, such as star-worship, euhemerism, fetishism, nature-worship, ancestor-worship, totemism, the remark is made that "these hypotheses were based on the erroneous assumption that savage religions represented the primitive mode of thought, out of which civilized religions had evolved." And the author cites, with approval, the statement of G. F. Moore, that "we can learn a great deal from the lowest existing religions, but they cannot tell

us what the beginning of religion was, any more than the history of language can tell us what was the first human speech." Prof. Haddon sees some danger in the *renaissance* of the nature-mythology theories of the school of Frobenius, Ehrenreich, etc.

A. F. C.

The Mind of Primitive Man. By FRANZ BOAS. A Course of Lectures delivered before the Lowell Institute, Boston, Mass., and the National University of Mexico, 1910-1911. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1911. xi, 294 p.

This book, wherein are embodied the results of years of personal investigation and study of primitive peoples at first hand, together with the author's mature thoughts concerning the many problems involved from the point of view of psychological anthropology, will be welcomed by all interested in the history of man individually and racially considered. Expert in somatology, in ethnology, in mythology and folk-lore, and in linguistics, an investigator in the field, as well as in the laboratory, Professor Boas' authority to speak on certain matters relating to the nature and significance of racial differences and resemblances, the origin and the connection of the forms of human culture found among savage and barbarous peoples and their interpretation for the history of the evolution of human civilization, etc., is of the very highest order, and, in many cases uniquely satisfying. Besides a summary (pp. 243-250) the volume contains nine chapters devoted to the following topics: Racial prejudices, the influence of environment upon human types, influence of heredity upon human types, the mental traits of primitive man and of civilized man, race and language, the universality of cultural traits, the evolutionary view point, some traits of primitive culture, race-problems in the United States. Several of these chapters are the revised and enlarged forms of papers published during the period 1894-1910 in various scientific periodicals, monographs, etc. Pages 279-294 are occupied by notes of a bibliographic nature,—an alphabetically arranged bibliography might have been better; and an index would have been useful.

The most important conclusions reached by the author are these: On the whole, hereditary traits, more particularly hereditary higher gifts, are at best a possible, but not a necessary, element determining the degree of advancement of a race (p. 245). Historical events appear to have been much more potent in leading races to civilization than their faculty, and it follows that achievements of races do not warrant us in assuming that one race is more highly gifted than the other (p. 17). Hardly any evidence can be adduced to show that the anatomical characteristics of the races possessing the highest civilization were phylogenetically more advanced than those on lower grades of culture; the various races differ in this respect, the specifically human characteristics being most highly developed, some in one race, some in another (p. 245). A direct relation between physical habitus and mental endowment does not exist (p. 245). One of the most potent causes of modifications of the anatomical structure and physiological functions of man, leading to dif-

ferences of type and action between primitive and civilized groups of the same race, must be looked for in the progressive domestication of man incident to the progress of civilization (p. 75). The differences between different types of man, are, on the whole, small as compared with the range of variation in each type (p. 94). The average faculty of the white race is found to the same degree in a large proportion of individuals of all other races; and, although it is probable that some of these races may not produce as large a proportion of great men as our own race, there is no reason to suppose that they are unable to reach the level of civilization represented by the bulk of our own people (p. 123). The hereditary mental faculty does not seem to have been improved by civilization (p. 247). Language does not furnish the much-looked-for means of discovering differences in the mental status of different races (p. 154). Linguistic relationships and racial relationships are not interchangeable terms (p. 124). Types, languages, and culture are not so intimately connected that each human race is characterized by a certain combination of physical type, language and culture (p. 125). All attempts to correlate racial types and cultural stages have failed; cultural stage is essentially a phenomenon dependent upon historical causes, regardless of race (p. 249). The change from primitive to civilized society includes a lessening of the number of the emotional associations, and an improvement of the traditional material that enters into our habitual mental operations (p. 250). But, while in the logical processes of the mind we have a decided tendency, with the development of civilization, to eliminate traditional elements, no such marked decrease in the force of traditional elements can be found in our activities; these are controlled by custom almost as much among ourselves as they are among primitive man (p. 242). The existence of a large mulatto population in the United States is, of itself, enough to prove that the alleged "race-instinct" of the whites is not a physiological dislike but rather a repetition of the old instinct and fear of the connubium of patricians and plebeians, of the European nobility and the common people, or of the castes of India (p. 273). As all races have contributed in the past to cultural progress in one way or another, so they will be capable of advancing the interests of mankind, if we are only willing to give them a fair opportunity (p. 278).

Dr. Boas' volume should be read by all interested in the problem of human civilization, and particularly that aspect of it concerned with the relations of so-called "higher" and "lower" races. If they are not, as is so often the case, beyond the reach of argument and blind to the connection of facts, the Southern Negrophobe and the Northern Teutonophile will both be able to profit by it. Special attention might be called to the treatment by Dr. Boas of certain topics within the general discussion. Such, e.g., are: the difference between the civilization of the Old World and that of the New (p. 8),—essentially a difference in time, and the "precocity" of Mediterranean culture; the importance of the effect of rate of development upon the final form of body and of mind (p. 49); the effects of the "domestication" of man (pp. 65-75); the phenomena of race-mixture (pp. 78-81); the small ancestral group and

the origin of "local races" (p. 88); the rôle of the individual in primitive culture (pp. 112-114); the question of relapses of educated "savages" and civilized Robinson Crusoes (pp. 120-12); the "Aryan problem" (pp. 133-136); the achievements of the earliest ancestors of man (pp. 165-166) and the dissemination of cultural elements from tribe to tribe; the phenomena of convergent evolution (p. 186); the nature of "totemism" (p. 190),—not a single psychological problem, but embracing the most diverse psychological elements.

For religious psychology and sociology Dr. Boas has much of value, particularly in those sections of the book dealing with the mental traits of primitive man and the distribution of culture-phenomena among the various races of man, past and present. On pages 105-114, Dr. Boas effectually disposes of the argument that primitive peoples as such lack the power to inhibit impulses, have no power of attention or concentration of mind, are without the power of original thought, etc. Here, "the difference in attitude of civilized man and of primitive man disappears if we give due weight to the social conditions in which the individual lives" (p. 108). The alleged "improvidence" of primitive man had often better be deemed "optimism," as we call it when found among civilized Europeans or Americans. In the religious ideas and institutions of primitive peoples may be found abundant evidence of the influence of the independent thought of individuals,—this is particularly true of certain American Indian tribes (p. 112), and "may be observed in the increasing complexity of esoteric doctrines intrusted to the care of a priesthood." An interesting example of the adoption of new and modification of old ideas is to be found in the "Ghost Dance" religion of the Plains Indians, and other North American tribes. And Dr. Boas informs us that "the notion of a future life of an Indian tribe of Vancouver Island has undergone a change in this manner, in so far as the idea of the return of the dead in children of their own family has arisen" (p. 113). On this point, the author expresses the opinion that "the mental attitude of individuals who thus develop the beliefs of a tribe is exactly that of the civilized philosopher." In the section on race, language and culture, a place might have been found, perhaps, for a more extended discussion of the connection of language with religion, or rather of the phenomena of a linguistic nature accompanying the development of religious ideas and beliefs, a topic which the author has touched upon in the Introduction to the *Handbook of Indian Languages* (vol. 1, Washington, 1911), published by the Bureau of American Ethnology. The possibility of the rapid spread of cultural achievements is exemplified in the history of cultivated plants, domestic animals, etc., but "perhaps the best proof of transmission is contained in the folk-lore of the tribes of the world." Here, the following remark of the author is much to the point (p. 169): "The culture of any given tribe, no matter how primitive it may be, can be fully explained only when we take into consideration its inner growth as well as its relation to the culture of its near and distant neighbors, and the effect that they may have exerted." The complete generalization involved in the viewpoint of so many evolutionists that there has been "a correlation between industrial

development and social development, and therefore a definite sequence of inventions as well as of forms of organization and of belief," lacks proof—cf. the facts in the distribution of the arts of pottery and metallurgy. This is especially true in the field of primitive religion, mythology and folk-lore, where it has been "inferred that because many conceptions of the future life have evidently developed from dreams and hallucinations, all notions of this character have had the same origin." The improbability of the use of masks all over the world having had a single origin is another case in point. Totemism, again, is, doubtless, of multiform derivation, as Goldenweiser has demonstrated in his recent monograph on that much-discussed subject. Only in a limited sense can it be true that there exists "a uniform development of culture among all the different races of man and among all tribal units" (p. 195). We must take into consideration here "a peculiar tendency of diverse customs and beliefs to converge toward similar forms," and remember that "anthropological phenomena, which are in outward appearance alike, are psychologically speaking, entirely distinct, and that, consequently, psychological laws covering all of them cannot be deduced from them." Herein consists one of the distinctions between the general European school of anthropologists and the "new" American, as Dr. Lowie well brings out in his discussion of "A New Conception of Totemism" in the *American Anthropologist* (N. S. vol. 13, 1911, pp. 189-207). The study of *tabu*, which looms so large sometimes in the religious and related ideas of savage and barbarous peoples offers many problems of a similar nature. Dr. Boas, e.g., thinks (p. 222) that "it is very likely that the Eskimo taboo forbidding the use of caribou and of seal on the same day may be due to the alternating inland and coast life of the people." Thus we would have an unconscious origin for a peculiar custom, as may be the case also with the fish-*tabu* of some of the Southwestern tribes, i.e., the impossibility of obtaining fish in a certain habitat developed into the custom of not eating fish. The continuation solely through force of habit of actions considered proper or improper is exemplified numerously in the customary actions of civilized peoples to-day, as well as among primitive peoples. The field of ritual is very important here, for, as Dr. Boas says (p. 229) "in our day, the domain of ritual is restricted, but in primitive culture it pervades the whole life; not a single action of any importance can be performed that is not accompanied by prescribed rites of more or less elaborate form." In many cases, "rites are more stable than their explanations," and "they symbolize different ideas among different peoples and at different times." The characteristic trait of "nature-myths," according to Dr. Boas, is "the association between the observed cosmic events and what might be called a novelistic plot based on the form of life with which people are familiar" (p. 230),—one distinction between folk-tale and nature-myth "lies solely in the association of the latter with cosmic phenomena," an association that "does not naturally develop in modern society," and, "if it is still found every now and then, is based on the survival of the traditional nature-myth." With regard to mythology, it is well said (p. 234) that "the same kind of tales are current over enormous areas, but the mythological use to which they are

put is locally quite different." To sum up in a word, "the difference in the mode of thought of primitive man and that of civilized man seems to consist largely in the difference of character of the traditional material with which the new perception associates itself" (p. 203). Or, again, "'mythology,' 'theology' and 'philosophy' are different terms for the same influences which shape the current of human thought, and which determine the character of the attempts of man to explain the phenomena of nature." A marked trait of primitive life is "the occurrence of close associations between mental activities that appear to us as entirely disparate" (p. 209). As contrasted with the general run of civilized life: "In primitive life, religion and science; music, poetry and dance; myth and history; fashion and ethics,—appear inextricably interwoven."

A. F. C.

Geburt, Hochzeit und Tod. Beiträge zur vergleichenden Volkskunde. Von ERNST SAMTER. Mit 7 Abbildungen im Text und auf 3 Tafeln. Leipzig und Berlin: Druck und Verlag von B. G. Teubner, 1911. 222 p.

This book, provided with numerous bibliographical references in footnotes and an index, treats of all sorts of beliefs and practices concerning birth, marriage and death from the point of view of comparative folklore. Beginning with the discussion of the Roman custom of placing the new-born infant on the ground, from which its father lifted it up and recognized it, the author ends with a brief section on the traces of spirit-cult in birth and wedding rites and ceremonies. The other chapters deal with the dangers to the woman at child-birth from demons, spirits, etc.; defensive rites at birth, wedding, death; driving away the spirits by noises, etc.; torches and candles; fire and water as obstacles for demons and spirits; change of clothes; "the false bride;" change of name; nakedness as a defense against demons and spirits; untying knots and hair; taboo of sleep; covering up or avoidance of mirrors; taboo of touching the threshold; taboo of looking back; salt as defence against evil things, etc.; stopping the wedding-procession *en route*; offerings at birth and at marriage; sacrifices of blood, hair, etc.; red color in connection with birth, marriage, death; throwing a shoe after the bridal couple, and related practices. Hr. Samter, who has already published a monograph on *Familienfeste der Griechen und Römer* (Berlin, 1901), and a number of articles in the *Neue Jahrbücher für das Klassische Altertum* on classical folk-lore, ceremonials, etc., considers some of these items with special reference to Teutonic and ancient Greek and Roman data. The custom of having the woman about to give birth to her child kneel on the ground, and many other practices akin to this, receive from the author the following explanation (p. 19):

"After all that has been said, it is no rash supposition, if we assume that kneeling and clasping the earth on the part of the Greek woman at child-birth are to be explained in the same way as the same practices in the chthonic cult, and also the custom among other peoples of placing on the ground the parturient and the dying, we can assume that it was the belief among the Greeks also that the woman-with-

child should be brought into contact with the earth and with the realm of the subterranean, so that birth might take place successfully and auspiciously, i.e., that the soul of the child might thus arise out of the earth, an idea that naturally goes with what Albrecht Dieterich has taught us concerning the Greek conception of Mother Earth." Many rites and ceremonies seem to belong in part, at least, to the celebrations connected with birth, marriage and death, all three. The Roman *candela* at child-birth, the wedding-torch, and the funeral lights, illustrate this point. Even to-day it is sometimes difficult to distinguish certain parts of a wedding from some belonging with a funeral. Painting children, candidates for matrimony, the dying and the dead, is also an ancient and widespread custom; as is likewise the practice, often akin to this, of disguising such human beings in various ways so as to cheat or avoid demons, evil spirits, etc. The "false" or "substitute" bride is another device to "cheat the Devil"—or his imps. A like end is served by change of name, etc. The rôle of human nakedness in connection with certain of these rites and ceremonies of a protective or a defensive sort has been variously interpreted (pp. 112-120,—indeed no single explanation will do for all cases, for ritual nakedness may have divers *motifs*. Samter considers that there is not a little in Heim and Crooke's theory of the origin of ritual nakedness in the idea of the magic effectivity of the obscene; but nakedness, of course, has not always been considered indecent. The taboo of sleep to the bridal couple the night before the wedding, or the night after, to mothers for the night after the birth of the child, to boys after circumcision, to watchers at the grave of the dead, etc., is a curious, but rather widespread practice. The taboos of the threshold have a large kinship in ancient and modern folk-belief and folk-custom. Hr. Samter emphasizes (p. 210) the customs and practices which, seemingly, have to do with ancestors, souls, spirits, etc., but is careful not to seek to derive all such rites, etc., from the primitive soul-cult, for "while belief in the soul is to be regarded as one of the chief roots of religion, it is assuredly only one, not the root of all religion" (p. 217). With Samter's book should be read Dr. Arnold van Gennep's volume covering much the same ground, *Les Rites de Passage* (Paris, 1909. 288 p.). By "rites de passage" are meant those ceremonies, customs, practices, etc., connected with the passage of the individual from one age to another, from one condition to another, from one occupation to another,—also with physical passage, i.e., over the threshold, through openings of all sorts, etc.; and with beginnings, entrances into new occupations, new situations, new lands, submission to new chiefs, new masters, etc. Van Gennep discourses particularly rites concerning pregnancy and *accouchement*, birth and infancy, initiatory-rites, betrothal and marriage, death and burial. He emphasizes the fact that often these "rites de passage" form a fixed whole, from birth to death,—a whole than can only arbitrarily be sectioned off into ceremonies preliminary to puberty, for puberty, for marriage, for pregnancy, for birth, for infancy, etc. Such a cycle of ceremonies from the adolescence of the parents to the birth of the first child exists, e.g., among the Todas (p. 277). Here, again, as Samter pointed out in certain cases, the resemblances are sometimes very great between rites of initiation and wedding-cere-

monies, between puberty-rites and funeral-practices, between baptismal rites, ceremonies of adoption and fraternization and marriage rites and customs. For van Gennep the *sequence* of such rites and ceremonies is of much importance. Of great interest is the displacement or transference of certain of these ceremonies, etc. Often, when the woman during pregnancy is not regarded as unclean, or when any one can assist in the *accouchement* (an ordinary, normal, though painful event), the scheme of rites and practices will be found connected with infancy, with betrothal, or with marriage (p. 277).

A. F. C.

Increasing Human Efficiency in Business. A Contribution to the Psychology of Business. By WALTER DILL SCOTT. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1911. p. 339. Price \$1.25 net.

The index to this book, which discusses as means of increasing human efficiency, imitation, competition, loyalty, concentration, wages, pleasure, the love of the game, relaxation, etc., does not contain the word "Religion," although it is not to be imagined that Professor Scott intends to overlook it or to exclude it altogether as a factor in the perfection of the modern business man. This, too, in the light of the first sentence of Chapter I., "The modern business man is the true heir of the old magicians." There are occasional references to religion throughout the book, and the author does mention religion (p. 220) along with philanthropy, literature, art, club-life, athletics, etc., as among the things from which upon entering business every young man should select "some form of endeavor or activity apart from business to which he shall devote a part of his attention,"—this interest "should be so absorbing that, when he is thus engaged, business is banished from mind" (p. 220). Religion as a recreation is one thing, religion as a human instinct is another. If "by the proper application of psychology the efficiency of men is to be increased beyond the idle dream of the optimist of the past," care must be taken, that here, as elsewhere in human history a particular institution does not kill a generic instinct or an omni-human ideal. There is almost a fetish of "efficiency" to-day and men as human-beings, and women and children also, run much danger of being metamorphosed into highly-efficient machines, whose actual years of life will soon be as readily and as accurately predicted as is the life-time of a loom or a locomotive. Professor Scott's book, like that of Taylor is interesting and suggestive, but both emphasize a tendency already too apparent in American life, to demand the efficiency of one individual under the supervision of another as the *sine qua non* of commercial and industrial method and the creator of business genius. The generically human ought not to be altogether swamped by the particularly American.

A. F. C.

The Natural History of Religious Feeling. A Question of Miracles in the Soul. An Inductive Study by ISAAC A. CORNELISON, D. D. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1911. xvii, 273 p. Price \$1.50 net.

The author of this book died, at the age of eighty-three and in the best of health, while it was in press. This study grew out of "the diffi-

culty he has encountered in his efforts to bring certain generally accepted notions regarding experimental religion into harmony with the great body of truth," and was undertaken "to lay speeters of doubt which were beginning to appear in his own mind." He is of opinion that "the time has come for an advance to be made in the religious world, like that which began in the scientific world, with the appearance of Charles Darwin's *Origin of Species*; an advance, from an incorrect, to a more nearly correct, view of the divine order in the development of the spiritual life in man" (p. ix). The argument of the book is directed against the assumption of the evangelical church that "conversion is necessary to make a man a Christian and conversion is a supernatural, divine work, a miracle in the soul, which is always manifested in the consciousness by unmistakable emotional experiences,"—against this view and the deductions made from it. Part I of the book treats of the natural causes of religious feeling (tropism, regeneration, the one miracle in the human soul); Part II of the religious ecstasy (ecstasy in the heathen and the Christian world); Part III of conversion (what is conversion? the divine agency in conversion, the variety of means employed and the difference in result, natural causes of conversion, the psychology of emotion, changes in character and life from natural causes, prophecy and Pentecost, the test of experiment, etc.); Part IV of the practical consequences of the doctrine of conversion (evils attending conversion, what is the church? evangelism, repentance and forgiveness, the evangelism needed). In an appendix (pp. 233-268) are gathered "examples of conversions from a wide range of space and time:" St. Augustine, Martin Luther, John Bunyan, Jonathan Edwards, David Brainerd, Asahel Nettleton, C. G. Finney, H. W. Beecher, S. H. Hadley. Dr. Cornelison is unsparing in his description (pp. 169-187; 200-219) of the "evils of conversion" and the "evils of evangelism" and its business of "soul-winning,"—this he terms an "uncouth and unsriptural phrase" (p. 210). The conclusion at which the author arrives is that "conversion is an effect produced by natural causes, and is not, either in whole or in part, the product of direct supernatural agency, is not a miracle in the soul" (p. 162). The hypothesis of conversion does not pass the test of experiment (e.g., the listing by a heathen of the converted and unconverted in a Christian community, "determined in the classification solely by what he observes in their character and conduct). If modern evangelism wants to undertake a fit task, the author suggests for it (p. 227), "the elevation of the tone of the religious feeling in Christian people, the quickening of their spiritual life, a work which the Roman Catholic church is doing by its 'missions;' " or, again, "to endeavor to produce in all men, if possible, an experience like that of the raptures of conversion or the ecstasies of mysticism,"—feelings that give us one of our purest and most exalted pleasures. The religious rapture may be employed for such purposes, just as dramatic art, fiction, music and all the fine arts are and have been, and not as a test of discipleship or membership in the fold of Christianity (p. 229). In the words of Dr. Cornelison, "the religious rapture will be of short duration, as nature has not energy enough to make it perpetual, and, once experienced, it may not return again; but the memory of it

will be a precious possession." On the question of the origin of religion, the author believes (p. 12) that "superstition, as well as religion, springs from the inherent tendency to turn to God." There is in man a *Theotropism*, as fully justified as any of the tropisms of the animal world below him. And Theotropism is saner than Satanophobia or Gehennaphobia as a rule of life and conduct. This book might be read to advantage by the "soul-winners" of the "Men and Religion Forward Movement," now running like wild-fire all over the country. The author makes use of Coe, Starbuck and James, but his bibliographic data are not extensive. In the paragraph on "the medicine of the American Indian" (pp. 42-43), e.g., he contents himself with a quotation from Parkman's *The Jesuit in North America*.
A. F. C.

The Religious Life of Ancient Rome. A Study in the Development of Religious Consciousness from the Foundation of the City until the Death of Gregory the Great. By JESSE BENEDICT CARTER. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1911. ix, 270 p.

The eight chapters (originally eight lectures delivered before the Lowell Institute in Boston, during January, 1911), of this book treat the following topics: Rome and the Etruscans (the religion of agriculture and the religion of patriotism); Rome and Greece (the religion of superstition and the decline of faith); the religion of the early empire (salvation by reason and salvation by faith); Constantine and Christianity; Julian called the Apostate (the twilight of the gods); Augustine and the City of God (the struggle of Pagan and Christian thought); Benedict and the Ostrogoths (the problem of the salvation of ancient culture); Gregory and the Lombards (the preparation for the Holy Roman Empire). For the first three chapters the author makes some use of his earlier book on *The Religion of Numa* (London, 1906). The volume lacks a bibliography and the only foreign (non-English) authors referred to in the preface are Duchesne and Gregorovius,—although his book on the religion of Numa indicates his acquaintance with the works of Wissowa, etc. The first part of the present volume could have been improved by consideration and absorption or incorporation of some of the material of foreign authors published during the last quinquennium with which Professor Carter is no doubt well acquainted (see on this point R. Wünsch's review of the literature of 1906-1910 relating to Greek and Roman religion in *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, vol. 14, 1911, pp. 517-602).

The author emphasizes the changes of religion that the Eternal City has witnessed, from the era of the Etruscan to the death of Gregory in 604 A. D.,—"the world's history offers no other such variety of religious experience" (p. 7). Upon the earliest known primitive people of Rome, with a religion born of pastoral and agricultural life ("at best only an advanced form of animism"), was imposed, according to Professor Carter, the Jupiter cult of the Etruscans, who "changed a religion of physical increase to a religion of patriotism." The Etruscans, moreover, educated the Romans to comprehend, in part, at least, the Greeks, who gave Rome new gods, but destroyed also many which she already possessed. Then came the Oriental influences, culminating in the cult of Mithras and its

alliance with the cult of the Magna Mater,—“never in the history of the world has there been a more effective organization of missionary endeavor than in the ranks of the worshipers of Mithras” (p. 90). After this or rather with it, in part, we have Christianity, “whose early history is if anything more interesting and more picturesque than that of Mithras” (p. 97). In the third and fourth centuries there were “three great contending forces: Neoplatonism, Mithraism and Christianity,” and “each of these forces came in succession to the front and gained at least a temporary control of the Empire: Mithras in the person of Diocletian; Christianity in Constantine; and Neoplatonism in Julian” (p. 120). In the possession of a definite body of doctrine and of organization Mithraism and Christianity had the advantage over Neoplatonism. The victory of Christianity, the author holds, was due to the fact that it possessed something which Neoplatonism and Mithraism knew nothing of, viz., “what we, who have the privilege of living in these post-Darwinian days, may call its opposition, the resistance, which it offers to the working of the doctrines of biological evolution, its war against the practice of the survival of the fittest” (p. 123).

In his discussion of the Etruscans Professor Carter sees too much Greek and Babylonian influence, believing that the *haruspicina*, the art of divination as known among them “is a purely Babylonian method” (p. 19), and overmagnifying “the Oriental element in the Etruscans.” Even after Thulin’s and Körtes’ arguments for the Chaldean and Babylonian origin of liver-augury, it may be possible that the bronze liver of Piacenza represents something that grew up independently upon Italian soil. He holds that the “foreign element” in the Etruscans (a mixed race) entered Italy about 800 B. C., much later than was generally believed. He also thinks that “in coming out of the Orient they tarried for a while under Greek influence in Asia Minor,” and also that “their original home, or at least a very long abiding-place, was Babylon” (p. 19). One cannot, however, accept this view, which neither the language nor the culture of the Etruscans justifies, for much more of their civilization than the author is prepared to admit was evolved *in situ* and is really “Italian” and not “Oriental” in the sense intended by him. One wishes he had included in this volume at least a brief account of the Lupercalia and their vicissitudes, from the rites of a simple pastoral folk, to their later development and metamorphosis. And there are also a few other points that might have been enlarged upon somewhat. The statement, on page 5, that “all religion is by nature conservative” needs a little reservation. A. F. C.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

By ALEXANDER F. CHAMBERLAIN.

25. *Babylonian prodigy-books.* In a brief article in the *Mitteilungen d. Schlesischen Ges. f. Volkskunde* (vol. 13-14, 1911-1912, pp. 256-263), Dr. Bruno Meissner, of Breslau, treats of "Babylonische Prodigienbücher." Besides the records of liver-auguries, etc., ancient Babylonia has furnished "books of prodigies," cataloging the strange and wonderful events (in one case, almost in Livian fashion), which have preceded the fall of kings and the great cities. On pages 257-259 is a list of 47 such prodigies (first published by Boissier and recently again, in a new edition by King),—stated to have preceded the fall of Akkad, or northern Babylonia. Among the prodigies mentioned are the following: A woman with a beard and a split lower lip; a male date-palm bearing dates; a man having carnal relations with his mother; a white falcon and a white raven seen in the city; falling stars; in Chaldea a male dog bearing young; a child born with a trunk like an elephant. In other lists of prodigies occur such as these: Day changed into night; coming of strange, wild animals into the city; appearance of a demon in the bedroom of the God Nebo, etc. These prodigies form an interesting element in the mythological and religious lore of the ancient Mesopotamians. The lists also resemble some of the productions of later ages in Christian Europe, etc.
26. *Buddhistic contributions to Christianity.* Richard Garbe's article in the *Deutsche Rundschau* (Oktoberheft, 1911, pp. 55-73) on "Buddhistisches in der christlichen Legende," appears also in English as "Contributions of Buddhism to Christianity," in the *Monist* (vol. 21, 1911, pp. 509-563). The author points out that there is "an essential difference between the *alleged* Buddhist elements in the canonical Gospels and the *actual* Buddhist elements in the Apocryphal Gospels." According to Garbe (p. 513) "in reality no influence of Buddhist tales or of Buddhist doctrine upon the New Testament Scriptures has been proved,"—although "the similarities between the stories of Buddhism and those of the New Testament have formed an arena where dilettantism has long had a flourishing existence." Garbe discusses some of these alleged borrowings: The story in John IX 1-3 of the man blind from birth, the supernatural birth of Jesus, the temptation story of Christ, a number of minor items. He also raises the question "whether the evidences of intercommunication at all permit the assumption that, as early as the first century after Christ, or earlier, Buddhist legends and ideas had found their way into Palestine?" In the second century A. D. conditions were more favorable and in that period "belongs the loan of the fish-symbol from northern Buddhism" (pp. 525-527). Buddhist influence really "first

entered into Christianity in the Apocrypha,"—the parallels with Buddhist tales in the Apocrypha are of an entirely fabulous character, and are entirely different from those claimed to exist in the canonical Gospels." According to Garbe, "here we have to do with genuine Indian miracle tales,—not miracles of situation for purposes of edification, but quite unheard-of miracles the invention of which had for its sole purpose to arouse the astonishment of the hearer or reader." After pointing out borrowings from Buddhistic literature in the stories of St. Thomas, the tale of Barlaam and Joasaph, etc., the author discusses with some detail the legend of St. Eustachius Placidus (pp. 538-530) and the legend of St. Christopher (pp. 550-558). Concerning the first, he observes that the points of agreement between the Jataka story of Brahmadata and the legend of Placidus "are so manifold that they cannot rest on chance,"—indeed "the most important features are absolutely identical." In like manner the Jataka story of Prince Sutasoma and the Christian legend of St. Christopher are so alike as to convince him that "the man-eating giant of the Indian fairy-tale has become one of the best known saints of Christendom! He is as real as St. Josaphat (Joasaph, Bodhisattva) to whom a church was erected in Palermo! And if edificatory tales have influenced Christian literature, "the externalities of the religious life of Buddhism may have served the Christians as a model." The author sees no historic evidence contradicting the assumption that cloister and monachism, celibacy and tonsure of the clergy, confession, veneration of relics, the rosary, the shepherd's crook, the church spires, and the use of incense and bells may have been borrowed from Buddhism by Christianity. According to the author, "the common utilization of the halo in both Christianity and Buddhism comes from classical antiquity." The transference (possibly direct through Hellenism) from the Occident to Buddhism must have occurred rather early, since "the figure of Buddha appears with a nimbus on coins of King Kanishka (about 100 A. D.)."

27. *Christianity in China.* Some interesting items concerning both the good and the bad side of Christianity in contact with the yellow race are to be found in "The Journal of S. Wells Williams, LL. D.," which, edited by his son, Professor F. W. Williams, of Yale University, has just been published in the *Journal of the North-China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* (vol. 42, 1911, pp. 1-233). Dr. Wells was secretary and interpreter of the American Embassy to China during the expedition to Tientsin and Peking in 1858 and 1859. The "Journal" also contains many comments on Chinese matters, notes of a philological character, etc. The discussion (pp. 176-178) on the status of the President of the United States, as compared with the Emperor, the Pope, etc., and the nature of the *kotow*, are worth noting. Says Dr. Williams (p. 178): "There is really not the least difference between the reverence paid the Pope and the Emperor, and both demand it on the same grounds,—that they are the vice-regents of Heaven, and sitting in the seat of God, claim

to be gods. After what these Chinese functionaries said to-day, no Christian man should ever discuss the question whether he can perform the *Kotau*,—it would be an idolatrous act." Interesting, too, are the discussions of some of the phrases used in diplomatic communications.

28. *Circumambulation*. According to Dr. A. Hillebrandt's article on "Circumambulatio," in the *Mitteilungen d. Schlesischen Ges. f. Volkskunde* (vol. 13-14, 1911-1912, pp. 3-8), this old and widespread custom "can best be studied in the usages of ancient and modern India,"—It is mentioned in both Brahmanic and Buddhist books. At their wedding bride and bridegroom walk round the fire; the pious student had to pass around images of deities, Brahmins, cows; the ancient *pradaksina* is represented to-day by the *Pañc-Kōsi-Yātra*, which the pilgrim executes around the sacred city of Benares. The Hindu ritualistic text-books distinguish two forms of circumambulation, from left to right, and from right to left. The first method holds for ceremonies in honor of the gods (then all movements are directed thus), the second is practiced when it is a question of magic, or when spirits or demons are concerned. Not infrequently the movement in the one direction is followed by a movement in the opposite direction. The Hindu *pradaksina* and *prasalavi* find analogues in the circumambulation of persons for good-luck and for ill-luck, among the Celtic Highlanders of Scotland,—the sun-wise going round is *dazil*, the opposite procedure *withershins*. In Gaelic the imitation of the apparent motion of the sun is termed "the right or lucky way;" the opposite is "the false or unlucky way." Circumambulation is known to other Aryan peoples, "but the distinction between sun-wise and 'against the sun' is much less emphasized." Here ought to be mentioned also the old English custom of "beating the bounds" and related ceremonies, etc.
29. *Contrast of hunter and cultivator*. In his article on "The Irulans of the Gingee Hills," in *Anthropos* (vol. 6, 1911, pp. 808-813), C. H. Rao gives some interesting information concerning the Irulans of the Gingee Hills in the Tindivanam Taluk of the South Arcot district of Madras, who numbered some 20,000 according to the census of 1901. They stand in marked contrast to the Hindu agriculturalists about them. The Irulans of the Gingee Hills are more primitive than those on the eastern slopes of the Nilgiris. These Irulans are a forest folk, hunters, living an essentially wild life. Their "codes of laws," forbid, among other things, the following (characteristic of the agriculturalists): 1. Living inside a village. 2. Using sandals. 3. Using an umbrella. 4. Use (by women) of bodice (or petticoat). In matters of religion every Irulan should be his own priest, and he keeps the drum, his insignia of priestly office, going most of the night. Another point in religion is that he should "worship only the seven *Kannimar* (or the seven virgin goddesses) and not bow down before the gods of the Hindu agriculturists." While

Irulans are prohibited from becoming *ryots* or cultivators, like the Hindus around them, there seems to be no bar against a *ryot* entering the Irulan fold, but such a convert is held strictly to the tribal "laws." The *Kannimar*, or goddesses, "are represented by wooden symbols which have female clothes tied around them, and have ornaments bestowed on them."

30. *Culture-idea*. In *Logos* (vol. 2, 1911-1912, pp. 200-207), Gustav Radbruch writes "Ueber den Begriff der Kultur." He distinguishes three different culture-ideas, the historical, the historico-philosophical and the ethical, and discusses briefly each of these. According to R., "the culture of a people, or an age, . . . includes not only its virtues, insights, taste, etc., but also its vices, errors, tastelessness; its powers for hindering and antagonizing culture, as well as those for promoting it." And besides all this, "over-culture and unculture, even the culturelessness of a primitive people, are culture-facts."
31. *Double proletariat of antiquity*. In an article on "Le double prolétariat antique," in the *Mercure de France* (vol. 90, 1911, pp. 673-686), P. Louis treats of the free *plebs* and the slave *plebs* as they existed particularly in ancient Rome. With a people whose national industry was war, slavery was natural and became the characteristic system of organization of work, first in the country, afterwards in the city. At the close of the Republic Italy counted 4½ million slaves, distributed among the various agricultural, industrial and commercial activities, or employed in the public service. The free proletariat, vegetating above these, suffered greatly from their competition, and from the loss of useful employments. Rome itself lived in constant fear of sedition among the free *plebs* or revolt among the slaves. But the very antagonism between the free *plebs* and the senile *plebs* saved the State. They could not make common cause, and the directing class ruled in virtue of this fact,—the aristocracy continued to dominate, while these two lower classes lived on, almost as separate as two distinct peoples.
32. *Egypt and the Bible*. In the *Nineteenth Century* (No. 418, December, 1911, pp. 1135-1146) Rev. E. McClure writes of the "Latest light from Egypt on the Holy Scriptures," with special reference to the papyri, ostraca, and inscribed pottery, discovered in 1906-1908 on the island of Elephantinê. Details concerning these finds are contained in two quarto volumes, published under the editorship of Dr. E. Sachau, of Berlin, the well-known Semitic scholar. The period covered by these papyri is 494-404 B. C., and their language Aramaic. On pages 1138-1140 is given *in extenso* a translation (from Dr. Sachau's German) of a letter to the Governor of Jerusalem from the priests of Elephantinê. The Jewish people of Elephantinê were a military settlement, planted there long enough to have lost their ancestral speech (i.e., Hebrew), while "continuing to preserve their sacrificial cult, which required a temple for its observance, and the recognition of

Yahveh, the God of the Hebrews." The personal names in this document "find an echo in the history handed down to us by Ezra and Nehemiah." Other papyri throw light also on Bible names and statements. One fragmentary papyrus is of considerable interest since it contains the story of *Achikar*, to which, under the name *Achiacharus* (in the English version), reference is made in the book of Tobit in the Apocrypha.

33. *Freemasons in folk-lore.* In certain regions of Europe there is current a considerable amount of folk-lore concerning the Freemasons, who, according to the ideas of the people have had much to do with politics and also with the Devil and his imps. In an article on "Die Freimaurer im Deutschen Volksglauben," published in the *Mitteilungen d. Schlesischen Ges. f. Volkskunde* (vol. 13-14, 1911-1912, pp. 232-241), Dr. K. Olbrich gives numerous folk-lore items, including some tales and legends, from various parts of Germany and Austria concerning Freemasons, their life, actions, etc. The initiation-ceremonies, oaths, etc., are looked upon as a pact with Satan; by the help of Satan, every Freemason, by uttering a few words, can become rich; they are capable of doing many weird things because of their supposed connections with the spirit-world,—among things thus attributed to them is the elixir of life; they have control over the demons of hell in animal form, or visible or invisible; in return for the favors of the Evil One and his subordinates, favors are demanded from them, and all sorts of "deviltry" is attributed to the Freemasons; at death the Devil gets the Freemason, body and soul. In Catholic countries, naturally, the Freemason has fallen under the ban of folk-thought and much of the wealth of devil-lore and "magic" of the black sort has been thought to be his. The term "Freemason" serves in places to denote an uncanny or suspicious person. In Thuringia, in the middle of the 18th century, a stranger (speaking a foreign tongue and wearing his own hair, in contrast with the wigs of that period), who restored to productivity and placed on a money-making basis the property of a certain decayed nobleman of the country, soon came to be looked upon as "a Freemason." In another region the school-children are said to have believed that men who wore gray top-hats were "Freemasons." A tale concerning the origin of the name "Freemason" is cited on page 237.
34. *Imprisoned spirits.* In an article on "Gefangene Geister" in the *Mitteilungen d. Schlesischen Ges. f. Volkskunde* (vol. 13-14, 1911-1912, pp. 98-120) Dr. Richard Kühnau treats of German folk-lore concerning "imprisoned spirits;" such tales, legends, etc., as relate to "a little bottle, box or casket, a bag, wallet, etc., in which is shut up a small invisible creature, such as a worm, a spider a fly, a beetle, or perhaps a bird or some other creature moving to and fro,"—the belief being that the possessor of such an imprisoned creature (the thing is often found by accident, given or sold by a stranger, etc.) has in it a servant capable of fulfilling all his wishes, especially in

the matter of money. The receptacle must never be opened, as only the greatest luck will enable the possessor to return the imprisoned creature into its "home," and, if it is once let out it becomes a source of misfortune and destruction for the former owner. Dr. Kühnau cites 53 such legends, from all parts of Germany; many of those imprisoned are simply goblins, house-spirits and the like,—the Devil often uses them as tools in his designs upon the bodies and the souls of men. Sometimes it is Satan himself, who, for purposes of his own, gets into, or permits himself, in reduced form, to be put into such small receptacles. Besides the famous trick of St. Patrick, there is a mass of interesting folk-lore concerning "the Devil deceived." Many of these imprisoned creatures are thought to be souls of the dead, mostly of those who have done ill in their life-time, and who wander about as evil spirits, until by exorcism, tricks of black art, etc., they are induced (or forced by some hokus-pokus), to enter a sack, a wallet, a purse, a satchel, a casket, a pot, a jug, a glass, a bottle, etc., in which they are safely impounded or corked up, and rendered harmless as long they remain there. Accidentally, they often get released. These receptacles are sometimes transparent, sometimes not; they are often hidden in out-of-the-way spots far from human dwellings, etc.

35. *Judeo-Christian psalter of the first century.* In the *Mercur de France* (vol. 89, 1911, pp. 774-787), Henri Schoen writes of "Un psautier judéo-chrétien du premier siècle." The Ms. in Syriac (the original was probably in Hebrew or Aramaic) was discovered in Mesopotamia by Rendel Harris. It has been edited by Harris and dealt with also by A. Harnack, *Ein Jüdisch-christliches Psalmbuch aus dem ersten Jahrhundert* (Leipzig, 1910). It is a collection of lyric songs, attributed to Solomon,—the title *Odes of Solomon* was known to the early Christian historians (Lactantius, e.g., cites it), but this is the first appearance of the text itself,—but evidently the work of a Jewish poet (somewhere between 50 B. C. and 67 A. D.,—certainly before the destruction of Jerusalem, 70 A. D.). Toward the end of the first century, this collection was slightly revised and added to by some Palestinian Christian in order to fit it for use in the Judeo-Christian churches. We have here "one of the oldest witnesses to the ardent faith and naïve piety of the primitive church." The mystic *Elan* of these poems recalls the accents of the Song of Songs, and although anonymous they "have a very marked personal character,"—throughout "it is the *I*, and not the Judeo-Christian community that sings and sighs, is exalted and triumphs." At the center of the poet's religious conceptions is the idea of love. In a general way one feels that he has let go the purely external ceremonials of Israel,—he has achieved "an enlightened piety." Perhaps Harnack is right in perceiving here "the quarry where the block of Johannine theology has been cut." The elevation of moral and social ideas corresponds to the religious order of the sentiments. Moral personality is regarded as a sacred thing and morality alone is significant. The last word of

this poet is a declaration of the reality of human liberty in the service of the good and the true. In this new document, important for the history of early Christianity, is revealed "a relatively recent form of Judaism,—a religious individualism already detached from every mythic element and from the rites prescribed by the Mosaic law." It shows how "Christianity was prepared in the bosom of Judaism,"—it is not easy, however, to determine with exactness, what belongs properly to the Jewish poet and what to the Christian author. The *Odes of Solomon* were considered by some churchmen to belong to the canonical scriptures; it is hard to see why they were left out altogether.

36. *Magna Mater cult in ancient Crete.* In an article on "Ein Mützenidol aus Kreta," in the *Mitteilungen d. Schlesischen Ges. f. Volkskunde* (vol. 13-14, 1911-1912, pp. 377-385, 6 figs.), Dr. Hugo Prinz discusses the significance of certain conic clay figures, from various localities in ancient Crete, sometimes in connection with terra cotta idols of the chief goddess of the Minoan religion, the Great Mother. Two of these, discovered in the palace of H. Triada, represent a human head, wearing a conical cap; in others the cap is represented independently without being attached to a human head. After this separation of head and cap occurred, the latter could be modified and metamorphosed in various ways,—it took on, e.g., the form of a vase of some sort, with "handles" (sometimes snakes, horns, etc.). According to Dr. P., the conic clay figures in question are "nothing else than representations of the cap of the Minoan Magna Mater," and not phallic idols as Wide maintained,—here we have a very good example of the ease with which phallic objects can be seen and recognized by modern investigators in the art-products of antiquity; and the same thing is not uncommon among certain students of the art and the religion of primitive people of to-day. The cap here represents, *pars pro toto*, the deity herself, as the double-ax does her consort. The cap-cult was widespread in ancient Crete, going back perhaps beyond 1600 B. C. And, as the discoveries in Prinia indicate, this cult survived even in historic times.
37. *Medieval notions of hell.* In *The Romanic Review* (vol. 2, 1911, pp. 54-60) Prof. S. L. Galpin treats of the "Influence of the Medieval Christian Visions on Jean de Meun's Notions of Hell." The most flourishing period of the production of these Christian visions, "the time at which they were longest and most detailed, lies between the middle of the 12th century and the first decade of the 13th century." This, as the author points out, "immediately precedes, in point of time, the flourishing period of French allegory," and "the most cursory examination of the two phenomena discloses similarities of structure and content which may hardly be considered fortuitous." Such, e.g., are, "the dream form, common to both, and the correspondence of the typical features of the Paradise of the Christian visions with those of the Garden of Love in the lay allegories." But "demonstrable proof of interrelationship between the Christian visions

and French allegory is more readily found in the references to Hell and Purgatory than in the comparison of paradises divine and erotic,"—and Love's Paradise is as old as Tibullus. The author discusses the notions of hell in the second part of the *Roman de la Rose*, by Jean de Meun, and concludes that he "laid under contribution his reminiscences of the medieval Christian visions. Among the Christian visions are the vision of Tundal (of which 54 Latin Mss. are known), the apocryphal Vision of St. Paul, the Vision of Charles the Fat, the Vision of Thureill, the Vision of Drihthelm, St. Patrick's Purgatory, etc. Of course not all of the items in de Meun are to be found in any one of these Visions, not even in the Vision of Tundal, the most detailed.

38. *Mount Sinai*. In an article on "Die Sinaifrage," in *Mitt. d. k.-k.-Geogr. Ges. in Wien* (vol. 54, pp. 628-641, 3 maps), Prof. E. Oberhummer résumés the various theories as to the location of the Biblical Mt. Sinai, the place where the law was delivered to Moses. Of late years the opinion has gained in strength that the scene of the events described in the book of Exodus was not on the Sinai peninsula, but farther to the East, beyond the Gulf of Akaba. The theory also (first, apparently, suggested by Beke, the English geographer, in his pamphlet, *Mt. Sinai a Volcano*, published in 1873,—he afterwards gave up this view) that Mt. Sinai was a volcano has gained ground. Quite independently of Beke, the Old Testament scholar, Professor H. Gunkel of Giessen, in various of his writings, 1903-1905, has arrived at the conclusion that Mt. Sinai was a volcano; and that it was to a volcano that Moses led his people and their experiences with Jahveh are to be explained in connection with a volcanic outbreak, etc. E. Meyer (1906) went further still, and maintained that "Jahve was originally a volcanic fire-god, native to Midian." Prof. Haupt, of Johns Hopkins University, is another who holds the volcano-theory, as expressed in his essay on "The Burning Bush and the Origin of Judaism" (*Proc. Amer. Philos. Soc.*, 1909). The identification of the particular volcano has, according to Dr. Oberhummer, been made possible by the recent investigations of Professor A. Musik and his companion L. Kober, the geologist. The true Biblical Mt. Sinai would appear to have been the volcano Hala-l-Bedr, in N. lat. 27° 12' and E. long. 37° 7', much further south than even the supporters of the Midian theory had hitherto placed it. If this theory ultimately prevails, as it is likely to do, it means quite a rearrangement of the map of the wanderings of the Children of Israel, and the "crossing of the Red Sea" is now the traversing not of the Gulf of Suez, but of the Gulf of Akaba. Much interesting discussion will doubtless develop in the effort to identify in the Land of Midian, the stopping-places of the Israelites, which had formerly been located in the Sinai Peninsula.
39. *Mysticism*. In *Logos* (vol. 2, 1911-1912, pp. 242-256) G. Mehlis discusses "Formen der Mystik,"—it seems rather paradoxical to speak of forms of that which is claimed to be essentially formless. Still,

we may distinguish speculative, esthetic and practical mysticism; the individualistic mysticism of Eckhart, the cosmic mysticism of Plotinus; the intellectual mysticism of Eckhart, the voluntary mysticism of Jacob Böhme, the mysticism of activity, the mysticism of passivity. In the mysticism of Eckhart lives still the spirit of the antique, in the mysticism of Böhme beats already the heart of a modern age. The greatness of Eckhart lay in his being able to "unite the demands of the magical consciousness with those of the mystic." For Eckhart the soul is creator, and not merely creature, and God must ultimately unite with it, whether he will or no. By the power of religious genius this great work grows up out of the opposing demands of magic and mysticism. The high evaluation of the soul satisfies the demands of magic; mysticism is satisfied with the emphasis of the universal in the thought of burial in waste and empty deity. Eckhart attempted the synthesis of magic and mysticism.

40. *Mysticism and Rabbinical literature.* In *The Hibbert Journal* (vol. 10, 1911-1912, pp. 426-443), Rev. J. Abelson treats of "Mysticism and Rabbinical Literature," discussing "the mysticism of the Shechinah" and "the mysticism of the 'Ruach Ha-Kodesh,' or Holy Spirit." According to Dr. A., the "hosts of references to the Shechinah and Holy Spirit" show that "Rabbinism does possess a strong mystical element." It is, indeed, "a compound consisting of the harmonious co-existence of the two factors, viz., mysticism and formalism." With the Jews, fortunately, "Rabbinical mysticism was judiciously balanced." The "safest anchorage of the religious Jew" was "the very fact of the interweaving of these two elements,—the mystical and the authoritative."

41. *Neptanabus, the magician, and Alexander the Great.* In his article, "Der Zauberer Neptanabus nach einem bisher unbekannten Erfurter Text," in *Mitteilungen d. Schlesischen Ges. f. Volkskunde* (vol. 13-14, 1911-1912, pp. 188-198), Dr. Alfons Hilka, of Breslau, discusses, with reproduction (pp. 195-198) of the Latin text, an account of the magician Neptanabus, teacher of Alexander the Great, *nominatissimus astronomorum*, the wonders at his birth, etc., from a Ms. of the 15th century, part of the *Codex Amplonianus* in the city library of Erfurt. This is a rather free working-over of a mythic Alexander-story, "a sort of *Enfances Alexandre*." It adds something to the folk-lore of the great Greek. In style and feeling it rises far above the vapid contents of the Medieval Latin texts. It is neither borrowed from Walter of Châtillon's *Alexandreis* nor from Valerius.

42. *Prehistoric art, magic and awe.* In the *Hibbert Journal* (vol. 10, 1911-1912, pp. 380-392, under the title "In a Prehistoric Sanctuary," R. R. Marett, the author of *The Threshold of Religion* (1909), and other interesting minor works on the origin and development of religion, writes of a visit to the prehistoric cave of Niaux with the

archeologist Cartailhac. Here the ancient artist in simple black-and-white has drawn "the living image of Prjewalski's wild horse of the Mongolian deserts," and many other frescoes of various animals known to his age. A visit was also made to the cave of Gargas, near Aventiron, in the valley of the Nest. At Gargas, "we are among the pioneers of pleistocene art, the so-called Aurignacians,"—here we get a hint of "the magical, striving with purely decorative, and artistic purposes." At Niaux, "we are amongst the later Magdalenian artists, who could, and did draw true to life." Marett points out the fact that at Niaux, as at Font-de-Gaume, Les Combarelles, etc., the access to these caves is very difficult (crawling or on one's knees), and argues that these recesses must have been "sanctuaries," for "no artist ever graved animals, or men with the heads of animals, masked dancers, it may be, for simple fun in such a place." An explanation may partly be found in the customs of existing savages for "these ceremonies, best known to ethnologists in their Australian form, whereby savages, by magico-religious means, including the use of sacred designs, endeavor to secure for themselves good hunting and a plentiful supply of game animals, take us by analogy straight back to the times of prehistoric artistry." The man who left his footmark at Niaux "drew near in awe, whether it was spell or prayer that accompanied his painting." In Marett's opinion "all genuine rites involve one and the same fundamental mood and attitude, a drawing near in awe." But this is quite too dogmatic.

43. *Primitive conception of death.* In *The Hibbert Journal* (vol. 10, 1911-1912, pp. 393-407), W. H. R. Rivers writes of "The Primitive Conception of Death," with special reference to the arguments advanced by Lévy-Bruhl, in his recent volume, *Les Fonctions mentales dan les Sociétés inférieures* (Paris, 1910), and the author's own experiences of the primitive mind as exemplified in the natives of the Solomon Islands, etc. According to M. R., M. Lévy-Bruhl is in error in maintaining that primitive thought is not subject to the law of contradiction (see the example cited from the island of Eddystone by Mr. Rivers, p. 395). The Melanesian uses of the terms *mate* (dead man; person serious ill and likely to die; often also, person healthy but so old that, if he is not dead, he ought to be) and *toa* (living, but excluding all who are *mate*) and the burial of all who are considered *mate* are discussed (pp. 397-400). Such practices Lévy-Bruhl cites as evidencing "pre-logical mentality," but, as Rivers says, "they are merely cases in which the facts of the Universe have been classified and arranged in categories different from those of ourselves;" they are really "cases in which there is no real contradiction at all, in which there is no failure of logic in our sense." And moreover, "the behavior which follows, behavior which often seems to us unnatural and inhuman, is merely the realization of these principles in a thoroughly logical manner." The apparently contradictory ideas about the dead entertained by the natives of Eddystone Island may be "the resultant of the mixture of two cults, one possessing the belief that

the dead dwell in a cave of the island, and the other being the cult of an immigrant people, whose dead returned to the home whence they came." This would be a case of "religious syncretism." The life of primitive man "is far more definitely divided into periods than that of ourselves," and "the rites connected with death would seem to have the same character as those accompanying various transitional periods of life." By primitive man, "the passage from life to death is looked on in much the same light and treated in much the same way as the passage from one condition of life to another;" and to primitive man, "death is not the unique and catastrophic event it seems to us, but merely a condition of passing from one existence to another, forming but one of a number of transitions, which began perhaps before his birth, and stand out as the chief memories of his life." Another valuable article on primitive ideas of death, etc., is that of Dr. H. Klaatsch on "Die Todes-Psychologie der Uraustralier in ihrer volks-und religionsgeschichtlichen Bedeutung," in the *Mitteilungen d. Schlesischen Ges. f. Volkskunde* (vol. 13-14, 1911-1912, pp. 401-439. The author, well-known for his studies of fossil European man and of the evolution of man from the lower animals, spent three years (1904-1907) in scientific investigation in Australia, psychological as well as somatic, archeological and ethnological. For scientific purposes the native Australians are "the most important race on earth," and "their naïve and childlike ideas give us clear indications how and in what direction among primitive men of the Tertiary period the beginnings of religious ideas developed out of very coarse and earthly concepts and apprehensions" (p. 405). General among the Australians is the conviction that "almost all accidents, diseases, etc., that befall the individual are caused by the deliberate action, at a distance, of enemies alive or dead." The most peculiar culmination of such belief, as Dr. Klaatsch notes, is what Roth has termed *thanatomania*, i.e., "the idea of being so bewitched by a distant enemy that nothing at all can save one from death, so all there is to do is to lie down and die without any recognizable direct cause of death, merely as a result of the psychic affection." An important rôle in Australian primitive religion is played by the "medicine-men," particularly in connection with "magic at a distance," and the employment of souls of the dead, etc. All over Australia is found the belief in the continued existence of the soul after death. This belief, according to Dr. Klaatsch (p. 411) "is not the result of profound philosophic considerations or religious feelings, but simply the consequence of inability to conceive of a cessation." Then the parallel between death and sleep comes to give the naïve primitive man, the idea of a soul that can at times leave the body. Existence after death is like that during life, and, "if we find the Australian natives everywhere in fear of evil spirits, we must not deduce therefrom a theoretical structure of hostile elemental forces, what we have here is a very real fear of men, of dead men" (p. 411). Nor are we authorized to see in the efforts to appease the dead or make them innocuous, "ancestor-worship." Of prime importance is what is done with the body,—here even cannibalism is a mode

of burial assuring the control of the spirit of the dead man by him who has devoured, e.g., his significant part, the kidney-fat, regarded by the natives as the seat of the psychic qualities. The treatment of mummies is also significant, the idea being "the retention of the dead body in as unchanged form as possible, but so arranged as to prevent any motion looking toward the return of the soul and subsequent harm to the survivors" (p. 421). The Australian practice of mummification, "Hocker" position, and tying up of the corpse, belongs with their "soul-lore." The idea of preventing the return of the dead, Dr. Klaatsch thinks, is hardly the essential point,—“rather the Australians do not think the dead man is dead, or do not trust him” (p. 426). Interesting is Dr. Klaatsch's views on the development of religion (p. 433):

“The usual, dominant idea is that man personified the elements, and that belief in a personal God was the last step in a long series of evolution with gradual clarification of conceptions.

“My comprehension of the matter is just the reverse: first was the personal and that was deified. The elements were not personified, but persons were elementarized.

“When a whirl-wind arose, some Australian had blown, when it rained, that, too, was the work of some one man, the thunder was the roar of some man who was feared, etc.

“Originally, there was a portion of God in different gradations, the individual being able in different degrees to exert magic at a distance. If we, in our definition of religion, take as point of departure the literal translation, then, in the light of the views here discussed, this relation was originally a purely personal one, partly one of love, partly, and to a much greater degree, of fear. The fear of the influence of a powerful dead man, especially a shaman, is the embryonal stage of the fear of God present in the highest religious systems.”

The most important fact in primitive religion is, therefore, the *personal*. Indeed the becoming of man was through the awakening of the personal. All else is later, according to Klaatsch, “with the exception of a few pre-anthropie, pre-human sources of religious phenomena,” e.g., the peculiar rôle of the serpent, intelligible only as a relic of preceding animal stages. The serpent is not a god,—man's attention to him is a reflex of the great pre-human struggle between mammals and reptiles, in which the ancestors of our human race won their lasting victory.

44. *Race and culture mixture in Asia Minor.* In his article on “Les Karamanlis” in the *Mercure de France* (vol. 94, 1911, pp. 74-80), H. de Ziegler gives some interesting information concerning the conditions in Caramania (ancient Cappadocia and Galatia) in southeastern Asia Minor. It is a Turkized part of the Hellenic world. Here the Turkish tongue is written with the Greek alphabet. In some places (e.g. at the port of Adalia) half the population is Greek and speaks Turkish; the other half is Turkish but speaks Greek. The most ancient towns are the least Turkized. Certain villages have not ceased to

be Greek in manners, language and appearance. Others have been completely metamorphosed and Turkized altogether. And all sorts of intermediary stages are to be found between these two extremes. Where Greek is spoken, the inroad of Turkoman, Persian and Arabic words is on the increase. The modern Karamanlis "are Turkish by language, habits, manner of life, dress, etc., by Greeks by alphabet,"—in contrast with the Mohammedans of Crete, who are Greek by race and language, but use the same system of writing as their co-religionists. In the two Christian churches of Nigdé the mass and all the liturgy are conducted in Greek, not a word of which the people understand. The sermon, whenever there is one, is delivered in Turkish. The gospel-book in use has, opposite the original text, a Turkish translation in Greek letters. The personal names of the Karamanlis, e.g., *Pappazoglou* (= Greek *Papadopoulos*, "son of the priest,") simply translate Greek antecedents.

45. "Resurrection" of still-born infants. In his article, "Les résurrections d'enfants morts-nés et les sanctuaires à 'répit,'" in the *Revue d'Ethnographie et de Sociologie* (vol. 2, 1911, pp. 65-74), P. Saintyves treats of a very curious practice, viz., the "resurrecting" of still-born infants by saints and priests at certain churches and shrines from the 14th century down. Theological doctrine held that still-born infants, not having received baptism, are prevented from entering heaven and seeing God; while not burning in hell or in purgatory, they are in the limbos and are essentially damned. Parental love demanded the "resurrection" for a few instants of these unfortunate beings, so that the rite of baptism might be administered to them during such moments of life, and they might thus be admitted into the realm of the blessed. The parish-registers of certain regions of France, we are told, bear record of hundreds and thousands of these "resurrections," effected by the power of the Virgin, the Saints, etc. Among the Saints to whom this miracle has been attributed are: St. Stephen, Saint Cunegonda, St. Leontius, St. Rosalia, St. Thomas of Villanueva, St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Viventius, St. Claudius, etc. But, naturally enough, it was to the Virgin Mary that the miracle of "resurrection" was most commonly ascribed. The east of France seems to be the favorite region for this practice in the past,—Franche-Comté, Savoy and Burgundy,—although Lorraine, Picardy, Flanders, Belgium, Switzerland, furnish many examples (Notre-Dame d'Alsemberg in Brabant, Notre Dame des Halles, Notre Dame de Foy at Gravelines are all said to have effected such "resurrections;" in one case the infant had been buried a fortnight). Among the churches and shrines of the Virgin in France, famous for miracles of this sort are: Notre-Dame Caester, near Hazebrouck (9 cases 1494-1496); Notre-Dame de Grâce, at the Abbey of Saint-Sauve, Montreuil; Notre-Dame de Boulogne; Notre-Dame de Bonne Nouvelle, Nancy; Notre-Dame de Benoitte-Vaux, Verdun (13 cases 1644, 1659); Notre-Dame de Pitié, Moutiers; Notre-Dame de Mont-Provent at Châtillon sur Cluses, upper Savoy (cases in 1820 and 1863); Notre-Dame de Faisees at Pillier; Notre-Dame de la Vie, at Vénasque,

Provence; Notre-Dame de Bletterans in Orgelet (here was a cemetery for these infants); Notre-Dame La Blanche at Favorney, Doubs (here, in the 16th century, in less than 20 years, 489 cases are recorded). The custom was quite widespread, and from time to time seems to have met with local or somewhat general opposition on the part of the ecclesiastical authorities having been condemned several times by bishops and synods (the condemnation in 1452 is given textually on p. 70). In Langres and Besançon several synodical condemnations occurred between 1452 and 1656. Semi-defences of these practices appeared from time to time and they had often the quiet, if not the open, approval of many priests of the church. Nor are they altogether extinct even to-day. At Notre-Dame de Romay, near Paray-le-Monial, the curé records the custom and states that it is "impossible to doubt the miracle," in 1865,—and in 1908 the practice was still in vogue. Very remarkable is the history of Notre-Dame de Noyer, at Cuiseaux. Here the custom had full sway toward the middle of the 16th century; and from 1702 down more than 60 cases are recorded,—some as late as 1822, 1825, 1850, and even 1867. The shrines and chapels consecrated to these miracles are known in Picardy, etc., as *répits* i.e. "respites." One infant so "resurrected" is said to have lived two days. Of an infant, buried for a whole fortnight, "resurrected," at Notre-Dame des Halles, in 1428, it is stated that "having lived five hours after receiving baptism, it gradually melted away like a snow-ball,"—all this in the presence of 70 people." Movements of hands or feet, regaining the color of living flesh, motion of the tongue, bleeding, shaking the head, moisture at the mouth, are some of the "signs of life" mentioned in the records. Often the infant "died" the very second the baptism was ended. In these practices we have an interesting example of the power of parental love in subordinating to its uses the sacraments of a great church. Human piety lies near to human pity. Pity recreates the lost opportunity, which piety hesitates long to refuse. In a brief article, "Die Taufe totgeborener Kinder ist noch heute üblich," in the *Zeitschrift d. Ver. f. Volkskunde* (vol. 21, 1911, p. 333), Richard Andree, after *résumé*ing some of the facts in Saintyves' essay, points out that the practice in question is known also to-day in the Tirol. To the shrine of the Mother of God at Trens near Sterzing the peasants still bring their still-born infants, to have them waked to life again so they may receive baptism. Something on this point is to be found in H. Noë's *Winter und Sommer in Tirol* (Wien 1878, see p. 48).

46. *Sacred books of the Yezidis.* In an article, "La découverte récente des deux livres sacrés des Yézidis," published in *Anthropos* (vol. 6, 1911, pp. 1-39), Father Anastase Marie, a Carmelite of Bagdad, gives an account of two sacred books of the Yezidis, or "Devil-worshippers," one of the numerous religious sects of Asia Minor. These two documents were discovered in the shrine of Sheik Adi on Mt. Sinjar, near Mosul. These codices are reproduced, in the original Kurdish (Arabic versions are also in existence) are reproduced on pages 12-19

and 22-35, with a translation into French (pp. 20-21, 36-39) of them both. In a later issue of *Anthropos* (pp. 628-638), under the title "Die beiden heiligen Bücher der Jeziden im Lichte der Textkritik," Prof. Maximilian Bittner, furnishes critical notes and scholarly comments on the language, etc., of these curious religious documents,—The Kiteb-i jälwä ("Book of Revelation") and the Mashaf-(i) ras ("the Black Book"). Father M. thinks that the former, which is more sacred and venerated, and less known to the Yezidis in general, is the older work. Its ideas are higher, its doctrine also more original. These Ms. on gazelleskin parchment, were discovered in 1904. They are written in a Kurdish dialect approximating the classical Mukri, and are of great philological as well as religious interest. Arabic versions of these sacred books of the Yezidis had already been made use of (unknown to Father Marie) by Parry in the Appendix to his *Six Months in a Syrian Monastery* (1895) and Dr. I. Joseph in his "Jezidi Texts," in *The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures* (1909). Prof. Bittner emphasizes the genuineness of the Kurdish texts and their value for the study of Yezidi beliefs. The recent literature of the subject includes also a monograph by Djelal Noury, a highly educated Turk: *Le Diable promu 'Dieu.' Essai sur le yézidisme* (Constantinople, 1910), based on a book on "The Devil-Worshippers," written by his father, and published in Mosul. According to Prof. Bittner, this last is probably identical with the Turkish text brought home from Asia Minor by H. Grothe and described by G. Jacob in the *Beiträge zur Kenntnis des Orients* (vol. 7, 1909, pp. 30-35). The "Black Book" is particularly concerned with the ideas of the Yezidis about the creation. It contains also the Yezidi taboos. The name of God is given as Shaitān (Satan). Gabriel is the assistant of God in the creation, and makes Eve to console Adam. This Yezidi *Genesis* makes curious parallel reading for the account in our Bible.

47. *Socialism in Japan*. In an article in the *Mercur de France* (vol. 79, 1911, pp. 480-494) on "Socialistes et régicides Japonais," A. Maybon sketches, with special reference to the data in M. Ludovic Naudeau's *Japon Moderne* and Count Okuma's recent work on Japanese history during the past fifty years, the origin and development of socialism, etc., in Japan. Okuma's book has a chapter on the history of socialism by Professor Abe Isoo, of the University of Waseda. The socialists of Japan split up into a loyalist and a revolutionary party, from the latter of which came the regicidal plotters,—one of the individuals executed was Kōtoku, "popularizer of Marxism, a founder of the socialistic party, disciple and translator of Tolstoi and Kropotkin." The nomenclature of socialism and anarchy in Japan is of some interest. The term for "socialism" is *shakwai*; "anarchy," *museifu*; "revolution," *kakumei*. The word *shakwai* is derived from *sha* (society) and *k(w)ai* (union, society); *museifu* from *seifu* (government) and the negative or privative prefix *mu*; *sei* is the radical for "government," "politics," etc.

48. *South Teutonic and North Teutonic Sagadom.* Under the title, "Ragnacharius von Cambrai," in the *Mitteilungen d. Schlesischen Ges. f. Volkskunde* (vol. 13-14, 1911-1912, pp. 121-154), Dr. G. Neckel compares the data in Gregory of Tours' *Historia Francorum* with North Teutonic and Scandinavian *saga*-material. In a way, Gregory "supplies the missing South Teutonic *saga*." There is much interesting *rapprochement* between the Merovingian sovereigns and the vikings. The tale related by Gregory in most detail is that of Ragnacharius of Cambrai, whose character and "doings," Dr. Neckel compares particularly with the Scandinavian Hroerekr, Huggleikr, and the viking Eysteinn, son of Haraldr gilli (1142-1157).
49. *Symbolism in Petrarch.* In an article, "The Symbolism of Petrarch's Canzone to the Virgin: A Comparative Study," in *The Romanic Review* (vol. 2, 1911, pp. 32-53), Francis W. Snow finds that "the whole symbolism, studied in the present article, fused what is in essence a religious *alba* with an elegiac expression of his purely worldly grief arising from his love for Laura." And, "in the formation of this synthetically remarkable *canzone*, Bible, Apocalypse, the homilies and comments of the Fathers of the Latin church; the early Latin hymnal; the Provençal religious *albas*, have all, in ratios not certainly determined, had their share." The author is of opinion that the last two of these, five sources "have never, either by the *canzone*'s commentators, from the oldest to the most modern, or by special investigators of the religious symbolism *per se*, received the recognition which is their due." For the author "Petrarch's *canzone* to the Virgin . . . seems to represent, from the aspect at least of genius, the culminating point in the long and complex development of the religious symbol." The symbolism forming the nucleus of religious hymns and *albas* (morning hymns) is in brief:
1. *God*: the great Universal Light.
 2. *Mary*: light in general; specifically Dawn; sometimes, (a) Lucifer, (b) Stella Maris.
 3. *Christ*: the Day; by confusion, (a) Lucifer, (b) Dawn, (c) the Sun itself.
 4. *Satan*: Sin; Night; Sleep.

The author seems to be the first to have pointed out that "Petrarch's magnificent invocation to the Virgin, in the high and solemn beauty of which the mystic and essentially medieval side of the poets' complex nature finds eloquent expression, contains the same symbolism as that on which the early Christian hymnists based their morning hymns; which forms the nucleus of the 10th century bilingual *alba* discovered by Johann Schmidt in the Vatican Library in 1881; and which was utilized by Folquet de Marselha (if the attribution be reliable) and his successors in this field, as a nucleus for the production of the psychologically interesting, and, to certain temperaments, esthetically pleasing religious *albas* of the 12th and 13th centuries in Provence."